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Abstract 
 The present thesis makes a twofold contribution to the existing 
literature. Firstly, it shows that clientelism complements cartelization, 
providing parties with stability in condition of weak mass mobilization. 
Secondly, it traces the specific mechanisms through which cartel parties 
channel public resources, within the institutional setting of the post-communist 
Europe. It provides an important extension to the cartel party literature in the 
context of new democracies.  
 The main finding of this project is that cartel parties can survive and 
achieve stability through clientelistic distribution of benefits, both within, and 
outside their organisations. Furthermore, I find that cartelization generates a 
new model of clientelism, as public resources (e.g. procurement contracts) are 
also used to finance the party organisations, not only the clients. Through the 
in-depth case study of Romania, we can see that when political parties have 
little time to develop territorial networks and mobilization capacity, clientelism 
becomes an effective tool for establishing roots in society. The context of 
post-communist countries presents distinctive conditions for clientelistic 
linkages and the cartelization process. Multi-party systems in these countries 
have reappeared simultaneously with the institutions of the democratic state. 
Consequently, party-state interpenetration has been more profound, building 
upon previous legacies, as well as the permissive transitional circumstances.  
 The present thesis analyses the following sequences of clientelistic 
exchanges: (1) internal party selection – patrons within the party 
organisations, (2) party patronage – political interference in public institutions, 
(3) politicization—political appointments in key positions of the Central 
Government (i.e. Senior Civil Servants), and finally (4) preferential resource 
allocation—public funding channelled through party networks. In addition to 
the chapters devoted to each of these clientelistic mechanisms, the thesis 
also contains a comparative chapter overseeing the challenges and 
opportunities for clientelism and cartelization in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE).  
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Introduction  
Concepts, Theory and Research Question 
European political parties are currently facing a series of challenges to their 
survival. This thesis deals with the key problem of the parties’ weakening links 
with society leading to a decline in mass mobilization. The weakening ties with 
society are reflected in the lowering levels of party membership, and high 
electoral volatility—especially due to new competitors. Consequently, political 
organizations are not only facing challenges of electoral mobilization, but also 
of financing their current activities, which previously came from membership 
fees and contributions. Furthermore, constraints from outside the organization 
include regulation of political activities (e.g. campaign funding, internal party 
selection mechanisms) and administrative reforms aimed at depoliticizing the 
state—often a marked change in European post-communist democracies. 
Addressing an existing gap in the literature, the research question 
addressed here is: How can a stable political party system emerge in a 
post-communist setting given the weakness of mass mobilization? For 
this research question, Romania is a good case study, as it has relatively 
stable party system (more so than most other post-communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)), with regard to the three big players: PSD, 
PDL, and PNL. These three parties also have a relatively clear development 
trajectory: PSD and PDL (the former more than the latter) stem from the 
National Salvation Front, a communist successor party; the PSD has a 
relatively clear ideological and sociological profile, and the PNL is a historic 
party, with a clear sociological and ideological profile. Given this context, this 
thesis argues that the stable party system in Romania emerged because of 
the development of the cartel system. The present thesis analyses how the 
process of cartelization can stabilize a party system and increase the survival 
chances of established parties, when complemented by clientelistic linkages. 
The process of political cartelization involves both the anchoring of the 
parties within the state (as opposed to an anchoring in society), and an 
agreement between the main competitors to enhance their chances of 
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survival (much like the economic cartels). Clientelism can substitute the 
diminishing capacity of political organizations to achieve mass mobilization.  
As informal channels of resource distribution, when deployed in a consistent 
and predictable manner, clientelistic networks can create the same effect of 
voters alignment as policy measures benefiting a specific electoral group. In 
the context of new democracies, these channels become embedded in the 
cartel party system, which grants them increased and continuous access to 
public resources. As such, they can effectively contribute to the latter’s 
survival on the long term. 
Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) developed the cartel party model in 
response to the same puzzle: how can we explain the continuing relative 
stability of party systems in Western Europe, given the weakening ties 
between parties and society? Their answer was the stability generated by 
party-state inter-penetration and inter-party collusion. However, the survival of 
cartel parties is a persistent puzzle given their continuous reliance on limited 
resources (Hopkin 2002, Bolleyer 2009). 
Cartel parties thus remain exposed to this dual challenge of developing 
networks to substitute their lost (or previously non existing) organizational 
capacity, and to ensure alternative funding. We have partial answers to these 
challenges in the existing literature on cartel parties. On one hand, a 
detachment of the party leadership from the lower ranks of the party would 
diminish the need to develop the territorial organizations (Koole 1996, Carthy 
2004, Bolleyer 2011). But, this leaves them vulnerable to new competitors 
employing mobilizing electoral promises, such as populist or extremist parties. 
On the other hand, public funding is seen as a solution to the financing 
challenges (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007, Casal Bertoa and Kopecky 2014, 
Van Biezen and Napel 2014). Once again, this leaves them vulnerable to 
governmental monitoring and increased public scrutiny on internal party 
affairs (e.g. candidate selection procedures, appointment criteria). 
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the emergence of a stable party 
system is even more of a puzzle than in Western Europe, given how the new 
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parties in CEE are and how weak their links to society are. In contrast, in 
European new democracies, clientelism is much better established as an 
informal linkage mechanism, employed by parties across the political 
spectrum. In this context, it can play an important role in hedging against the 
potential threats to the cartel party. By establishing a territorial presence, and 
a means of conditional mobilization, clientelism can provide a solution to the 
fact that “regardless of the strategy employed, cartels invite challengers” 
(Blyth et al 2010:14, see also Koole 1996:508). 
Several criticisms emerged with regards to this theoretical framework. 
On one hand, the path to cartelization is not clearly mapped out, as cartel 
parties form in different contexts, in different ways (Detterbeck 2005). On the 
other hand, the distinctiveness of the cartel party model was challenged, as it 
does not necessarily mark an abrupt change of parties’ relation to the state, 
given that patronage and clientelism can be traced to previous party models 
as well (Kitschelt 2000). While accounting for such conceptual limitations, the 
cartel party model continues to be the best theoretical option we have to 
frame the study of contemporary party organizations. The present thesis 
attempts to extend the model to the context of post-communist party systems 
in Europe. 
The evolution of political parties in Europe has been heavily contingent 
upon the circumstances of their formation and the institutional conditions in 
which they subsequently developed. Political parties in new democracies went 
through a different process of genesis, within a vastly different context than 
their Western counterparts (Van Biezen 2003). Given the much poorer 
institutionalization of the party system in these countries, their current stability 
is surprising. This comes up when we look at the electoral volatility of all 
stable parties (i.e. those above the threshold for inclusion in the political 
system over two consecutive elections) (Powell and Tucker 2014, Crabtree 
and Golder 2016). Thus, focusing solely on the very low scores of electoral 
volatility of the main political competitors (Powell and Tucker 2014, see Table 
1), we find them quite stable in the CEE context.  
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Within the subset of post-communist countries, we find a weaker state 
apparatus, as a result of the Communist Party symbiosis with the state 
(Dimitrov et al 2006, O’Dwyer 2006, Grzymala-Busse 2007). The cartel party 
model gains distinctive empirical substance in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), given the simultaneous development of the multi-party system and the 
new administrative institutions. The permissiveness of the institutional system, 
as well as the poorly developed regulation of political activities left parties in a 
privileged position to deploy state capture. Parties in office subsequently built 
an institutional framework that would continue to allow informal linkage 
systems to persist decades after the initial transition (e.g. patronage, 
politicization, preferential allocation of public goods and services). 
Unlike in Southern new democracies, clientelistic networks in CEE are 
generally an integral part of the political organization, be they inherited—in the 
case of successor parties, or subsequently developed by parties in office. I 
argue that the interpenetration between the party and state made clientelism a 
genuine solution for developing the organizational capacity, and a response to 
the weakness of mass mobilization. Through clientelistic networks, public 
resources could thus be channeled along party lines. 
Given such a systematic informal deployment of public resources, 
clientelism empowered cartel parties in a way that would not have been 
possible to parties in old democracies. The latter were subjected to a much 
better institutionalized and less flexible administrative system at the time of 
their formation. This distinction between the administrative permissiveness in 
old and new democracies follows Shefter’s argument that the timing of 
bureaucratization explains why certain parties employ informal linkages 
(Shefter 1994). 
Clientelism is a political phenomenon that involves the informal 
exchange of goods and services for political support. The clientelistic 
networks’ ability to extract and distribute resources, on a large scale, is 
essential to the survival of the patron political organizations, nowadays. It is 
important to note that clientelistic exchanges are mainly distinguishable from 
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any other social democratic or populist policy measure (designed for electoral 
mobilization) by the informal manner in which the benefits are transferred. As 
Simona Piattoni suggests: „politics is inherently particularistic and what makes 
the difference is how particular interests are presented, promoted, and 
aggregated” (2001:3, emphasis in original, see also Roninger 2004:360). 
Thus, clientelism is essentially an informal system of interest representation 
and partial mobilization; its success is reliant on unhindered access to public 
resources—which is optimally achieved within a political cartel. 
In the existing literature, we find only general comparative overviews of 
cartel parties’ reactions to the challenges they face (e.g. public funding, 
stratification of party organizations). Little attention has been paid to the 
specific mechanisms and conditions that allow cartel parties to survive over 
multiple electoral cycles. Even more so, the distinctive traits of old political 
parties vs. new political parties in Europe remain largely unaccounted for. 
Methodology 
This thesis explores the informal linkage mechanisms between political 
parties, central and local structures of government, and society—clients or 
brokers. The present study is focused on the process of state capture, and the 
systems of informal resource distribution. Process tracing analysis allows us 
to see how political parties in post-communist countries remain, or become, 
embedded in the state, even after the transition period. This enquiry is 
important not only from the perspective of state capture, but also on the 
implications it has for the party system and political organizations. Within the 
present research project I develop an in-depth analysis of how the clientelistic 
linkages can develop the organizational capacity of a cartel party. 
Given that clientelistic exchanges operate obscurely, assessing the 
extent of the transferred goods and services, as well as who the final 
beneficiaries are often requires proxy measures (e.g. number of 
appointments/dismissals, funds transferred outside main budgetary chapters). 
Through data triangulation, and comparative assessment of the linkage 
mechanisms employed by the main Romanian parties, I can account for the 
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overall orientation of their deployment. A reliable perspective on the 
predominant goal of their deployment (i.e. fueling the party’s roots in society 
vs. self-interested exploitation) is developed through in-depth evaluations of 
each sequence of such informal transactions. While state capture may also 
accommodate private gains, I argue that the clientelistic phenomenon 
presented here is more complex than state capture. The mechanisms 
employed to informally distribute the captured resources (e.g. transfers to 
local governments, party donations) are highly indicative of the extent to 
which clientelism develops the patron organizations. 
Sequences of clientelistic exchanges analyzed in the present thesis 
are: (1) internal party selection – who are the patrons within the party 
organizations, (2) party patronage – projections of political power on public 
institutions, (3) politicization—political appointments in key positions of the 
Central Government (i.e. Senior Civil Servants), and finally (4) preferential 
resource allocation—public funding channeled through party networks. 
Conceptual Delimitations 
Both party patronage and politicization reflect the degree of party-state 
interpenetration. While politicization has been regarded in other studies as a 
component of political patronage (see for example Meyer-Sahling 2012), I 
conceptually distinguish the two, to zoom in on mechanisms of public 
resources extraction. Party patronage involves political appointments in public 
institutions, many of which fall under the prerogatives of elected parties in 
office. This is why I refer to it as a projection of political power on the public 
sector. This does not necessarily involve the clientelistic channeling of public 
resources. Politicization (i.e. political appointments in key civil service 
positions) is treated separately in this thesis, as it presses upon the 
formal/legal separation between the political and the administrative functions 
of the state. It can therefore be more closely linked to state capture than party 
patronage, as the rank of the appointments can easily lead to proprietary use 
of state resources . This thesis focuses on linkage mechanisms embedded 
within different, but inter-linked informal phenomena. 
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 Another conceptual distinction that informs the present methodology 
deals with the units of observation. The cartel party literature does not provide 
us with clear-cut distinctions between the cartel party and a cartel party 
system. More specifically, we do not generally have the empirical possibility to 
analyze cartel parties as independent units. Explicit criticism in this regard 
was formulated against the cartel party as a dominant typology: „a systemic 
property (a cartel at the level of the party system) should not be used to 
characterize individual parties” (Koole 1996: 508, emphasis in original). 
Rather, we find that cartel parties belong to a cartelized party system, 
characterized by: party-state interpenetration, and inter-party collusion (Katz 
and Mair 1995). Therefore, this thesis reveals linkage mechanisms belonging 
to the Romanian party system as a whole; within a cartelized party system, 
clientelism is deployed by all parties. There are slight variations in terms of the 
specific clientelistic tools (e.g. distribution of consumer goods vs. preferential 
regulatory rules) or in terms of their effectives (i.e. delivering electoral 
victories).  Still, overall the evidence presented here does indeed confirm that 
all the main parties are employing informal exchanges to strengthen their 
organizations. 
Most of the empirical data collected in this thesis is focused on the 
forms, outputs and outcomes of the party-state interpenetration, as the main 
element of variation within the cartel party model. Looking at the existing case 
studies of cartelization in the United Kingdom, Sweden and United States 
(Blyth and Katz 2005), or Ireland (Bolleyer 2011) we can easily see that 
collusion between parties is an implicit element of party-state interpenetration. 
Furthermore, it is within the party-state interpenetration that we also find one 
of the most significant distinguishing elements of the cartel model from 
previous typologies: the heavy reliance on capital intensive strategies of 
mobilization. 
Placing the Analysis in Time and Space 
 The timeframe of the research covers the entire post-communist 
period, since the transition to democracy, until present day. It also traces 
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some of the communist lineages in terms of party organizations, and 
administrative structures. Certain categories of empirical data do not cover the 
entire post-communist period (e.g. civil service appointments, party 
membership, party donations, funding allocations). This is due to: the 
sequential implementation of administrative reforms, and the late introduction 
of the legislative provisions on public access to some of the relevant data. 
Whenever the official records permitted it, we have assembled a systematic 
collection of data for as wide a period as possible. Essentially, as the research 
question is addressed through a qualitative framework, even the absence of 
data over certain periods of time is informative to the topic. The more opaque 
the appointment procedures or funding decision are, the more likely it is they 
are done in a discretionary manner. 
Given the need to conduct in-depth research on the linkage 
mechanisms that embed parties within the state, and allow them to 
discretionary channel public resources, this thesis employs a single case 
study. Such an in-depth research allows us to trace alternative routes of 
electoral mobilization, as well as the implications of informal exchanges. 
Therefore, Romania serves as the selected case study meant to provide 
insights into the utility of clientelism to cartels, and to showcase their 
symbiosis in the context of CEE party systems. 
There have been some notable comparative studies on the extent to 
which parties in Central and Eastern Europe develop a high dependency on 
extracting resources from the state (see for example Kopecky 2006, Van 
Biezen and Kopecky 2007, Grzymala-Busse 2007, Grzymala-Busse 2008, 
Kopecky et al 2012, Van Biezen and Kopecky 2014, Innes 2014). A 
particularly prominent study in this regard is Anna Grzymala-Busse’s 2007 
book on party competition and state exploitation in post-communist 
democracies, which together with her 2008 article on clientelism and state 
capture lay the foundations of conceptualizing the complementarity between 
cartelization and clientelism. Still, Romania is not covered by any of these 
studies: 
	 20	
“The striking omission from Grzymala-Busse’s study is 
Romania; a particular surprise especially in light of the lack 
of regulatory reform and the cronyism and patronage of the 
early 1990s under President Ion Iliescu (Gallagher, 2005). 
Indeed, given the lack of ‘robust competition’ in this period 
one would expect it would bolster Grzymala-Busse’s case 
considerably” (Haughton 2008:488).”  
I argue that the Romanian case study not only bolsters Grzymala-
Busse’s argument that the lack of robust competition leaves way for state 
exploitation and clientelism, but it also allows us to further nuance this 
argument. The case study of Romania illustrates the cartel party model 
through party-state interpenetration via state capture, as opposed to the 
majority of studies on cartelization in CEE that focused on party funding. 
Romania also illustrates well the inter-party collusion via weak representation 
or contestation from the opposition (Evans and Whitefield 1993, Innes 2002, 
Hanley and Sikk 2016), gerrymandering (Giugal et al 2017) and electoral 
legislation that safeguards the status quo (Marian and King 2010, Radu and 
Buti 2015). In the contextual determinants of CEE, the Romanian case study 
shows not only how weak opposition leaves way for clientelism, but also how 
state capture and clientelism interact to achieve political stability. This has not 
been reflected in the literature before.  
Data Collection 
Empirical evidence is collected in this thesis from various sources: face 
to face interviews, archival research and official documents, statistical data 
and various secondary sources. The 50 interviews that informed the present 
research were conducted at different stages of the research. I started by 
identifying relevant experts from public records and contacted them via email 
or phone. Subsequently, I employed the snow-balling technique, asking each 
respondent to recommend other persons with whom I should talk to regarding 
the particular topics of interest. The interviews can be broadly separated in 
two categories: those dealing with appointments in public office, and those 
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dealing with contracts and acquisitions. The topics overlapped at times, 
especially with regards to anecdotal illustrations, and also covered adjacent 
topics relevant to this thesis, depending on each interviewee’s profile and 
expertise. Because the fight against corruption has been prominent in the 
public debates in Romania, I encountered little difficulties in reaching 
respondents and obtaining expressive, illustrative answers.   
Out of the total number of interviews, 37 structured and semi-structured 
interviews replicated the methodology of the Party Patronage Index1 and 
targeted the following categories of expert respondents:	 academia, civil 
service, civil society, media, and party officials. Some of these interviews also 
comprised a semi-structured discussion of the traits of the civil service in 
Romania which helped me develop the foundations of the Rotation Index 
Methodology presented in Chapter 5. As the topic of the interviews was 
sensitive, especially for civil servants and party officials, every respondent had 
the option of answering anonymously. Most of the interviewees from this 
phase of the research did not solicit their names to be hidden, yet refused in 
general to be recorded and asked for my notes after transcription2.  
The rest of the 13 semi-structured interviews were spread across 
different years to help me understand the mechanisms through which political 
parties extract public resources to the benefit of their organizations. The main 
categories of respondents were: private contractors, public officials dealing 
with investment projects and/or public procurement, and political campaign 
staffers. In this category of respondents the majority preferred to remain 
anonymous, as the discussions involved descriptions of personal 
experiences, and procedural or legislative breaches.  
While the interviews were sufficiently numerous to enable me to 
reproduce the party patronage index for the Romanian case study (i.e. 
																																																								
1 Initially developed in Kopecky et al 2012, and subsequently extended to a larger set of 
cases in Kopecky et al 2016 
2 I also sent the manuscript of the peer-reviewed articles (Volintiru 2015, Gherghina and 
Volintiru 2017) that draw on these interview data to the interviewees before being published.  
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average scores for the 9 policy sectors, and depth of patronage at different 
institutional levels), their qualitative input was much more limited.  
The inherent subjectivity of respondents meant that every relevant 
answer had to be ascertained through additional empirical evidence (e.g. 
judicial prosecutions, own archival research, press coverage). Every 
reference to legislative provisions or procedural aspects was researched in-
depth subsequently. The assessment of political parties organization was 
based on various party documents (e.g. rules and regulations, manifestos). 
I have conducted a great number of additional conversations on the 
topics of interest (e.g. clientelistic mechanisms of distribution in the territory, 
party organisation and internal dynamics, private contractors and public 
procurement) that have provided me with valuable insights, but their nature 
was ‘off-the-record’ so I did not include them in Annex 4 (i.e. Interview List). 
Generally, all the interviews were a starting point, providing clues for further 
investigation and systematic analysis. 
For the purpose of the legislative analysis, I used the digital on-line 
repository iDrept3 which makes subsequent changes, or amendments visible 
in the text of each law and official decisions. The same repository allowed me 
to trace the evolution of the institutional framework: the development of new 
institutions and changes, through governmental decisions and subsequent 
laws. For appointment and dismissal decisions in the Central Government, I 
manually downloaded each Ministerial decision from the online repository of 
the national Parliament and from institutional archives. For various other 
pieces of information, I benefitted from the possibility to solicit information 
from the relevant authorities based on the provisions of the Law No 544/2001 
regarding free access to public information in Romania. I also used 
declassified reports on Romania from the Department of State4 to compile a 
broader picture on the transitioning circumstance in Romania.  
																																																								
3 http://idrept.ro, last accessed on 2.08.2016 
4 FOIA Request F-2011-04522 
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In terms of quantitative data, the series were often fragmented and 
required a compilation efforts (e.g. public funding), or had to be constructed 
from scratch (e.g. party donations, political affiliation of mayors). The datasets 
that composed some of the indexes used in this thesis (i.e. Index of Party 
Patronage, Democratic Accountability Dataset) were previously creates using 
expert surveys. Much like many other widely used democracy or governance 
indexes, they represent a perception-based assessment of each 
country’s/party’s relative positioning. While it is useful to have an overall 
perspective on the extent to which party patronage or clientelistic exchanges 
are used in Romania (in comparison to other countries) these can not be 
treated as hard measures of the phenomena under investigation and thus are 
treated as starting points for in-depth research and validation.   
The within case analysis developed here is aimed at unveiling the 
mechanisms that couple political cartelization and clientelistic distribution of 
goods and services. This means that a triangulation of data was necessary 
and the observable patterns in the data sets and indexes had to be 
contextualized within a process tracing analysis of party organizations and 
political choices, which allowed me to distinguish both macro- as well as 
micro- level elements of the phenomena of interest (George and Bennett 
2005: 206-216, Munck 2004:108-112). Such a mechanism-focused analysis 
allowed me to assess the outcomes of such practices at the intra-party and 
party system levels, as well as their impact on institutional processes.  
The risk of reaching narrow or idiosyncratic findings is managed and 
(hopefully) avoided by looking at processes that have or can be explored in 
the context of other European post-communist case studies. I address the 
extent to which the current findings can travel in the region through the 
comparative analysis in chapter 2. 
Case Selection 
The Romanian case study illustrates the underpinnings of  how the 
party-state interpenetration was maintained and developed in the post-
communist period, successfully transitioning from the one-party state, to a 
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multiparty system. It provides us with ample opportunity to explore the role 
clientelism can have within cartel parties in new democracies. The size of its 
administration, as well as its economy, territory, and population, all allow us to 
develop a multi-layered analysis of clientelistic linkage mechanisms—at the 
central and local government levels, both within the party organizations and 
outside them (e.g. linkages with private contractors) etc. 
Firstly, the selection criteria are focused on the Romanian political 
parties—as employers of clientelism and promoters of cartelization. The 
emerging successor party—the National Salvation Front (FSN), comprising its 
subsequent versions (i.e. PDSR, PSD), was the most successful example of 
its kind in CEE post-communist democracies (Tismaneanu 2003, Gallagher 
2005, Gledhill and King 2008). Not only did it manage to win the first electoral 
rounds, but it also managed to remain competitive on the national political 
scene, as the biggest political force—measured in members and territorial 
capacity, returning periodically to power. Its electoral volatility has been 
relatively low, judging by the changes in their vote share, as they score 
around 35%, for list-based electoral competitions, either at the local (e.g. 
county or local council), or legislative elections (e.g. House of Representatives 
or Senate). 
The main competitor—the Democratic Party (PD) that would later 
become the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) has its roots in the same 
successor party—National Salvation Front (FSN). In other words, two of the 
main political parties of the post-communist period emerged from the one-
party state lineage at the time of the transition. The National Liberal Party 
(PNL) is the only surviving historic party, and as such has a clear ideological 
profile, but has never managed to win a majority in Parliament on its own, and 
it was often a right-wing coalition partner. 
Important to note, a further argument in support of the stabilizing role 
clientelism plays in consolidating cartel parties: there is no noticeable 
extremist or fringe party in Romania. Sean Hanley and Allan Sikk note that no 
anti-establishment parties have materialized in Romania, which they relate to 
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“markedly low level of democratic freedoms (...) compared to other EU states 
(as indicated by Freedom House political rights and press freedom scores)” 
(2016:524). The nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) had a good 
electoral performance in 2000, driven mostly by the charisma of its leader, 
and weak competition from the right wing spectrum (given its high 
fragmentation at the time). It was thus a temporary opposition agent, which 
subsequently disintegrated. Subsequent attempts of extremist parties (e.g. 
United Romania Party (PRU)) have not been able to meet the Parliamentary 
threshold.  
The electoral stability of the mainstream parties in Romania under 
cartelization allows us to empirically evaluate the manner in which clientelistic 
linkages successfully preserve political parties’ roots in society. The literature 
explains how the narrowing policy space occupied by the cartel parties 
essentially invites challengers (e.g. populist parties, extremist parties) who 
can effectively pursue the electorate whose grievances remain unrepresented 
(Koole 1996, Blyth and Katz 2005, Blyth et al 2010). As we see the 
emergence of fringe alternatives across Europe, the Romanian case becomes 
an essential illustration of the conditions under which the cartel party system 
can fend off such competitors. When effectively deployed, the clientelistic 
system hedges the mainstream political cartel against outsiders. 
On the other hand, the selection criteria of the Romanian case study is 
based on the institutional development of the state—as the main object of the 
investigated phenomena of clientelism and cartelization (through party-state 
interpenetration). The single case study approach is informed by the 
consideration that Romania has certain distinctive traits, both in terms of the 
sultanistic nature of the Communist Rule (Linz and Stepan 1996), and the 
violent nature of its transition. These traits make it an illustrative case for the 
intersection of the clientelistic phenomenon and the cartelization of political 
parties. 
The Romanian Revolution was paradoxical in its nature as it preserved 
an entire echelon of political elites in power, while being also the bloodiest in 
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the Eastern Europe (Tismaneanu 2003, Gledhill 2011/2012, Stan and Vancea 
2015). In contrast, the rapid proliferation of political parties “brought about a 
weak form of pluralism that was not conducive to genuine political competition 
(...) new political parties had weak constituencies, little grass-roots support, 
and lacked well-defined doctrines and internal discipline” (Stan and Vancea 
2015:15). The strong position of the successor party from an organizational 
point of view, as well as the need for social stabilization in the face of 
repeated violent confrontations (i.e. Mineriade) ensured an elite continuity in 
the administrative and political systems - the nomeklatura  (Light and 
Phinnemore 2001, Grosescu 2004, Gledhill and King 2008). While the 
alternation in power, and liberalization reforms slowly started to take shape, 
the initial circumstances of the birth of the post-democratic party system 
ensured the continuity of many of the informal/party linkages with 
administrative structures that characterized the old regime. 
In conclusion, the selection of the Romanian case study fits the 
‘extreme’ case study typology (Gerring 2007: 86-109, Seawright and Gerring 
2008: 297, 301-302) with regards to clientelistic mechanisms. For the extreme 
case study “it is the rareness of the value that makes a case valuable” 
(Seawright  and Gerring 2008: 301). As the topic of this thesis’ inquiry the 
stability of the major Romanian parties is remarkable, given that it is the 
lowest in the region based on the electoral volatility data of Powell and Tucker 
(2013) (see Table 1 in Chapter 2). The stability of the major Romanian parties 
(Preda 2016) coupled with the fact that it is the only post-communist 
European democracy with no successful extremist or anti-establishment party 
(Hanley and Sikk 2016: 524) reflect the rareness of this case study.  
The selection of the case study based on the traits of the dimension of 
interest (i.e. party stability) is in apparent contradiction with the usual selection 
methods that argue against selecting on the dependent variable (see Geddes 
1990, Collier et al 2004). Still, I do not claim that Romania is a representative 
case study for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). As mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, it has distinctive traits both in terms of the trajectory of 
its political parties, and in terms of the context in which these parties 
	 27	
appeared (i.e. transitional circumstances) and evolved. It has however a 
strong explanatory power of how the coupling of cartelization with large-scale 
informal distribution channels (i.e. clientelism) can contribute to party survival. 
As suggested by Seawright and Gerring, as long as we do not ignore the full 
range variation of the population of interest (in this case post-communist 
political parties) and retain them as points of reference in the analysis, sample 
bias is unlikely to affect the findings (2008:301-302)  
Relevance of the Research 
The current relative stability of CEE party systems is a puzzle, in view 
of their weak links with society. The case study of Romania allows us to 
explore the interaction between clientelistic linkages and cartelization, as well 
as to validate the causal mechanisms through which cartelized party systems 
maintain their roots in society, effectively preventing outside challengers. Most 
of the described mechanisms of intersection between political interests and 
clientelistic solutions are not idiosyncratic, as they can be traced to the 
challenges and opportunities faced by all post-communist parties in Europe. 
As such, the present research has a twofold relevance to wider 
academic debates: (1) it illustrates how clientelism complements cartelization 
providing parties with stability in the face of declining mass mobilization, and 
(2) reveals the specific mechanisms through which cartel parties channel 
public resources in a clientelistic manner, in the institutional context of new 
democracies. 
The political parties in this region faced similar organizational 
challenges—streaming both from the legacies of the previous party-state 
regime, as well as from the transitional circumstances. Recent comparative 
evaluations of the extent of such informal practices as clientelism (Kitschelt 
2015) or party patronage (Kopecky et al 2016) show that in larger datasets, 
CEE countries remain grouped around similarly high values. We have every 
reason to believe that similar structural interactions are at play across the 
region. Nevertheless, comparative overviews of informal linkages (e.g. 
Kitschelt 2015, Kopecky et al 2016) are mainly based on expert survey data. 
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They allow us only to understand the presence and perceived range of the 
phenomena, yet leave the specific linkage mechanisms involved largely 
unaccounted for.  
Romanian parties are much more likely to resort to clientelistic 
exchanges to achieve electoral success. As such, the expert surveys 
conducted under the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) 
(2011) show that Romania has the third highest regional score, after Bulgaria 
and Greece, for how much effort politicians and political parties make to 
induce voters with preferential benefits to cast favourable votes. Along these 
lines, the Romanian party system as a whole is judged to be steering major 
efforts in clientelistic exchanges, as opposed to more moderate stances taken 
by other European new democracy case studies, such as Spain, Portugal, or 
Italy. 
Therefore, an in-depth investigation in this case study of the different 
clientelistic linkages operating within cartel parties is informative on several 
accounts. Firstly, it allows us to understand when and how informal linkages 
distort public institutions. While it is usually referred to as a corrosive 
phenomenon, we do not generally have the insight on how exactly it erodes or 
distort the functions of the state. The present research elaborates on such 
specific instances as politicization of civil service, and political allocations. The 
supporting empirical evidence provides us with variation across institutions, 
and across parties, so that specific patterns of deployment emerge. Effective 
policy measures against wasteful spending or governmental corruption can 
only be based on such a thorough assessment of the informal institutional 
processes: how clientelistic networks tap into public resources, and what do 
they do with them. 
Cartelization and clientelism together make for mixed effects in terms 
of public support. On one hand, cartelization via state capture deprives 
citizens of public resources and creates a preferential or restrictive access to 
them. This in turn usually leads to popular discontent, which does not 
contribute to the patron’s party stability. Simply put, state capture can not buy 
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all the votes needed for survival. This is one of the main lines of argument in 
the literature regarding the inherent instability of the cartel.  
On the other hand, I argue that a nation-wide clientelistic system that 
ensure predictable while still informal or conditional exchanges contributes to 
the stability of the patron party. Highly illustrative to this point is the electoral 
context of the 2016 national elections in Romania when the Social Democrats 
(PSD) won a landslide majority in Parliament with over 45% of the public 
suffrage, only to face a month later the largest protest movement since the 
1989 revolution. Their social roots fueled by decades-long clientelistic 
exchanges ensured their victory, even though discretionary control over the 
state resources resulted in a predictable popular contestation. The cartel is 
further confirmed in this context, as none of the other major parties in 
Romania made a similarly forcible opposition.   
This avenue of investigation also helps us understand the iterative 
nature of a clientelistic system (e.g. state capture, informal distribution). Weak 
institutions for example lead to the development of an informal system of 
benefit distribution. Nevertheless, once such clientelistic channels are set up, 
they will continue to erode public institutions by extracting resources. A 
comparative overview would only reveal a context of poor institutional 
capacity, but not the continuous reinforcement of clientelism. Therefore, the 
present thesis is relevant to the wider debate on the source of institutional 
weakness. I argue that it is not driven by the clientelistic phenomenon, but 
exploited by it. 
Secondly, the in-depth case study allows us to see the composition of 
the clientelistic networks—who the patrons and clients actually are, and 
especially to account for co-opted members from outside the political party 
organization (i.e. civil servants, private contractors). By accounting for such 
third parties as private contractors, we are able to develop a new clientelistic 
model (Gherghina and Volintiru 2016)—one that portrays the alternative party 
financing mechanisms under the current organizational constrains. 
	 30	
Finally, one of the main unresolved issues regarding both clientelism 
and cartelization is whether they are effective electoral instruments. While 
impossible to disentangle their contribution to electoral victories in a single 
case study, it is much easier to understand their overlapping functions once 
we analyze both losing and winning candidates. As this thesis shows, 
electoral victory is only one of the outcomes targeted by clientelism. For cartel 
parties, clientelism serves both as a means to mobilize the electorate, but 
also, as a means to effectively control public institutions. 
In terms of long-term survival, the key target of clientelism is to fuel the 
party organizations. When the territorial network of the party is strong, the 
informal distribution system is in place, and parties in public office only need 
to maintain the flow of goods and services. Even parties with a weaker 
territorial presence benefit from deploying clientelism, as channeling funds in 
the territory helps them develop their own local organizations. Cartelization 
can ensure such a continuous access to public resources, but it also creates 
tensions between the different layers of the party organization. This is mainly 
due to the fact that cartel parties develop a stratarchy, as leaders detach 
themselves from the base. The present thesis shows how the stratarchy is 
counteracted by the clientelistic system, as hierarchical links are reinforced 
within the party to ensure the distribution of resources to local organizations 
and to the electorate. 
As the present research shows, tensions between central leadership 
and local organizations may arise as control over resources enhances. If local 
leaders control increasingly more public resources, they usually claim more 
decision-making power within the party (e.g. central government 
appointments), as it is they that take on the burden of financing electoral 
campaigns. If, on the other hand, the institutional context limits their access to 
public resources (e.g. strong opposition, legislative changes that restrict their 
budget or attributions), local leaders remain more dependent on the central 
leadership, and usually can not deliver electoral victories on their own. Most of 
the political parties in new democracies find themselves in this latter situation, 
as their territorial presence was scarce to begin with, and the institutional 
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context in these countries was sooner steered towards centralization than 
decentralization. In this aspect, it is only the successor parties, with their 
stronger territorial presence, that resemble Western cartel parties in their 
ability to create a franchise system. In support of the argument that clientelism 
is developing the organizational capacity of cartel parties I account for how 
and why power is distributed/shared between the center and the periphery of 
Romanian political parties. 
In terms of control over governmental institutions, under cartelization, 
parties in office have only limited control over the subordinated state 
apparatus, sharing it with coalition partners (e.g. political appointment 
algorithms). This thesis shows that even if the electoral outcomes are not 
always favourable, the utility of clientelism to cartel parties persists. Through a 
network of political appointments (i.e. party patronage), the clientelistic system 
allows parties to make full use of the party-state interpenetration. 
 The topic of this thesis (i.e. how clientelism complements cartelization) 
and the area of its study (i.e. CEE) is relevant to the wider debate on the 
survival of cartel parties, and means of mobilization. Linkage mechanisms can 
have a significant role in the functioning of the state apparatus (to the better, 
or to the worse). Charles Tilly argued in favour of their prominence in the 
political life: “relational mechanisms (e.g. brokerage) and environmental 
mechanisms (e.g. resource depletion) exert strong effects on political 
processes” (2001: 24-25). The informal linkage mechanisms (i.e. clientelistic 
exchanges, patronage networks) are even more important to explore in-depth, 
as they usually operate outside (not necessarily against) the prescriptions of 
the legal framework. The present thesis aims to address the fact that little light 
has been previously shed on the informal linkage mechanisms, the extent of 
their contingency, their purpose and utility for political parties that deploy 
them.  
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 develops the conceptual framing of the present research, 
and its anchoring in the existing literature. The main assertion of this thesis is 
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that clientelism can be a powerful substitute to the depreciated linkages cartel 
parties have with society, with their own party organizations, and a useful tool 
for extracting most advantages from party-state interpenetration. As 
clientelistic channels of distribution fuel the lower ranks of the party 
organizations, the party leaders and lower levels become brokers, and are 
able, to the extent of the clientelistic phenomenon, to maintain or develop 
roots in society. This counterbalances both the internal stratarchy of cartel 
parties, and their detachment from the electorate. But, for a cartel party to be 
able to create these clientelistic linkages it has to capitalize on party-state 
interpenetration. As such party appointments, and politicization are key 
means of controlling the public institutions, and consequently the funding 
allocations, and decision-making process.  
The conceptual linkages between clientelism and cartelization are 
placed against the background of European post-communist new 
democracies. It is in CEE that political parties faced specific organizational 
challenges, as most of the political actors were established at the same time 
as the multi-party system. Furthermore, it is within this specific context that 
political organizations were more readily able to deploy clientelism and party 
patronage because of two reasons. Firstly, there was a historical 
interpenetration between political elites and the administrative process within 
the single-party state. Secondly, within the transition to democracy, the public 
administration was either redesigned or newly created, leaving it more 
accessible to politicization than in the more established institutional system in 
Western Europe. It is especially because of this latter aspect that clientelism 
can contribute to the development or survival of cartel parties in CEE.  
The second chapter of this thesis develops a comparative overview of 
four Central and Eastern (CEE) new democracies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania. It looks at the political parties in each of the selected 
cases—formation and evolution, and the way their specific traits (i.e. 
organizational constraints, electoral competition) were conducive to the 
deployment of party patronage, or political appointments. It is within the 
specific context of CEE that the connections between party patronage and 
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politicization on one hand, and clientelistic channeling of public resources on 
the other hand can contribute to the development of political organizations.  
Furthermore, Chapter 2 develops a systematic comparison of the 
legislative and administrative framework of the selected case studies. This 
dual assessment from the political parties perspective, and from the public 
administration perspective is needed in order to reveal the specificities of the 
clientelistic mechanisms in CEE. In this sense, of particular significance is the 
distribution of power within the administrative apparatus. We can thus see the 
legislative and administrative reforms in CEE, over the course of the post-
communist period, as determining factors to the extent and utility of party 
patronage and politicization. This finding is supported by existing large 
comparative datasets (i.e. Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 
(DALP), Index of Party Patronage (IPP)) on the extent and form of clientelistic 
exchanges that are interpreted in this chapter.  
 The following chapters of the thesis develop the in-depth case study 
analysis of Romania. Chapter 3 explores the party organizations in Romania, 
and the internal power relations between the central leadership and the 
periphery. The formal (e.g. internal party regulation on leadership selection) 
and informal (e.g. influence in support a candidate) system of power sharing 
within the party organizations is highly significant to clientelistic exchanges. 
This chapter aims to assess who are the patrons in the clientelistic systems of 
exchange within the parties: central or local leaders? We thus can understand 
better who benefits from the political penetrations of the administrative 
system. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the internal party 
dynamics is frequently influenced by administrative reforms that alter the 
distribution of prerogative between Central Government (CG) and Local 
Governments (LGs). Therefore, this chapter is addressing the issue of who is 
accountable to whom—formally and informally, in the political parties’ internal 
clientelistic systems. 
 The following two chapters deal with the mechanisms through which 
political parties place loyal supporters, or party members in public jobs. 
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Chapter 4 develops an overview analysis of the public sector employment in 
Romania, and the opportunities and constraints of political appointments. It 
presents the original dataset for Romania based on the patronage index 
methodology (Kopecky et al 2012). The collected empirical dataset allows us 
to see cross-sectorial variation in party patronage, and an in-depth analysis is 
developed to explain these patterns. Based on the same expert survey 
assessment, we can also see the scope and depth of patronage within 
different administrative strata (e.g. ministries, non-departmental agencies or 
commissions, executing institutions). Party patronage is nevertheless a blunt 
tool, as it can be used both as an electoral or organizational resource 
(Kopecky et al 2012, see also Piattoni 2001, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), as 
well as an exploitation tool of personal enrichment (Volintiru 2015). Finally, the 
chapter provides an overview of the politicization mechanisms in Romania—
based on an original systematic analysis of all personnel appointments in 
Senior Civil Service positions. 
Finally, a conceptual distinction is made between the deployment of 
clientelism for functional purposes (i.e. winning elections, developing the party 
organization), and exploitative purposes (i.e. benefits concentrated around 
party elites). The separation between the two functions of clientelism is not 
clear-cut, and they are often co-existing, but we develop throughout the thesis 
in-depth qualitative assessments of who are the people composing the 
clientelistic linkages in Romania, and whether these are predominantly party 
connections, or personal networks. As clientelism can be seen as having a 
predominantly functional purpose, we nevertheless argue that in those 
instances in which a political party uses clientelistic mechanisms of public 
resource extraction without fueling the party organizations, then it becomes a 
counterproductive survival strategy. 
  Chapter 5 looks at key office-holders responsible for managing public 
resources. It provides a comparative analysis of the Romanian Senior Civil 
Service. The cases selected for this comparison are the Ministries with most 
personnel changes for Senior Civil Service positions: Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Administration, Ministry of Environment, and Ministry of Economy. 
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For the period 2005-2013, an original Rotation Index is developed to reflect 
the stability of appointees in Senior Civil Service position, and the variation 
across different ministerial mandates. The Rotation Index is used as a proxy 
indicator for politicization, or how much the politically appointed Minister affect 
changes on administrative personnel. 
 Chapter 6 shows the relevance of party patronage and politicization to 
clientelistic exchanges and electoral outcomes. There are two clientelistic 
linkage systems presented in this chapter. Firstly, public funds that are 
allocated along party lines to local governments. Secondly, central and local 
governments make discretionary allocations to private contractors, who in 
exchange become party donors. This latter clientelistic linkage is significant 
because it has never been explored in the literature before, and it is a new 
model of clientelism (Gherghina and Volintiru 2016). 
When linking the clientelistic practices of political parties in Romania to 
their electoral performance we see variation of outcomes across different 
administrative layers. At the level of the cities and communes that benefit from 
political allocations, we find that more than 70% of them managed to get 
reelected—suggesting a powerful role of proprietary spending in relatively 
small communities. Admittedly, the continuity of these political leaders in 
office is not influenced only by political allocations, but this analysis addressed 
the broader patterns of the functional utility of clientelistic mechanisms. On the 
other hand, we can see less than half of the county presidents managed to 
get reelected even if they were the ones that were negotiating the budgetary 
shares of various transfers and programmes for the localities.  
These county leaders or “local barons” apparently benefited less from 
preferential allocations because of two reasons. Firstly, the power distance 
towards them was higher, and consequently their patronage role towards the 
electorate was diluted. Secondly, they were the targets of opposition attacks 
with regards to preferential spending and political allocations. At the same 
time, as corruption cases unveiled for more than a quarter of county council 
presidents, their main goals in deploying clientelistic mechanisms were not as 
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much electoral, as they were exploitative. As our empirical focus is not on 
corruption, but on clientelism, the interesting fact about the links between 
political elites and private contractors is that the latter were used to transform 
public contract payments into party donations, thus fueling the political 
organizations with financial resources.  
Overall, this thesis is designed to address the puzzle of stable party 
systems in a post-communist setting (which faced much bigger challenges of 
party system consolidation) despite the weakness of mass mobilization. I 
argue that the first layer of stabilization for the newly formed parties was that 
of cartelization. As opposed to Western democracies, the party-state 
interpenetration in CEE was effectively achieved given its preexisting party-
state interpenetration under communism, as well as the favourable post-
communist political environment. The transition meant a simultaneous 
development of the multi-party system and the democratic state, which left the 
parties in office with considerable leverage over public institutions. Given 
cartels’ continuous access to public resources, clientelism thus becomes a 
powerful instrument of stabilization, as it can solve many of a cartel’s inherent 
challenges (e.g. funding, territorial presence, electoral mobilization).  
Within the propitious setting of the CEE, this thesis shows how 
clientelism provides a second layer of stabilization to the main political parties. 
The relevance of this research is that it shows how a weak administrative 
capacity (i.e. transitional circumstances) can lead to the consolidation of 
informal exchanges (e.g. political allocations, politicization of senior civil 
service jobs). Furthermore, it shows how the informal networks embedded 
within the state apparatus can ensure party financing solutions (i.e. public 
contractors making party donations). Finally, and most importantly, this thesis 
argues that the clientelistic exchanges within a cartel provide more than 
partial electoral mobilization: they consolidate its organization and develop 
roots in society.  	  
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Chapter 1. Clientelism – the Missing Ingredient of the 
Cartelization Model in New Democracies 
Clientelistic linkages can help cartel parties survive: when deployed 
systematically they become informal systems of redistribution, and anchor the 
party in society. They also provide a substitute for traditional measures of 
organizational strength (e.g. human and material resources). The cartelization 
process generates informal linkages on its own, even in the absence of 
clientelism, as it builds upon an interpenetration with the state. But, the 
emergence and development of a cartel party brings about the detachment of 
its leadership from the party base, and to a certain extent from the electorate 
as well. It is within this context that party patronage, politicization, and 
especially the clientelistic distribution of goods and services become useful to 
the electoral survival of a cartel party, in the longer term. 
Extensive theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the 
process of cartelization is driven by the weakening of political parties’ ties with 
society and this tendency has been covered in depth with case studies and 
comparative analysis of older democracies. However, it is much less clear 
why and how the cartelization process occurs in newer democracies—where 
political parties had very different paths of formation and evolution. 
Furthermore, insufficient studies to date show us how the cartel parties 
manage to survive successive electoral cycles in the absence of strong roots 
in society, and limited resources. 
This thesis responds to the following research question: How can a 
stable political party system emerge in a post-communist setting, given 
the weakness of mass mobilization? The process of cartelization provides 
a partial answer to this question, as it stabilizes the political parties by 
anchoring them in the state. In addition to this, I argue that clientelism serves 
as a supporting mechanism of cartelization. In this sense, the present thesis 
addresses the twofold puzzle of how political parties in new democracies have 
reproduced the cartel party model, and its subsequent survival. 
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Clientelism can play a stabilizing role in the development of a cartel 
party, both within the party organization—interlinking various strata of the 
political party, as well as outside it—interlinking the party with its institutional 
and societal counterparts. It can be an effective complement to the model of 
cartel parties typical of western Europe, as it recreates connections with the 
electorate and the lower ranks of the political parties. It uses the captured 
public resources to maintain political linkages with society. Clientelistic tools 
(i.e. party appointments, politicized administrative functions, discretionary 
resource allocation) can be used to extract public resources to the benefit of 
the party leaders, the party organizations or local bosses, and ultimately, the 
party members and supporters.  
1.1. Party Models, Evolutionary Challenges and Cartelization 
The literature on political parties has produced a series of typologies of party 
organizations. The most recent paradigm is the cartel party model. Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair (1995) put forward the cartel party model following a 
process of organizational transformation within the European political parties. 
It can be best characterized by a weakening of the parties’ linkages with 
society, and by the intensification of their relation with the state (Katz and Mair 
1995). This thesis builds on this typology, as it frames cartelization as the 
solution for both the organizational weakening of mainstream parties and the 
increased competition they face. It does not however appear to be stable due 
to its continuous reliance on state resources, and poor links with society. 
Where possible to systematically extract resources from the state (e.g. in the 
context of CEE post communist democracies) clientelism can reinforce the 
cartel party, by consolidating the internal party organization, and ensuring 
electoral support.  
Most of the initial typologies of political parties analyzed the level of 
inclusiveness within the organization, or the extent of the members’ 
involvement. Based on this consideration, Maurice Duverger (1954) made the 
famous distinction between cadre-party and mass party. With a similar logic, 
Neumann (1956) distinguished between the party of individual representation 
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and the party of mass representation. Both of these classic typologies are 
however constructed on the assumption that at least some political parties 
retain extensive organizations.  
Party politics scholarship later offered typologies that help us 
understand how contemporary parties have coped with/adapted to the demise 
of organizational capacity. Kirchheimer (1966) developed the catch-all party 
model in response to the ideological detachment of parties that no longer 
engaged with specific social cleavages. In conjuncture to the catch-all party 
model, Otto Kirschheimer developed some considerations on what he called 
the ‘state-party cartel’ looking at the increasingly weak or inexistent opposition 
in party systems and the ‘reduction of politics to mere management of the 
state’ in a paper written in German in 1954 (see Krouwel 2003:23-24)   
Panebianco (1988) puts forward the typology of the electoral-
professional party—relying heavily on external professionals in campaigning 
and communications for winning elections. This is an important step forward 
in conceptualizing contemporary parties whose internal weakness (i.e. 
decreasing membership, stratarchy, poor territorial presence) should have 
made them succumb according to previous prescriptions. Instead, old and 
new parties resort to external resources—either as campaign staff, or party 
donors. This is clearly illustrated in the business firm model, where internal 
party structures are loose “with technical tasks often ‘contracted out’ to 
external experts with no ties to the party” and “membership is also limited, 
with a high proportion of its members being officeholders who see the party as 
a vehicle for acquiring political positions” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999:133). 
Linked to the issue of organizational capacity, political parties also 
have to face the threat of competitors, especially in the context of weak mass 
mobilization. Addressing both the issue of organizational demise, and the 
issue of outside challengers, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) develop the cartel 
party model involving: party-state interpenetration and inter-party collusion. As 
such cartel parties become agents of the state, and no longer fulfill their 
brokerage function between the state and society (Katz and Mair 1995). This 
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is particularly important to the present thesis’ hypothesis that clientelism, 
which is essentially a brokerage mechanism, can fulfill some of the lost 
function of cartelized parties.  
Few theoretical models have been so expressive and largely supported 
by empirical evidence than the cartel party and its party-state interpenetration 
dimension. Systematic comparative empirical tests in old and new 
democracies (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2014), from both Europe and 
elsewhere (Blyth and Katz 2005, Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007) show that 
the model holds its relevance and explanatory power decades after its initial 
formulation.  
A wealth of studies illustrates the organizational weaknesses of 
contemporary political parties (i.e. party membership decline, narrowing 
programmatic appeal, financing) (Mair and Van Biezen 2001, Schmitter 2001, 
Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, Blyth and Katz 2005, Van Biezen et al 2012). 
Some of these organizational challenges are related to the simultaneous 
pressure of resource scarcity, and increased relevance of financial resources 
in electoral competitions. Consequently, political parties tend to increase their 
reliance on public funding (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, Pinto-Duschinsky 
2002, Hopkin 2004, Scarrow 2006, Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007, Van 
Biezen 2010, Haughton 2012, Casal Bertoa and Spirova 2017) or resort to 
state capture (Ganev 2007, Kopecky 2006, Muller 2006, Grzymala-Busse 
2007, Innes 2014, 2016). This latter aspect of state capture is particularly 
relevant in the poorly consolidated institutional context of post-communist 
European democracies.   
The initial theoretical statement of the party-state interpenetration 
within a cartel model by Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) has been 
subsequently nuanced in its rejoinder (Katz and Mair 1996), as well as its 
restatement in 2009 (Katz and Mair 2009). The 2009 restatement of the cartel 
party thesis defends the key traits of this ideal model and its empirical validity, 
while also expanding the initial considerations. Here the authors touch upon 
such aspects as the narrowing policy space—“increasing homogeneity of 
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experiences and expectations of the vast majority of citizens” and the 
inherently limited resources of the state (2009:758). It also integrates some of 
the previous limitations of the model in dealing with the international context of 
policy harmonization, increasing reliance on mass media and new 
technologies for campaigning (see criticism in Koole 1996), as well as the 
threat of defection from the cartel (see criticism in Kitschelt 2000).  
Poor differentiation through policy and platform in contemporary 
electoral competitions (i.e. narrowing policy space) is more widely considered 
in a complementary analysis of Mark Blyth and Richard Katz (2005) in which 
the political economy of the cartel is reviewed in consideration of policy 
resources rather than party subsidies. Blyth and Katz engage with the risk of 
defection as one of the main challenges to cartels (2005) in addition to the 
initial risk of new competitors (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009). According to their 
analysis, the fiscal limits of public budgets—as an inherent problem of catch-
all politics, transform “parties from maximizing competitors to risk averse 
colluders” (2005: 40), and thus diminish the risk of defection.    
While generally embraced as a useful ideal party type, some of the 
most prominent criticism to the cartel party model came shortly after its initial 
formulation, from Koole (1996) and others such as Beyme (1996) Kitchelt 
(2000), Detterbeck (2005), or Birnir (2010). The criticisms target what they 
believe to be too ambitious theoretical claims, and question whether the cartel 
party is indeed an evolution from the catch-all party, or whether it is simply a 
variation of existing party models.   
Ruud Koole quickly reacted to the initial formulation of the cartel party 
model by signaling out both theoretical and empirical limitations. Firstly5, 
Koole challenged the novelty and distinctiveness of the cartel model. He 
mentions to this effect previous studies portraying established parties 
collusion to keep new entrants out by Arend Lijphart’s analysis of the Dutch 
“kartel democratie” (1996:515). A similar criticism is also presented by Andre 																																																								
5 The order of the arguments varies between the abstract and the structure of Koole’s 1996 
article, as well as from the order in which they are addressed in the Katz and Mair 1996 
Rejoinder.   
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Krouwel regarding Otto Kirscheimer’s mention of the emergence of a “state-
party cartel” (2003:24).  
Still, the contested novelty of the terminology is less relevant than the 
novelty and validity of the analytical framework put forward by Katz and Mair’s 
model. They assert that the failing linkages between parties and (civil) society 
leave way to a rising prominence of the parties’ linkages with the state (1995: 
7-16). In contrast, Koole argues that the increase of state interventionism 
makes it much harder to discern an evolutionary pattern of parties moving 
away from civil society towards the state (509-514), as the state is essentially 
moving towards society. Similarly, Herbert Kitschelt critique of the cartel 
model targets “the continuing vitality of relations of representation” 
(2000:152). Kitschelt criticism is supported by some empirical studies. Lisa 
Young (1998) tested the cartelization of Canadian parties, and finds that 
although there is some collusion in ensuring access to public funding, the 
linkage between parties and society remains intact. Both Beyme (1996) and 
Detterbeck (2005) also question the linear evolution of major political parties 
towards forming a cartel and argue that there is consistent variation in the 
socio-political context of cartelization.  
In defense of their initial conceptualization, Katz and Mair point to the 
fact that their model did not engage in any way with the changing relationship 
between the state and society, but rather how this relationship (changeable as 
it may be) is mediated or not by the political parties (Katz and Mair 1996: 527-
528). As most empirical studies that subsequently applied this conceptual 
framing show, it is all about the resources. Cartel parties become heavily 
focused on the state rather than popular representation, as it is the state, and 
no longer the society, that supplies the most consistent share of their 
resources. Still, there is merit to the idea that parties survival can not be linked 
exclusively to state capture and collusion and some form of representation for 
internal (i.e. party members) and external (i.e. voters) principals has to exist 
(see Kitschelt 2000:151). To this point, the present thesis argues that 
clientelism serves as a substitute channel of informal representation in the 
case of cartel parties.  
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In the initial outline of the cartel party model, Richard Katz and Peter 
Mair have clearly ascribed it to a situation in which ‘colluding parties become 
agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to 
ensure their own collective survival’ (1995:5). This assertion has been 
challenged by Koole on the grounds of conceptual clarity: can a cartel party 
exists without a cartel of parties? Katz and Mair respond by explaining that 
cartelization involves both intra-party characteristics derived from the party-
state interpenetration, as well as party system characteristics derived from the 
inter-party collusion (1996: 526, and the initial argument 1995:17). Indeed, 
empirical studies show that in some cases we see cartelization at the party 
level (Bolleyer 2007), while in other cases, we see more indicators of 
cartelization at the party system level than within individual parties (see for 
example Krasovec and Haughton 2011).   
The present thesis builds the argument of the synergy between 
cartelization and clientelism on what I argue is the main characteristic of the 
cartel party model: party-state interpenetration. While Katz and Mair (1995, 
2009) see party-collusion as the means to ensure party-state interpenetration, 
it is nevertheless much more volatile than the gradual process of anchoring 
the parties within the state. The changing nature of the party collusion is 
driven by the wide variations in the competitive context in which parties exist, 
and while cartelization might be designed to keep new entrants out, 
sometimes it fails at doing so. This is exemplified by the current rise of anti-
establishment parties across Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2016) despite a 
consistent inter-penetration with the state of all major parties. Based on the 
empirical evidence collected here, we can see that party collusion is visible in 
Romania in political networks (see Chapters 4,5,6), in broad spending 
patterns (see Marian and King 2016), and also with regards to electoral 
legislation (see Giugal et al 2017). Still, ensuring the flow of resources from 
the state is the main and most consequential trait of cartelization in post-
communist societies.  
Ruud Koole’s final criticism of the cartel party model in empirical terms 
is the most resounding element. The success of cartel parties translated by 
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their ability to survive and win elections has been also questioned 
subsequently by several landmark studies on cartelization in Southern Europe 
(Hopkin 2002) or Western democracies (Blyth and Katz 2005). Indeed, in 
some cases, the organizationally challenged political parties rely on selective 
benefits to reward supporters and develop their territorial presence while in 
power, but are unable to do so while in opposition (see for example Bolleyer 
2007). Overall, the stability of the cartel parties and their long-term survival is 
a reasonable concern. In fact, it is in response to this very observation that the 
present thesis explores the (re)anchoring of cartel parties in society via 
clientelistic networks.  
While specifically laid out as a model of intra-party dynamics (see also 
Katz 2001), the empirical investigations on this dimension have only appeared 
more consistently in recent years. The initial formulation of the cartel party 
model casts a shadow of doubt on the perspectives of intra-party democracy 
and engagement with internal principals (i.e. members, activists). A series of 
studies have engaged with this issue in depth (Carty 2004, Sandri and 
Pauwels 2010, Bolleyer 2012, Loxbo 2013, Cross 2016) and the empirical 
evidence constrains the assumptions of gradual separation given complex 
inter-dependencies. This seems to support some of Kitschelt’s (2000) criticism 
on the conceptual side of the cartel party model.  Furthermore, the party-state 
interpenetration via public funding can also lead to an undesired statist 
interference in the internal life of parties through more intrusive regulation 
(Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007, Van Biezen and Rashkova 2014).  
Richard Katz and Peter Mair explicitly place their thesis within the 
context of Western democracies, where the weakening of ties between parties 
and civil society “was understood to be relative to expectations regarding the 
mass party of integration” (2009:754), and “whether one should expect ties 
also to weaken in cases in which they had never been particularly strong 
remained to be seen” (2009:754). Thus, one of the main question of the 
research area that is rooted in the cartel party thesis is: how far can it travel?  
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Previous studies have shown the extent to which the cartel party model 
can travel to the new democracies of Southern Europe (Hopkin 2012) or those 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Lewis 1998, Sikk 2003, Krasovec and 
Haughton 2011, Kopecky 2006). The present thesis is firmly rooted in the 
assumption that the cartel party model can be an even more expressive 
framing of political organisations in the setting of new democracies. I account 
in the following paragraphs for the elements that remain specific to older 
democracies and can not be transferred to new democratic contexts, and 
those that are specific to post-communist countries and strengthen the cartel 
party argument in a way Western democracies can not.   
As anticipated by Katz and Mair (2009) what can not travel from the 
context of old democracies to that of new European democracies is first and 
foremost the genealogy of the parties from agents of the society to agents of 
the state. Especially in the case of post-communist democracies, parties have 
been consolidated as agents of the state and attempted to transition reversely 
towards becoming agents of society “parties in these new democracies often 
originate within the state and reach out only minimally towards society” (Van 
Biezen and Kopecky 2007:237, for the same argument see Krasovec and 
Haughton 2011: 208). 
Secondly, it is much harder to assess locus of power in political parties 
in CEE. The detachment of the party leaders from the lower ranks is an 
essential aspect of the cartel party model in Western democracies. Katz and 
Mair structure internal party dynamics on three key dimensions: party on the 
ground (POG) (i.e. members and activists), party in central office (PCO) (i.e. 
national leadership of the party organisation), and party in public office (PPO) 
(i.e. Parliament or Government) (Katz and Mair 2009:756). In the post-
communist context, the party in public office (PPO) is often overlapping with 
the party in central office (PCO) and as such the dominance of the latter 
through cartelization is hard to assess (Van Biezen 2003, Haughton 2004, 
Dimitrov et al 2006, Krasovec and Haughton 2011).   
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There are some cartelization elements that can assigned specifically to 
the context of post-communist democracies. As such, the cartel party model is 
in fact particularly more relevant to the CEE parties because of historical 
party-state interpenetrations: “In terms of resources, these parties have 
actually never been anything other than cartel parties” (Krasovec and 
Haughton 2011:208). The reliance of political parties on public resources to 
reward supporters and fuel territorial organizations are more heavily 
developed in the context of the single party-state tradition. Generally 
speaking, Jonathan Hopkin observe that where “traditions of state 
interventionism meet weak parties, informal politics is likely to be a key 
component of party competition” (Hopkin 2012:201). 
Characterized by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi as a form of ‘competitive 
particularism’, Romania along with other CEE democracies display a poor 
distinction between public and private goods: “In these countries, the main 
funding for political parties is public, and the chief commodity of the campaign 
is not private money (still controlled by the state by various means) but rather 
administrative resources of every kind.” (2006:94). Consequently, the poor 
regulation and standardization of institutional procedures, leaves way to state 
capture where extractive or “entrepreneurial” party behaviour is not 
opportunistic but deliberately and systematically pursued (Innes 2014: 6).   
Studies dealing with the traits of cartelization in the CEE context have 
grown in recent years, ranging from larger comparative assessments focused 
on party resources derived in the context of party-state interpenetration (e.g. 
Lewis 1998, Van Biezen 2003, Kopecky 2006) to specific case studies dealing 
with the cartelization process in Slovenia (Krasovec and Haughton 2011), 
Czech Republic (Haughton 2012), Poland (Szczerbiak 2001), Estonia (Sikk 
2003, 2006), Russia (Hutcheson 2013). Additionally, while not explicitly about 
cartelization, for the Romanian case there are studies on parties’ reliance on 
public funding (see Gherghina et al 2011, Gherghina and Chiru 2013), as well 
as collusion between major parties to keep new entrants out (Giugal et al 
2017). The present thesis builds upon this line of research, by adding both a 
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widely overlooked case study, and a new conceptualization of the cartelization 
process in symbiosis with clientelistic linkages.  
As mentioned before, I argue that clientelism can play an important role 
in the development of a cartel party. Beyond the role of parties as agents of 
the state and their “increasingly shared purpose and identity”, Katz and Mair 
ascribe as a characteristic of the cartel parties “the ever more visible gap that 
separates them from the wider society” (2009:760). I argue that in the 
coupling of cartelization with clientelism the latter aspect is not necessarily a 
feature of the cartel party. In a context where informal exchanges are 
deployed systematically and to a large scale, the cartel becomes stable and 
embedded in those segments of the society that it clientelistically engages.  
Such a contribution of clientelism to the cartel party is determined by: 
(1) the nature of the challenges political parties faced when turning to 
cartelization, and (2) the challenges cartel parties face once they adopted this 
model. In terms of preexisting challenges that lead to cartelization, the 
literature reveals significant contextual variation between post-industrial 
societies and new democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, Gunther et al 
2002, Van Biezen 2003, White and Webb 2007). Of interest to the present 
analysis is especially the simultaneous development of multiparty system and 
democratic administrative institutions in the case of new democracies.  
1.1.1. Transitional Challenges in New Democracies 
New democracies exhibit wide distinctiveness from the “old”, Western 
countries, with regards to parties’ genesis and evolution (Panebianco 1988; 
Stark and Bruszt 1998; Van Biezen 2003; Blondel, Muller-Rommel and 
Malova 2007; Webb and White 2007). This distinctiveness emerges from two 
sets of conditions. On one hand, there is an evolutionary path charged with 
the historical political legacies: ‘old’ mentalities/perceptions/expectations have 
an important influence, even after the regime change, on the way the political 
linkages form. They shape the manner in which political parties connect to the 
electorate (i.e. informal linkages with the voters), and the manner in which 
they govern (i.e. political appointments in civil service). The imprint of the 
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Communist Party’s embedded relationship within the statist structures has left 
political parties with a persistent tendency to use state resources in a 
proprietary manner. Similarly, in the case of some of the territorially strong 
parties in Southern Europe, informal networks have been preexisting to the 
new democratic party system (Hopkin 2001, Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001, 
Trantidis 2014, D’Attoma 2016).  
On the other hand, we find the impact of the transitional process. In the 
new democracies of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and in Latin 
America, the change of regime implied a sudden shift to political competition 
and free elections. As the political system faced the significant challenge of 
fast-tracked institutionalization, the new political parties were constituted in a 
vastly different pace and timing from their Western counterparts (Van Biezen 
2003).  
The newly formed political parties thus had the opportunity to construct 
the new political system in a relatively unconstrained manner. In many of the 
post-communist new democracies, legislative provisions regulating the 
political competition, as well as the internal life of political parties, only came 
into force years after the first democratic election. Such institutional 
engineering continued throughout the following decades (Van Biezen 2003, 
Renwick 2010). It targeted the organizational architecture of the state, or 
various provisions regulating the political life—from the organization of 
elections to that of the governmental apparatus. Comparing various Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, much of the institutional engineering 
was the effect of elite collusion, within the process of cartelization. 
The opportunities of a newly created institutional system allowed 
parties to employ such clientelistic tactics as filling up numerous positions with 
their party members or supporters. For example, it was not until 2004 or 2002 
that legal provisions were adopted in Romania, and respectively the Czech 
Republic, to specifically delimitate administrative personnel from political 
appointments. The situation is similar in other CEE countries as well. Even 
when laws regulating civil service were adopted early in the transition period, 
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their provisions were vague or ambiguous, thus providing political actors with 
ample room for manoeuvre.   
The former communist parties were much more prone to systematic 
interpenetration between political and administrative systems, than the 
authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe. As such, the party-state 
relationship—a central element of cartelization, has a natural force of 
attraction to political actors educated and socialized in a communist system. 
The inherited weak administrative institutions—the “hollow crown” (Dimitrov et 
al 2006) only made state capture more feasible for cartel parties, and their 
clientelistic appointment strategies.  
In terms of constraints, for both successor parties, and newly 
established parties, their territorial presence or roots in society did not exist in 
an institutionalised, recognizable manner. Essential for the present analysis is 
how the newly established political parties maintained existing or developed 
new ties with the state (Van Biezen 2005, Dimitrov et al 2006, Grzymala-
Busse 2008, Van Biezen and Kopecky 2014). By becoming agents of the 
state, cartel political parties in new European democracies have ensured 
electoral success, but faced new challenges of weak territorial presence and 
potential contestation.  
The literature proposes various alternative explanations of the 
development path of the political parties in post-communist European 
democracies. While contextual determinants are generally analyzed together, 
seminal studies pick different focus points: nature of the communist regime, 
transitional choices, party organization or cleavage structure.   
Some consider the explanatory power of the previous regime traits 
(e.g. Kitschelt et al 1999, Pop-Eleches 2007). Most of these comparative 
studies tend to exclude the case study of Romania due to its distinctive form 
communism. Building on a previous conceptualization of Max Weber, Juan 
Linz has described the Romanian communism as a “sultanistic” regime (Linz 
and Stepan 1996, Chehabi and Linz 1998), „characterized by patronage, 
nepotism, cronyism, and corruption” (Huntington 1993:111). The patrimonial 
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and discretionary nature of this form of communism makes for a much more 
difficult institutionalization of administrative rules and formal practices. In 
contrast, as seen in the evidence presented here, in the aftermath of the 
dictatorship, the new ruling elites attempted to emulate the previous system of 
personalistic exchanges (Grosescu 2004).  
The Romanian communism relied predominantly on the figure of the 
leader Nicolae Ceaușescu and his family; they were not only representing the 
Communist Party and the Romanian state like predecessors (i.e. Petru Groza, 
Gheorghe Gherghiu Dej), but also themselves and their rule. This partial 
disambuguation allowed for a much more ambitious engagement in foreign 
affairs than other neighbouring communist leaders. It also meant the state 
apparatus developed with a relative autonomy from the doctrine and the wider 
regional trends. Vladimir Tismăneanu refers to the „successful utilization of 
Lenino-Stalinist party structure to reach absolute control over the whole of 
Romanian society” (1989:2, see also Tismăneanu 2003).  
While such „stalinistic” or „sultanistic” traits can be easily seen as a root 
of the democratic state capture and patrimonial control of public resources, we 
have no connecting mechanisms appart from the general inclination of the 
elites to resort to such practices. This is in fact one of the main weaknesses of 
the legacy-based arguments: they are not particularly persuasive in explaining 
subsequent change or strategic choices of replication (especially in the case 
of successor parties) (Haughton 2014: 218, for the same argument see also 
Hanley et al 2008, Haughton and Fisher 2008).   
Other studies focus mainly on the transitional choices of the successor 
parties (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2002). This assessment approach is made 
difficult in the Romanian case study by the confusion surrounding the power 
struggle that unfolded at the revolution and in the early years of transition. In 
other CEE countries the Communist Party had a much more structured 
presence, its factions thus known, and reformists easily traceable. In contrast, 
the Romanian successor parties had an uncertain positioning: 
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“Our Romanian contacts, however, have given us a 
number of speculative, sometimes conflicting, theories 
about what “really” happened. These include: an 
orchestrated plot by the Ministry of Interior and Securitate 
remnants to crush the opposition and regain its former 
preeminence, a plot to destabilize the security situation to 
prepare the way for a Ministry of Defense take-over; efforts 
by a pro-Iliescu front hardliners to intimidate the opposition 
or a move by anti-Iliescu hardliners to discredit him 
internally and abroad. A definitive version in the conspiracy 
laden environment of Romanian politics may never 
emerge. Although the more elaborate theories seem 
farfetched, anything is possible.” (Note 06723, Department 
of State, Bucharest Office). 
Furthermore, it was not only the revolution of ’89 that was marked by 
violent confrontations, but also the subsequent years. John Gledhill links 
these events to the “intense uncertainty about the form that the new regime 
might take and associated uncertainty about the distribution of power and the 
state funds” (2012:43, for a similar positioning see also Gledhill 2005). Alina 
Mungiu Pippidi characterized the dual nature of the Romanian revolution as 
an overlap between the one of the protesters and intellectuals wanting swift 
and extensive institutional reforms, and the one of the army, bureaucracy and 
general public wanting a nonconflictive gradual transition (2002:189). The 
latter one won, which in turn left an imprint on the structure of the institutions 
and the compositions of the political elites – both bearing many similarities to 
the status quo of the old regime. 
Beyond reform choices and political calculus, alternative explanations 
also link party (in)stability and overall performance to party organization: „the 
stronger the party organization, i.e., the more sizeable its membership, 
extensive its local presence, and professional its staff, the more successful is 
the party electorally” (Tavits 2012: 95). Central and Eastern Europe is far 
more receptive to the organizational strength of political parties than their 
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ideological positioning (Innes 2014). Still, their means of building this 
organizational capacity were more restricted than in the case of Western 
parties. Margit Tavits claims that „organization matters regardless of (...) 
access to pork or patronage” (2012: 95). While accurate as his assertion 
might be, it is incomplete. One can not ignore the fact that the access to 
public resources and patronage impacts directly the organizational capacity of 
a political party on at least two of his measured dimensions: network of local 
branches—whose utilities, rent, and other expenditure rely on party 
resources, and the ability to employ professional staff. As I show in the 
present thesis, these indicators of organizational capacity are often build on 
clientelistic pyramids.  
Borrowing from the classical theories of voters alignment and social 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Dalton 1988), another line of studies has 
attempted to identify their occurrence in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Representative contributions in this line of research went beyond the 
existence or absence of cleavages in a given society, but also enquired about 
of their nature (e.g. ideological, economic, religious, ethnic) (Evans and 
Whitefield 1993, Whitefield 2002, Tavits and Letki 2013) or the extent to which 
they overlap and thus reinforce party stability (Casal Bertoa 2014). As 
opposed to Western democracies where previous cleavage structures 
informed current one (see Kriesi 1997), in the context of post-communist 
countries there were no traceable differentiation patterns given the nature of 
the regime and its stated purpose of socio-economic homogenization.  
The Romanian case study provides us with little visible cleavages to 
explain support for certain political parties over others. As opposed to other 
countries in CEE, religious cleavages are not effective in Romania with over 
80% of the population sharing the Orthodox faith. Economic cleavages have 
been substantially increasing after the fall of communism across the region, 
and this might create a stronger mobilization for left wing parties that address 
them (see Tavits and Letki 2013). Still, in Romania they do not imply voters’ 
alignment patterns as poorer areas (measured by average income) will 
support either of the main parties with consistency, showing that roots in 
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societies—measured as size of the local organizations, are much stronger 
determinants of voting behaviour6 (see for the same argument Tavits 2012).   
In conclusion, most of these alternative explanations in the case of 
Romania either converge with the clientelistic exchanges and cartelization 
process (e.g. patrimonial nature of the communist regime, transitioning 
choices for survival), or they simply do not hold an explanatory value for the 
Romanian case study (e.g. cleavage structure). Furthermore, those elements 
that converge with the present model, only strengthen the selection strategy 
of the case study, as Romania presents itself as a remarkable case study 
both in terms of the only European “sultanistic” regime, and in terms of having 
the only violent transition. Finally, while there is amble evidence supporting 
the role of party organization for political survival (Tavits 2012), little is known 
of why some the post-communist parties have in fact managed to achieve a 
better organizational capacity. In this sense, the present thesis and its 
conceptual model can bring a modest contribution to the party organization 
literature.  
1.1.2. Challenges to the Survival of the Established Political 
Cartels 
One of the main challenges faced by cartel parties once established is 
that they are unstable entities with a limited survival chance in the long term. 
This is one of the main puzzles this thesis is addressing as it shows how 
clientelism can play a role in stabilizing cartels. Some of the existing studies 
(Hopkin 2002, Bolleyer 2009) explain: political parties are growing 
increasingly detached from society, without a steady popular base of support, 
and as such they remain dependent on their position in office, and the flow of 
state resources.  
What is similar in both old and new contexts is the general decrease in 
party membership, financing problems and increased electoral volatility. 
These can be either traits of the decay of party organizations in post-industrial 
societies, or emblems of poor institutionalization of the party system in new 																																																								
6 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/12/21/social-roots-romania-2016-election/  
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democracies (Katz and Mair 1995, Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, Mair and 
Van Biezen 2001, Gunther et al 2002, White and Webb 2007, Gherghina 
2014). Nevertheless, given the genesis of political parties in Central and 
Eastern Europe was different from the West (Van Biezen 2003) it is difficult to 
establish an accurate comparison between the two systems (see for the same 
argument Lewis 2000, Millard 2004).  
The clientelistic phenomenon is a natural complement to a party 
because it provides necessary support to face various challenges. Informal 
clientelistic distribution can mobilize political support from both internal 
agents—party members, and external agents—party supporters. If we 
account for a longer timeframe, cartel parties without extended clientelistic 
linkages can be easily contested in elections. Their main competitors will be 
new political actors that build upon the disenchantment of the electorate 
towards corrupt practices of incumbent parties. This is reflected in two 
measures of electoral volatility: how many parties have entered/exited the 
party system, and how much has the vote share of established parties 
diminished/changed. Stable cartels (i.e. able to resist contestation) should 
theoretically enjoy low values on the latter, as even if new competitors appear, 
they would not be able to cut from their electoral share. 
Recent datasets allow us to see how historically low levels of party 
system electoral volatility have started to increase in Western Europe, 
especially in the last two decades based on both new entrants (i.e. volatility by 
regeneration) and changes in the vote share of existing parties (i.e. volatility 
by alternation) (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015). With regards to Central 
and Eastern Europe, we find that an important component of the high volatility 
scores has been that of party system regeneration (i.e. parties entering or 
exiting) and not as much the changes in the vote share of the main parties 
(Powell and Tucker 2014).  
The Powell and Tucker study on drivers of electoral volatility in CEE 
(2014), as well as another recent calculation of electoral volatility at party level 
in CEE (Gherghina 2014:65) both concur on the fact that the main parties in 
	 55	
CEE have been remarkably stable. Amongst which, Romanian party systems 
scores the lowest electoral volatility in European post-communist 
democracies, with only 7 for the Type B volatility (i.e. based on vote switching) 
(Powell and Tucker 2014, see also in Table 1 in the present thesis).  
There are inherent limitations of the Pedersen Index of Volatility 
formula employed by Powell and Tucker regarding the aggregate view of the 
party system, yet not the specific party-level dynamics. They attempt to 
engage with this issue by disentangling the between different drivers of 
volatility (i.e. vote switch or party entry/exit). Still, it “offers only a partial 
resolution because it does not account for the component parts of the system 
or allow simultaneous comparisons across multiple elections” (Haughton and 
Deegan-Krause 2015: 62-63, for the same argument see Casal Bertoa et al 
2012 and Haughton 2014: 212). In response, Haughton and Deegan-Krause 
(2015) apply to Central and Eastern European democracies the Weighted 
Party Age Index (WPAI) developed by Kreuzer and Pettain (2003) for the 
Baltic countries which looks at the length of time since party establishment. 
This measure too confirms Romania as an extreme case “whose party system 
grew older by roughly one year for every year of its existence, suggesting 
extreme stability” (2015: 63).   
The extremely low score further supports the case selection for this 
study, as “although political systems with low levels of volatility can be stable 
and consistent, those with too little volatility may also open themselves up to 
charges of cartelism” (Powell and Tucker 2014:123). 
The second category of challenges for established cartel parties stems 
from their interaction with the state. In many of the new European 
democracies, the weakness of the governmental institutions (Dimitrov et al 
2006) created a propitious setting for the development of new informal linkage 
mechanisms. They were not necessarily connected to remnant personnel 
networks (Grzymala-Busse 2007, 2008, 2010). Much like the waves of party 
formation and development (Van Biezen 2003), new democracies also face a 
different sequencing of other institutional developments. As far as formal 
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dependency on state resources goes, cartel parties appear to be captured 
themselves by the state through public funding and intrusive regulations of 
their organizational activities (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007, Van Biezen and 
Napel 2014). 
Still, empirical evidence amply reveals, the party-state relationship 
usually leads to state capture. In most of the cartel party examples from old 
and new democracies alike, it is the informal reliance on state resources, and 
the proprietary control over them that fuels the parties survival in office. Party-
state interpenetration, often leads to a perpetuating and increasing 
dependency on the extraction of public resources through state capture 
(Grzymala-Busse 2007). It is more frequent in post-communist European 
democracies because the previous regime was fundamentally based on a 
party-state interpenetration—where the administration was dominated by the 
Communist Party (Dimitrov et al 2006). 
 For example, third parties safeguarding political processes in Western 
democracies, such as the media, or watchdog civil society groups have not 
been well established in  new democracies at the time of the party formation. 
Such complementary institutions to a democratic system have themselves 
appeared as a consequence of a top-down approach. As we can see in the 
Index of Party Patronage (IPP) (Kopecky et al 2016) some of them are 
perceived to be heavily politicized in CEE (e.g. state-owned media). 
Clientelism helps stabilize parties when public resources extracted 
through cartelization are used for political purposes (i.e. financing electoral 
campaigns, maintaining networks of supporters, mobilizing voters). It is only 
inclusive clientelistic linkages (i.e. they expand to the lower ranks of the 
political party, and further into the societal strata) that can safeguard a political 
organization over multiple electoral cycles. In this sense, the present thesis 
argues that clientelism can be an effective mechanism of resources 
distribution, as it is through it that cartel parties reward all supporters, rather 
than simply extracting rents. This has previously been a gap in the literature, 
as most of the studies on clientelism and patronage in CEE have been 
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focused on the mechanisms of extraction (i.e. securing access to resources), 
and not concerned with how these benefits are further distributed. I argue that 
their utility goes beyond the recipients (i.e. clients that receive benefits or 
jobs), but that it also strengthens the party’s organizations, and presence in 
society, overcoming various challenges to its existence. 
1.2. Clientelism in New Democracies: From Dyadic Bonds to State 
Capture 
Clientelism is here defined as the exchange of goods and services for political 
goals. This thesis accounts for both electoral goals in deploying clientelism 
(i.e. winning elections), as well as organizational or relational goals (i.e. 
developing the territorial presence). The mechanisms investigated here are: 
(1) obtaining/capturing public resources (facilitated by cartelization), and (2) 
distributing public resources along party lines to local leaders and supporters 
(facilitating the cartel party stability). 
The clientelistic phenomenon creates linkage systems between the 
political sphere and the citizens that anchor the patron party in society. 
Informal networks are often better transmission belts between decision-
makers and citizens, in the context of poor institutional performance. The 
development of such linkages has however been different across European 
democracies, contingent upon the sequences of party system and public 
administration formation and evolution.  
Case studies of clientelism in South European new democracies show 
that the development of a democratic system did not replace the existing 
informal networks (Lopes 1997, Papakostas 2001, Caciagli 2006, Trantidis 
2014). In other words, in such cases, the clientelistic system was integrated 
within the plural party system, as an electoral instrument. Within the South 
European countries, Spain stands out, as its traditional caciquismo was not 
integrated very well by the new political parties (Blakely 2001, Hopkin 2001).   
Still, newer forms did emerge, building upon the acquired taste of 
political actors for reliable linkages with the electorate. These were sooner 
built upon the administrative prerogatives of ruling political parties, rather than 
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on societal, hierarchical linkages. As such, in the case of Spain, we see the 
Socialist Party using patronage and political appointments in the public 
institutions to grow and consolidate its clientelistic networks (Hopkin 2001). In 
a similar manner, although the clientelistic mechanisms from the Junta regime 
have survived the transition to democracy in Greece, a new form of 
‘bureaucratic clientelism’ based on the extension of public employment rose to 
prominence here too (Lyrintzis 1984). Despite the weak social linkages, 
Portuguese political parties have entrenched their position through state 
resources (Silva and Jalali 2016:5, Jalali 2007). In the Italian case, the 
familism of the South (Chubb 1982) was gradually complemented by newly 
developed informal networks in the North, exchanging economic interests, 
rather then loyalty (D’Attoma 2016).  
The post-communist new democracies, as opposed to many of the 
Southern cases, had little to offer to the newly developed plural party system, 
along the lines of informal networks and linkages. In this context, clientelistic 
bonds were already subsumed to a political organization within the former 
country-by-country versions of the Communist Party. Consequently, these 
were not integrated into the post-transition political competition, rather 
inherited by some of the more or less openly declared successor parties (e.g. 
PSD in Romania, BSP in Bulgaria, MSZP in Hungary, the KSCM in the Czech 
Republic). Still, throughout the following decades, the newly established 
political parties build up their own linkage mechanisms, and informal networks 
were especially easy to cultivate in the rural setting where social norms were 
propitious to the hierarchical nature of the clientelistic phenomenon.  
In order to develop a systematic assessment of the contact points 
between clientelistic practices and political parties’ challenges, I account for 
the political parties’ tridimensional existence: (1) relative to their own 
organizations, (2) relative to society, and (3) relative to the state. From this 
perspective, clientelism appears as a parallel system of reinforcement that 
offers informal anchoring in each case, when the political party cannot uphold 
effectively one of these relational dimensions due to either loss or non 
existence of organizational capacity.  
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1.2.1. Clientelism—A Political Phenomenon Driven by Party 
Organizations? 
In broad terms, the existing literature on political clientelism mentions such 
causes for it as the pursuit of electoral mobilization, and a low territorial 
presence and/or the lack of roots in society. As a result, exchange-based 
relationships develop between the political actors (i.e. patrons), and their 
voters (i.e. clients). Amongst the measures undertaken to maintain a 
clientelistic strategy for the development and survival of a political party we 
find: appointing loyal supporters in public institutions, as a reward, or 
appointing politicized personnel in key positions (e.g. state agencies, 
ministries), for control purposes, to ensure the flow of resources (see party 
patronage motivations in Kopecky et al 2012). Clientelism can therefore be 
seen as ‘a strategy of partial mobilization that differs from more universal 
patterns, such as programmatic appeals or mobilization motivated by parties’ 
achievement records’ (Roniger 2004:354).  
Starting with the electoral and organizational value of clientelism we 
find an evolutionary path that begins with dyadic bond (Scott 1979) between 
patrons and clients in hierarchical societies, moving on to broader networks, 
deployed especially on horizontal levels—the pyramidal structure of 
clientelism (Chubb 1988; Auyero1999, 2000; Hopkin 2001, 2002). At this latter 
stage of the empirical analysis of clientelism, the literature starts to mention 
the idea of a clientelistic machine (Chubb 1988) that is an efficient system of 
electoral mobilization, and informal benefits distribution.  
It stands in contrast to the previously social, personalized relationship 
between the parties involved (Tarrow 1967, 1977; Weingrod 1968) that was 
closer to a political cultural phenomenon, developing a code of conduct based 
on reciprocity and deference (Caciagli 2006:158). This personalized 
relationship can still be found in the case of clientelistic linkages active in 
smaller, local communities, as they are often promoted by local party bosses 
that have a certain degree of control over preferential distribution of goods 
and services.  
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As the electoral machine developed, so did the contractual definitions 
of this informal relationship. Therefore, moving beyond a code of conduct, the 
clientelistic phenomenon integrated systems of monitoring and enforcement to 
make efficient use of the distributional channels it exerts (Kitschelt 2000, 
2008; Stokes et al 2013). The systems of monitoring and enforcement require 
dense networks of intermediaries, often called brokers. They are the ones that 
effectively transform a reciprocal support relationship into an economy of 
scale in electoral mobilization. Contemporary parties usually use their 
territorial organizations to fill these brokerage roles.  
An important aspect of employing clientelistic systems of distribution 
within the political party hierarchy is the internal party competition between 
central and local leaders. In cartel parties, the power of local leaders is 
significantly lower than that of central party leadership. As such, their position 
in the clientelistic pyramid can be ascribed to that of the brokers. Recent 
studies suggest that the more internal party leadership competition there is, 
the less likely it is that leaders will continue to distribute patronage jobs on 
internal party hierarchical lines (Kemahlioğlu 2012). This is congruent with the 
findings that the more competition there is in a party system, the more 
constrained clientelism is (Grzymala-Busse 2007). But, there is a gap in the 
existing literature concerning what happens when both the central party 
leadership, and the local leaders are incentivized to cooperate rather than 
compete.   
The power relations between the center and periphery in a cartel party 
bring into question whether the local party bosses in a new democracy are 
brokers, or patrons, within the clientelistic pyramid. The basis of this puzzle is 
the general view that it is the patron who provides, and controls the flow of 
resources to its clients, with the help of intermediary agents, generally labeled 
as brokers (Auyero 2000, Volintiru 2012a, Stokes et al 2014). The evidence 
from the Romanian case study reveals that the clientelistic distribution of 
resources in the context of cartelization (i.e. continuous access to state 
resources) reinforces the local leaders support for the central party 
leadership. But, the systematic deployment of clientelism empowers them to 
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demand involvement in the party decisions, as key agents of an exchange-
based system of mobilization.  
This thesis explains that the more administrative decentralization there 
is (i.e. more resources are managed at the local level), the more likely it is that 
local leaders are co-opted in the national party leadership, because of their 
enhanced role in clientelistic mobilization. This contradicts some of the 
previous conceptualizations of the cartel party (i.e. stratarchy).  It does 
however fall in line with previous, large-scale comparative studies on party 
systems’ architecture depending on the locus of economic and political power 
concentration (i.e. National vs. Local) (Chhibber and Kollman 2004). With 
respect to the present inquiry on clientelism: the more economic and political 
power is concentrated at the national level, the more loyal and effective 
brokers the local party leaders will be.  
1.2.2. Clientelism—A Political Practice Embedded in Society? 
A significant stream of the existing literature discusses the impact clientelism 
might have on the clients’ quality of life, in delivering public goods, and public 
policy that they might not otherwise be able to receive (Kawata 2006, Stokes 
et al 2013, Calvo and Murrilo 2013, Brun and Diamond 2014, Diaz et al 2014). 
As such, we find the channeling function of clientelism, not only as a 
discretionary distribution of public goods from the patron to the clients, but 
also as a means of communicating needs and grievances. As mentioned 
before, this is especially true in the context of poor institutional performance. It 
explains why informal and discretionary practices are embraced by society, 
often to a larger extend than the formal bureaucratic or political channels 
available to them. It is by fulfilling the brokerage between the state and society 
that clientelistic exchanges help stabilize cartel parties.  
When public institutions fail to deliver efficiently and effectively public 
policy, and public goods, clientelism can be a good substitute to ensure the 
representation of popular interests, at the political and administrative level. 
This is especially visible in the case studies focused on Latin America (Brun 
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and Diamond 2014), or Southern Italy (Chubb 1988) that point to the benefits 
of clientelism as a mediator for receiving dedicated policy and public goods.  
We find compelling evidence that in some cases it supports the 
development of a more or less formalized distributive system (Calvo and 
Murillo 2013, Diaz-Cayeros et al 2014) through which people are able to 
receive the goods and services they need. Some studies have suggested that 
clientelism creates the habit of the representation of interests, which can 
ultimately be absorbed by political parties deploying social policies, and a 
better functioning democratic context (Brun and Diamond 2014). As such, 
clientelism would seem to be only a temporary substitute for the failures of 
representation in democracies around the globe. One of the main factors 
driving this reliance on informal channels is the detachment of the political 
elites, from the needs of the electorate. In-depth empirical studies of the 
brokerage system in Argentina (Auyero 1999/2000/2001) provide us with a full 
picture of how grievances would hardly be known, and much less be resolved, 
without these intermediaries. 
1.2.3. Clientelism and State Capture 
As the numerous case studies of new democracies show, clientelism thrives 
even in settings in which the administrative and democratic procedures work 
well in favor of the citizens (Piattoni 2001). This is because clientelistic 
systems also reinforce state capture, which brings into question the nature of 
the relations between a political party and the state. In these circumstances, 
the mobilization of resources by the clientelistic machines is done either 
through office corruption, or private resources (Van Biezen and Kopecky 
2014).  
In both cases, a circular process comes into place, as incumbents with 
access to public resources will fend off competitors. Even if clientelism does 
empower voters without proper political representation, it also allows 
incumbent politicians to stay in power. Clientelism thus appears to be a 
political instrument, or a strategy of surviving in office. This 
instrumental/adaptative use of clientelism supported by the empirical evidence 
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of the present research contradicts an older string of clientelistic literature that 
presents it as a stand-alone phenomenon, contingent upon cultural and socio-
economic settings (e.g. Banfield 1958, Powell 1970).  
Also, under weak competition in the political system, as is often the 
case with the emergence of the cartel party model, the electorate can revert to 
a pre-democratic status of trapped clientele: clientelistic parties become 
dominant political actors (Trantidis 2015). This is mostly due to the fact that 
clients stop having alternatives. In terms of the clients’ relationship with other 
political forces, much like in any market exchange, the ‘consumers’ would be 
able to change the supplier of clientelistic benefits, if another one existed. In a 
climate in which the political competition is narrowed down (through 
cartelization), and the incumbent position is effectively reinforced, there is no 
longer an alternative supplier of informal access to public goods and services.  
The more clientelism relies on informal linkages with the state, the 
more exposed the patron political party remains on its ability to extracted 
public resources. State subsidies and public funding are part of the 
cartelization process (i.e. party-state interpenetration). In addition to this there 
is also a wide array of material and human resources employed by the party 
in office, through its ability to control public institutions. To be able to distribute 
these benefits in a clientelistic manner, parties recur to personnel 
appointments and politicized funding allocations. Nevertheless, parties relying 
intensively on these clientelistic tools “are intrinsically vulnerable if state 
resources become scarce or fall under the control of rivals” (Hopkin 2002:5). 
In other words the tools for continuously extracting state resources are vital to 
the survival of a cartel party deploying clientelism. I will further elaborate is the 
following section on the dependence of clientelism on party patronage and 
politicization. 
As the dependency between cartel parties and clientelistic linkages 
evolves, the reliance of clientelistic linkages on public resources extracted 
through state capture generates a strong motivation to perpetuate the 
extractive mechanisms. When political competition is co-opted, clientelistic 
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parties ensure their continuous access to public resources. This can be 
achieved either through formalized governing alliances, or ad-hoc collusion 
between the political forces on various matters.  
The clientelistic linkages with the state can create various opportunities 
to the political parties’ organizations that have penetrated the state through 
cartelization. Firstly, there is a policy-making purpose in deploying party 
patronage, as governing parties require a certain level of political discretion in 
appointments, with the purpose of advancing their policy and governing goals 
(Dimitrov et al 2006, Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012, Kopecky et al 2012).  
Secondly, the informal channeling of public resources or regulatory 
favors is a means of advancing a party’s standing with its supporters and 
electorate. This thesis explores clientelism as an instrument of developing 
roots in society by using local leaders as brokers of preferential resource 
allocation. It is within an administrative system that is weak or inefficient that 
such personalized transactions flourish. Analyzing the existing clientelistic 
mechanisms in my selected case study reveals a variety of objects of 
exchanges—from appointments to public jobs, to regulatory favors and public 
contracts. 
Finally, clientelistic mechanisms can become instruments of party 
financing and electoral mobilization. Through partisan public contractors that 
work for the state, the political organizations receive donations and other 
material assistance. Furthermore, this thesis shows how a wide range of 
appointments in public office and public contracts are mobilized for 
campaigning and electoral mobilization. Nevertheless, the electoral outcomes 
are contingent upon a wider array of factors than simply clientelistic 
exchanges, but the resource accumulated through them ensures the stability 
of local organizations that would otherwise wither under cartelization.  
1.3. Interconnected Phenomena: Clientelism, Party Patronage, and 
Politicization 
My conceptual framing of the clientelistic phenomenon, as an intrinsic part of 
the cartelization process draws on interconnected informal political 
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mechanisms: party patronage, politicization, and clientelistic distribution of 
benefits. These practices should be regarded as manifestations of the same 
political survival strategy. Without established networks of loyal appointees 
first, the extraction of public resources for political reasons can easily be cut 
off.  
The empirical evidence of this thesis illustrates instances of clientelistic 
distribution of goods and services, as well as politically driven appointments. 
Because clientelism and party patronage fit within the study of political parties, 
they are seldom related to the instances of politicization, which usually fall 
within the area of public administration studies. In the present study I argue 
that these are interlinked phenomena, and as such, I account for all of them 
as sequences of the clientelistic system of extraction and distribution.  
The clientelistic phenomenon has long been investigated in connection 
to political parties, either as an electoral strategy, or as an exchange 
mechanism (Hopkin 2001, 2002, 2006, 2012). A newer stream of the literature 
started focusing on the public policy repercussions of political clientelism 
(Stokes et al 2013, Brun 2014). Still, the actual, structural penetration of the 
public administration remains a topic of disparate analysis, focused mainly on 
personnel appointments, either as party patronage, or politicization of civil 
service positions (Meyer-Sahling 2008, Kopecky et al 2012, Nakrosis 2014). 
The purpose of clientelistic mechanisms, be they electoral or organizational, 
cannot be fully understood without the structural assessment of the 
distribution of power within the state apparatus.  
As such, clientelism is here analyzed not only as a political 
phenomenon embedded in the general setting of the new democracies, but 
more specifically within the simultaneous development of democratic party 
systems and the institutional architecture’s characteristics of post-communist 
new democracies. It is within this multilateral context that it plays a particularly 
important role in the development and survival of cartel parties, as a 
stabilizing complement. 
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The justification for this approach stems from the main argument that 
clientelism delivers to organizationally weak parties the necessary human and 
material resources to ensure their survival. As such, I account for party driven 
appointments, either in the public administration (i.e. politicization), or in other 
public institutions, as the means to reward supporters and control material 
resources. The political appointments are not enough to win elections, and as 
such, I argue that their purpose for the patron is to access in a preferential 
manner the allocations, and decision-making functions that would ensure the 
wider clientelistic distribution of goods and services to the lower ranks of the 
party, the supporters, and ultimately the electorate.  
Patronage’s relationship with clientelism is a nuanced issue of 
overlapping functions. Clientelism is focused on cyclical electoral goals, while 
patronage serves more permanent goals of continuously controlling certain 
key positions and institutions. Kopecky et al (2012) see these differing goals 
as one of the fundamental differences between patronage and clientelism: in 
one case the party is trying to achieve control of institutions, or reward 
loyalty—party patronage, in the other case the party pursuing electoral 
outcomes—clientelism. Indeed, Kopecky et al accept patronage might be an 
electoral resources (2012:7, see also Piattoni 2001, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). Similarly, I argue that clientelism can be an organizational resource as 
much as an electoral one. This thesis shows that in fact, clientelism is much 
more efficient in anchoring a party in society than it is at delivering electoral 
victories that are contingent upon a wider array of factors.   
Between the two concepts, there is also a difference of range. Piattoni 
(2001) considers patronage to be ‘an instrumental use of power positions’, 
which mainly takes the form of distributing public jobs to personal or partisan 
supporters. Clientelism on the other hand, is depicted as a more penetrating, 
all-encompassing phenomenon, as ‘all public decision-making may become a 
token of exchange’ (Piattoni 2001: 6-7).  
This thesis argues that clientelism is not only an exchange system, but 
also a mechanism of organizational consolidation. Through the iterative 
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exchanges (fueled by party patronage and politicization) the mobilization role 
of local organizations is reinforced, or created from scratch. This is why 
clientelism can make cartel parties stable in the absence of mass 
mobilization.  
Patronage networks develop through the cartelization of political 
parties, especially through the process of interpenetration between parties 
and the state (Katz and Mair 1995, Hopkin 2012). It is this thesis’ argument 
that once in office, the governing parties work towards deploying public 
resources—jobs and funds, in a discretionary manner, as part of their survival 
strategy.  
The politicization of public office occurs when political parties use their 
influence over public institutions to accomodate their own organizational 
interests. Through the politicization process clientelistic exchanges may be 
realised, using different types of state resources (i.e. funds, jobs, assets). The  
literature gives us convincing evidence on how politicization of senior civil 
positions in CEE can aim at achieving programmatic or performance-driven 
policy-making, targeting at the electorate as a whole (Meyer-Sahling 2008). 
The problem with this conceptualisation is that it does not account for the 
vulnerabilities of political parties in CEE. Under cartelization (and threat from 
outside competitors), it is the targeted distribution of benefits that ensures 
political parties a stable electoral support. Therefore, while accepting that 
political appointments can further policy agenda as well, this thesis 
investigates politicization of Senior Civil Servants as a means to ensure the 
partial and resource-driven mobilization of the electorate.  
Bringing together the various streams of research in the academic 
literature portraying the clientelistic phenomenon, and the empirical evidence 
collected in the present thesis, we can briefly sketch the clientelistic goals and 
the roles it can play within the development of a cartel party. Clientelism can 
be exerted with a functional purpose to substitute political and institutional 
linkages that either do not exist, or are not serving the party’s interest in their 
formal function. As such, clientelism can play an active role in developing 
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roots in society through informal channels of communication and distribution, 
which in turn strengthens the electoral chances of political parties with poor 
organizational capacity. Furthermore, as we have seen in the case of many of 
the Latin American case studies, it delivers needed goods and services to the 
clients that they would not otherwise be able to access within a malfunctioning 
administrative system of distribution.  
The functional dimension of clientelism has two manifestations: party 
networks embedded within the public administration system, and patronage 
networks within the local party organizations. In the first instance, through 
politicization, functional clientelism draws on a network of party appointments 
to deliver policy outcomes (Meyer-Sahling 2008, Eichbaum and Shaw 2010, 
Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a) especially in those cases in which the 
administrative elites are loyal to another political patron, or hostile to change. 
This appointment logic is often mirroring the political distribution of coalition 
partners in the decision-making functions (Ennser-Jedenastik 2014b). 
In the second instance, through patronage networks, loyal supporters 
are rewarded with various functions (not necessarily in the public 
administration), thus strengthening their commitment to the party organization. 
This latter form of clientelism aims at electoral outcomes. In both forms, the 
appointees become gatekeepers of public resources and decisions. In this 
capacity they are able to facilitate the preferential allocations to local 
governments, which again can serve the functional purpose of fueling the 
informal distribution channels for the targeted constituencies.  
Overall, clientelism can play a dual role in the development of a cartel 
party. Within the political party, it can build towards electoral success in a 
manner in which the parties are no longer able to. It can thus develop the 
territorial presence through informal distribution of goods and services within 
the party organizations.  
Furthermore, outside the political party organization, clientelism plays a 
role in helping cartel parties extract public resources beyond state subsidies, 
and channeling those resources, along with other types of benefits to the non-
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affiliated party supporters, thus mimicking the preferential allocations and 
policy-making decisions of mass parties towards their traditional base of 
supporters.  In this sense, a cartel party with large, effective systems of 
clientelistic distribution in a post communist country might be very similar to 
well-established social democratic parties in Western democracies.   
In conclusion, organizational challenges, both from within the party 
(e.g. weak capacity in local organizations), and from outside it (e.g. new 
entrant competitors) can be dismissed through the process of cartelization. 
But, because the latter is inherently unstable, this thesis shows how 
clientelism can contribute to the survival of a cartel, in the context of post-
communist European democracies. I argue that it is with the help of 
clientelistic channels of resources distribution that a cartel party can make the 
best use of its ability to penetrate the state. With a continuous access to 
public resources (given cartelization) clientelism thus becomes an effective 
system organizational development, as well as mobilization/electoral 
instrument, by anchoring the party in society.  
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Chapter 2. Clientelism and Cartelization in New 
Democracies: Comparative Overview 
The present chapter is a comparative overview of informal linkages’ 
prerequisites, forms of manifestation and outcomes, in European post-
communist democracies. The party-state interpenetration (within the process 
of cartelization) is the focal point of this thesis. As such, the features of both 
the party system and the public administration become relevant; I compare 
and contrast along these lines similar case studies of the following CEE new 
democracies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania.  
 The selection of the four case studies is informed by two 
considerations. Firstly, in order to avoid selection bias or narrow and 
idiosyncratic findings, I refer to a comparative perspective on the wider set of 
post-communist European democracies. Some of the contextual elements 
that empower the symbiosis between cartelization and clientelism in Romania 
can be found in the entire region: a tradition of party-state interpenetration, 
weak state apparatus in the eve of the transition7, genesis of the major 
political parties. While Romania can be considered an extreme case of the 
most successful deployment of cartelization and clientelism by its major 
parties, the literature shows that these phenomena are not restricted to it. As 
such, it is to be expected that they can play a role in the electoral success of 
other major parties in CEE region, even if it is to a lesser extent than in the 
Romanian case study.  
Secondly, I selected these countries out of the total population of cases 
based on the data availability. In order to maintain a systematic comparison, it 
was important to explore the same analytical dimensions in all cases. While 
various elements of party system and public administrative structure were 
widely available for all CEE countries8, others were not. The most restrictive 
data set was that of the Index of Party Patronage (Kopecky et al 2016) which 
is here used as a proxy of party-state relations. As it only contained values for 																																																								
7 State weakness can be more pronounced in some cases than in others given specific 
historical developmental paths: for example the administrative bureaucratic tradition is 
stronger in Central European countries than in Romania or Bulgaria. 
8 The DALP dataset on clientelistic linkages includes more cases from the region as well. 
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three other countries from CEE apart from Romania, the sample of 
comparison is defined by this common reference framework9.  
Arguably, given the territorial and administrative size of Romania, 
which provides both a higher demand for clientelistic distribution of resources, 
and more opportunities of state capture, Poland would have provided a much 
more similar setting than the smaller case studies covered in this chapter. 
Unfortunately, the analytical method deployed for Romania can not be applied 
to this case study yet, as there is no measure of the extent of party patronage. 
Notable studies to date suggest an increasing reliance of Polish parties on 
public finances (see Szczerbiak 2001, 2006). The Democratic Accountability 
and Linkages Dataset (DALP) also indicate a higher prevalence of clientelistic 
exchanges in Poland than in the Czech Republic or Hungary, yet lower than in 
Romania and Bulgaria. It is thus reasonable to assume that similar 
cartelization and clientelistic mechanisms can be observed there, and the 
Polish case study would constitute a valuable extension of the findings of the 
present chapter.   
The first part of the chapter is dedicated to the contextual setting in 
which informal linkages (e.g. party patronage, politicization) have emerged or 
developed. Three contextual dimensions—party organizations, legal 
provisions on civil servants, and the architecture of the public administration, 
reflect the in-depth and systematic investigations into the Romanian case 
study covered by the subsequent chapters of the thesis.  Political parties are 
analyzed here as both employers of patronage, and drivers of political 
appointments. Overall legal provisions, and the reform of the civil service in 
each country are analyzed here as determining elements to the range, and 
goals of politicization. Finally, the administrative structure can reflect the 
power distribution between the center and periphery—both within the state, 
and within the party organization. 
The second part of this chapter evaluates the range of the party 
patronage phenomenon in the selected case studies. Many of the scores 																																																								
9  
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presented in this section are congruent with the qualitative, structural analysis 
conducted in the first part of the chapter. As such, the prolific or discouraging 
context for clientelistic exchanges is complemented by the perceived 
dimension of the phenomena (based on the Index of Party Patronage (IPP) 
data).  
The third section of this chapter looks at such specific elements of 
cartelization, in the selected case studies, as the extent of party regulation. It 
is informative to the present study in terms of its timing and coverage (e.g. 
provisions on regulating electoral activities, intra-party organization). This 
chapter accounts for CEE regulation on party financing from external sources, 
as in the case study of Romania I will later show how private donations are 
given in return for public contracts. Additionally, existing survey-based 
comparative evidence on clientelistic linkages (i.e. Democratic Accountability 
and Linkages Project (DALP)) helps us disentangle the extent to which 
different parties in the CEE are able and willing to use preferential benefits 
distributions.  
2.1. Institutional and Contextual Setting  
Party appointments in key positions are considered in this thesis to be 
the cornerstone of a clientelistic system. Still, political clientelism as a whole is 
much harder to analyze in a structured comparative manner, as it involves 
deep linkage mechanisms that are sometimes idiosyncratic to the 
organizational and environmental specificities of each political party.  
Party patronage and politicization are however much more readily 
embedded within a comparative perspective. While for party patronage the 
present thesis, and the existing literature looks at perception based 
evaluations, for the politicization phenomenon a much readily 
operationalization of the evidence is possible, as it is deployed in a specific 
setting, to specific appointments (i.e. civil service positions). As such, there is 
an interlinking relationship between the two phenomena investigated in this 
chapter. 
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2.1.1. Political Parties as Employers of Informal Linkages 
As this chapter explores the specificities of clientelistic phenomena in the 
post-communist setting of four Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, the structure of the political parties is at the core of the informal 
linkage mechanisms as strategic survival choices. The genealogy and 
transitioning process of the political systems as a whole, and of the political 
parties as evolving organizations, has been much discussed in the literature 
(Panebianco 1988, Kitschelt et al 1999, Van Biezen 2003, Grzymala-Busse 
2002, Webb and White 2007). This consideration to the origins and 
organization of political parties is justifiably granted in the context of new 
democracies, as their formative and transformative path impacts much of the 
larger institutional structure, and ultimately the behavior of agents involved in 
the political process.  
In the selected case studies—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Romania, we can find a similar political offer, with a successor type leftist 
party having alternative terms in power over the last decades, and various 
forms of center right opposition parties. Furthermore, in all four cases we find 
a growing predominance of new entrants (i.e. new parties or coalitions) in 
government. As such, the structure of the political system is relatively similar, 
as thus provides a good basis for comparison of the underlying mechanisms 
of clientelistic proliferation within and between political parties. 
By all accounts, the party systems in CEE seem to have had a poor 
institutionalization. This is explained by the fast pace of their formation, and is 
reflected in higher volatility scores than in Western Europe (Chiaramonte and 
Emanuele 2015). Interestingly enough though, if we look at the 
subcomponents of volatility scores—volatility by regeneration (i.e. new party 
entrants/exists) and volatility by alternation (i.e. changes in the vote share of 
main parties) we find a remarkably stable situation for the main political 
parties in CEE (Powell and Tucker 2013) (see Table 1). As this thesis argues, 
the explanation for the stability of the main political competitors in CEE lies in 
the successive stabilization waves of cartelization and clientelistic linkages. 
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The broader discussion of the successor-type political parties in the 
selected case studies is necessary, as it is within these organizations that we 
generally find the most extensive vertical and horizontal power structures, 
given their relatively steady party base. As such, with internal organizational 
power and discipline, they are primed to deploy party patronage once in 
power. Furthermore, given the heavy reliance of these parties on blue-collar 
voters, their intimate relations with unions created additional pressures to 
manage politically appointments in the public sector.  
Table 1. Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (1989-
2009) 
 One of the most notable disruptive elements in this linkage system 
between left wing parties, and wide-ranging spectra of union members was 
the massive wave of privatization of state-owned companies. This economic 
transitioning phase restricted the range of party patronage high-ranking 
management jobs, as it both eliminated the use of patronage appointments, 
as well as the beneficiaries of such amenable appointees, with mass 
dismissals. Consequently, most of the patronage based appointments in the 
state-owned agencies and companies remains a matter of reward, or 
Country 
Mean Volatility 
Type A (based on 
party entry/exit) 
Mean Volatility 
Type B (based on 
vote switching) 
Total Mean 
Volatility 
Romania 38 7 46 
Slovakia 50 9 59 
Moldova 36 10 46 
Czech Republic 15 11 27 
Hungary 13 14 26 
Lithuania 56 14 69 
Slovenia 35 15 49 
Bulgaria 22 17 39 
Latvia 34 17 50 
Estonia 30 17 47 
Poland 28 18 46 
Source: Powell and Tucker 2013 
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proprietary exploitation of resources, and much less a matter of favorable 
decision-making to traditional electoral segments. As such, we can see that 
the party patronage mechanisms of the latter democratic period can be 
transferable from left wing to right wing ruling political parties just the same.  
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), much like the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP), and the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD) have all had 
a constant presence in the political setting of their home countries. All of these 
left wing parties benefitted from more or less openly recognized organizational 
inheritances from their communist predecessor state parties, as well as from a 
relative stable party base. Their roots in society have generally been more 
stable than the democratic opposition spectrum, mostly because they had no 
serious competition in their corner. The monopolistic representation of the 
typological leftist electorate is especially visible in the case of Bulgaria and 
Romania, where the BSP and the PSD have been traditionally the only game 
in town.  
For Romania things appear to be shifting towards a strategic, or 
intentional fragmentation of the political left, as fractions of the PSD started to 
split over the past years—UNPR (National Union for the Progress of 
Romania), and more recently the PRU (Party for a United Romania). Even 
though they do not stand together officially, these appear to be calculated 
movements of covering the entire potential of the target electorate, as the 
PSD is moving towards mainstream, in the context of growing ties with the 
European family of the Party of European Socialists (PES). The ‘splinter’ 
parties on the other hand, effectively cover the existing deeply nationalist 
electorate, which was left without representation after the organizational 
demise of the Great Romania Party (PRM), once seen as the main opposition 
force to the PSD10.  
In contrast to Bulgaria and Romania, the Czech Republic and the 
Hungarian setting had a slightly more fragmented political offer from the very 																																																								
10 The Great Romanian Party (PRM) was the the second largest Parliamentary party after the 
Social Democrats, in 2000, with an average electoral score of 25.39% (between the Senate 
score and the House of Representatives score).  
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beginning. As such, we find the Communist Party of Moravia and Bohemia 
(KSCM) in the Czech Republic, which even if it is not desirable as a coalition 
partner, managed to hold on its electoral base with relative resilience. In 
Hungary, the representative power of the Agrarian Independent Smallholders 
Party (FKGP) creates slight overlaps with the rural profile of much of the 
target electorate of left wing parties in post communist countries. Romania 
also had the historical Agrarian Party (PNȚCD) rise to power in a right wing 
coalition format, in the first decade after communism, but the representative 
power of that political force diminished altogether in the following years.  
On the right wing of the political spectrum, there is much more 
fragmentation and change throughout the post communist democratic period, 
in each of these countries. Notable representatives from the very beginning 
include the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) in the Czech Republic, the United Democratic Forces (SDS) in 
Bulgaria, or the Democratic Party (PDL) in Romania. These parties have 
changed over the course of the past decades several times, either by 
restructuring, rebranding their own organizations, or by entering various 
catch-all coalition platforms to win the governmental mandate. As opposed to 
the left-wing parties, which have a much more structural informal linkage 
system in place, most of the right wing actors do not present the same 
institutionalization potential of their party networks, due to relative 
organizational volatility.  
Given the shifting nature of the right wing political offer, and the 
prominent emergence of/conversion to populist platforms, these ruling parties 
approach party patronage and politicization in a different way than left wing 
ruling parties. If the legislative reforms on the civil service were generally 
spearheaded by leftist parties, such as the CSSD in the Czech Republic, or 
the PSD in Romania, this can be linked to the fact that they had the internal 
personnel resources to populate various administrative appointments.  
If the professionalization reform of the civil service would be locked in 
under their cabinets, then it would be these appointees that would survive, 
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and be protected from subsequent political turnovers. A telling example of this 
strategy is the professionalization of Prefects and Underprefects in Romania, 
which were political appointments under the Social Democratic cabinet of 
Adrian Năstase, and were subsequently transformed into senior civil servant 
positions. Many of the appointees renounced their party membership status, 
and were consequently much harder to be dismissed by the following right 
wing government.  
In contrast, much less appetite for reforms aimed at the 
professionalization of public administration is found in right wing cabinets 
throughout all our case studies. This is not necessarily traceable to 
politicization objectives, but rather the opposite. In the case of many of the 
large spectrum populist coalitions, there is a significant penury of cadres.  In 
such cases, we see these parties engaging in slightly distorted patronage 
strategies: they appoint professionals to high-ranking jobs, and then court 
them to become party members, or at least partisans. Such technocratic 
infusion can be observed in the case of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in 
the Czech Republic (Kopecky 2012), or in the case of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (PDL) in Romania. Still, this reverse party patronage mechanisms is not 
exclusive to the right wing spectrum, but rather specific to parties that suffer 
from a lack of qualified professionals in their ranks, at a certain point in time. 
Spirova (2012) thus points to similar patronage tactics on the part of the leftist 
BSP and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) coalition in Bulgaria.  
2.1.2. Legal Provisions as a Framework of Deployment 
The reform of the civil service in CEE countries was a prolonged process 
altogether that is yet to be fully accomplished in some cases (Kopecky 2012, 
Volintiru 2014). Additionally, the legislative framework for the post-communist 
administrative system was not only in need of reform, it generally needed to 
be built from scratch in many regards. In this sense, integration pressures 
played a powerful role at least in fast-tracking existing proposals, or in 
encouraging the development of new legislative support for the proper 
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functioning of the central and local administrative apparatus (Meyer-Sahling 
2001, Dimitrova 2002/2005, Pop-Eleches 2007, Spirova 2012).  
The convergence pressures on the national administrative systems, 
from the part of the European Union (EU), as well as international 
organizations such as the World Bank, had the ultimate goal of building 
sustainable and predictable institutional partnerships that can last longer than 
the electoral terms. This is not a normative stance, but rather a operational 
objective, as many of the internationally funded development projects are 
managed by national governments—either central, or local, and usually span 
over longer periods of time than the average term of a political leader.  
In contrast, national political pressures, as discussed in the previous 
section, have been traditionally focused on preserving as much leeway for 
appointments in the public sector as possible. This was done both for policy-
making goals, as well as survival objectives—the more loyal supporters you 
have in key administrative institutions, the better your electoral chances are. A 
telling example of the effectiveness of this patronage-driven survival strategy 
are the small ethnic minority parties, such as the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), or the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
representative party DPS who found themselves as coalition partners 
throughout the majority of post communist cabinets. Beyond their grasp over 
a specific section of the electorate these parties have equally consolidated 
their party patronage networks of public appointees, aiming steadily at the 
politicization of specific policy sectors, or institutions. For example, the UDMR 
is always aiming for the appointments in the Environment Ministry or Culture 
Ministry, thus deriving better control over systematically developed personnel 
networks. 
Within this intersection of professionalization and politicization, the Civil 
Service in each of our case studies has equally progressed in its own pace 
towards consolidating as an autonomous structure, or professional body. As 
revealed in the Romanian case study, many Central or Local Government 
positions, especially in the Financial and Judiciary policy areas, have formed 
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organizational ties that are distinctive from those under the patronage of 
political parties. Thus, rather than being party agents, many of these 
appointees become members in their own professional networks, gaining 
significant autonomy from political appointment algorithms, and finally 
becoming hard to replace, even after their initial patron party has lost power. 
Similar dynamics can be observed in all of our case studies.  
The legislative reform on the Civil Service is not only important in 
securing the professionalization of the civil servants, or to protect these 
functions from electoral turnovers, and politicization. It is also highly relevant 
in terms of structuring the power relations within the state apparatus. As we 
can see in Table 2, there are various typologies of senior civil servants in 
each of our case studies, defined in one or several pieces of legislation. The 
most significant aspect in this regard is how much power these upper 
echelons of administrative professionals can hold.  
Accounting for the criteria of overarching control of all the functions and 
departments of the respective institution, the Bulgarian and Romanian Senior 
Civil Servants are the most powerful bureaucrats. In Bulgaria, the 
Administrative Secretaries for Ministries, like the Chief Secretaries for local 
governments are in charge of the entire administrative structure below. 
Similarly, in Romania, the title of General Secretary applies for Senior Civil 
Servants in both central and local public administration. As explored in other 
chapters, these positions are cornerstones of the institutional functions and 
processes, with the politically appointed state secretaries being mostly 
representative and prestige appointments, divided mostly for the purpose of 
rewarding loyal supporters, or attracting electoral capital from professional 
public figures.  
In contrast, the political echelon of State Secretaries plays a much 
more substantive administrative role in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In 
these two cases the Senior Civil Servants are either directly subordinated to 
the State Secretaries, as in the case of the Czech central administration, or 
doubled by a political figure with equal institutional standing, as in the case of 
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the Hungarian central administration. This organizational scheme created high 
interdependence of political appointees and Senior Civil Servants, which in 
turn means that a deeper politicization of civil service positions is not as 
necessary as in the case of Bulgaria and Romania.  
Indeed, as the expert survey data shows, there is a much smaller 
tendency of party patronage penetration to lower strata of the civil service in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, than in Romania and Bulgaria. An easy 
inference is consequently that party patronage is as much reliant on the 
contextual permissiveness for the ruling political parties, as it is on the actual 
institutional architecture, and the potential gains derived from various 
appointments.  
Hungary has been a frontrunner of the Central and Eastern European 
post-communist countries in reforming and implementing new legislation 
concerning its Civil Service (Meyer-Sahling 2001). The Civil Service Act (Law 
no. 23/1992) was passed simultaneous with a new legislation on the public 
finance system, and several organizational reforms aimed at empowering 
local governing bodies. As such, it seems that a picture of systematic reform 
was developed in the Hungarian legislative body that had as a main goal the 
professionalization of the administrative apparatus both at the central, and at 
the local levels. Still, the actual effects were slow to follow, and various 
degrees of politicization continued to exist within the state apparatus. The Civil 
Service Act went through multiple amendments throughout the following 
decades.  
Bulgaria and Romania rank second in the chronology of legislative 
reform on Civil Service, in the selected case studies. As such, we find in 
Bulgaria an overall framework for the administrative system—Public 
Administration Act (Law 130/1998), complemented the following year by a 
dedicated Law on Civil Servants or the State Officers Act (Law no. 67/1999). It 
is also in 1999 that Romania passed its cornerstone legislation on Civil 
Servants (Law 188/1999) even if the functions, and conduct of civil servants 
would be regulated by subsequent pieces of legislation.  
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Table 2. Comparative Perspective on the Regulation of Civil Service 
COUNTRY LEGISLATION 
SENIOR CIVIL SERVICE 
POSITION/S 
Bulgaria Law on Public Administration  
(Law no. 130/1998) 
Law on Civil Servants  
(Law no. 67/1999) 
Administrative 
Secretaries 
(administrativni sekretari) 
Chief Secretaries (glavni 
sekretari) 
Czech 
Republic 
Law on Civil Service  
(Law no. 218/2002, Law no. 
234/2014) 
Section Director (reditel 
sekce) 
Department Director 
(reditel odboru) 
Hungary Law on Civil Service  
(Law no. 23/1992) 
Administrative Secretary 
(kozigazgatasi 
allamtitkar) 
 
Romania Law on Civil Servants  
(Law no. 188/1999, and Law no. 
7/2004) 
Law on Local Public 
Administration  
(Law no. 215/2001) 
General Secretaries 
(secretar general) 
Source: compiled by the author based on national documents, and expert interviews 
In the case of Romania, an important legislative landmark is that of the 
regulation on local public administration (Law no 215/2001), as unlike other 
post communist administrative systems, the size and nature of the Romanian 
public administration has placed important powers on local governments. 
Before the 2001 provisions on local governments, their functions and 
attributions were mainly informal, fueled by the political strength of local party 
bosses. Connected to the rule of the territorially strong Social Democrats 
(PSD), the provisions of the Law 215/2001 went even further in reinforcing this 
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local strength with formal prerogatives and attributions being granted to 
mayors. This created a favorable setting for the development of parallel 
systems politicization: one at the central level, and one at the local level.  
As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, the continuous 
dependency of local governments on central transfers makes the local party 
leaders cooperate, rather than compete with central party leaders. 
Nevertheless, as their resource autonomy grows (see Decentralization 
Reform in Romania), they require more decision-making power within the 
party—a place in the party leadership forum (further detailed in Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, when the options of state capture increase at the local level, the 
clientelistic system is reinforced with a denser territorial presence.  
In the case of the Czech Republic, the regulation of the civil service 
appointments was supposed to be done through the Law 218/2002 on Civil 
Service—initially supported by the leftist Social Democratic Party (CSSD), but 
it was not effectively implemented in practice (Kopecky 2012, Innes 2016). As 
such, given amounting EU pressures for reinforcing the Czech public 
institutional capacity—especially in local government structures, and 
improving the implementation of EU funded projects (Council 
Recommendation, 2014/C 247/03), a new Law on Civil Service was adopted 
more recently (Law no. 234/2014).  
Furthermore, within the Czech Public Administration there is no clear 
demarcation line between the Senior Civil Service representatives, and the 
political appointments of the governing party. As such, like in all our cases, 
the Minister is assisted by multiple politically appointed State Secretaries, 
which in turn are assisted by section managers (reditel sekce). While these 
section managers can be considered the upper echelon of the Czech civil 
service, they are still politically appointed. Only the Department Heads (reditel 
odboru) are civil service personnel that are not politically appointed, which 
makes for a very blurred line, in the executives positions of the Central State, 
between civil servants and political appointments. Also, the provisions of the 
new Law on Civil Service (Law no 234/2014) include even the relevant 
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Ministers, and State Secretaries as steering bodies of the Civil Service, thus 
effectively creating significant overlaps between the political and the 
administrative powers, in this case study.   
For most of the Ministries within the selected case range, there are on 
average 1 or 2 State Secretaries, while for the Czech case, we can normally 
see between 4 and 5 State Secretaries per Ministry. Still, the appointment 
pattern of these openly politicized administrative actors follows a similar 
algorithm of appointment (i.e. representatives from the entire ruling coalition 
spectrum) (Kopecky 2012), as we observe in the case of Romania (see 
chapters 4 and 5). These political appointed state secretaries generally have 
the function of policy-steering, or political representation. As previously 
mentioned, the weaker the Senior Civil Service is in relation to them (e.g. in 
the case of the Czech Republic), the more likely it is that at least some of the 
State Secretaries, usually those representing the main coalition party, will take 
on de facto the administrative function.  
2.1.3. Governmental Structures as a Target of Politicization 
The previous subsections showed how the legislative prescriptions on the 
organization of the central government (CG) informs the extent to which party 
patronage can be deployed. Similarly, if we look at the structural distribution of 
power between the central government and the local government, we are able 
to discern the degree to which politicized appointments in the local 
governments are desirable by political clients.  
The architecture of the public administration in the four case studies 
varies on different levels. The most important is the leverage central 
authorities have over local authorities in administrative terms. While the 
process of decentralization has evolved at different paces throughout Europe, 
in most of the post communist countries there is still significant reliance on the 
central apparatus from the fiscal point of view. As such, the only dimension on 
which variation can be linked to differences in the party patronage linkage 
mechanisms is that of administrative prerogative division between central and 
local governments.  
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Table 3. Comparative Perspective on the Local Governmental 
Structures 
COUNTRY 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
(APPOINTED LEADERS) 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ELECTED 
LEADERS)  
Bulgaria 28 districts (oblasts), with 
centrally appointed 
Governors 
247 municipalities, with elected mayors 
and local councils  
Czech 
Republic 
-  13 regions (kraj)11, with elected regional 
councils (krajska zastupitelstva), within 
which a council president is elected 
(hejtman) 
Hungary - 20 counties (megyek) with elected county 
councils 
23 towns with extended regional 
prerogatives (megyei jogu varos) with 
elected mayors and local councils 
Romania 42 counties (judete) with 
centrally appointed prefects 
42 counties (judete) with elected county 
councils, and county council presidents 
320 electoral districts (103 municipalities 
and 217 towns) with elected mayors and 
local councils 
Source: compiled by the author based on national documents, and expert interviews 
When local governments have extensive electoral representation 
systems put in place by the legislative framework, it is more likely that the 
elected leaders will be coopted in the clientelistic system of the party in office, 
rather than centrally appointed agents of it. Reversely, when local government 
leaders are appointed by the central government, than such local leaders 																																																								
11 The Capital City of Prague has a mayor and is treated as a municipality for electoral 
purposes. 
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have to rely much more heavily on continuous political support (i.e. patronage) 
for their survival in office.12 
This comparative section is concerned with the degree of 
administrative autonomy at the local level, which would entice local party 
patronage networks to develop. Clientelistic newtorks are most likely to 
emanate from relatively sizeable administrative units, such as the main 
municipalities, or larger districts (e.g. regions, counties), with advanced 
administrative prerogatives, and with an electoral system of representation. 
The size is meaningful because it is a proxy for the potential resources (i.e. 
jobs, funds) that can be channeled into clientelistic exchanges.  
There is an interesting pattern emerging from the comparison of the 
local governments architecture in the selected case studies. In the Czech 
Republic and Hungary the local governments are managed by elected 
representatives, while in Bulgaria and Romania there is an overlap of 
prerogatives between elected local leaders and appointed ones. The electoral 
representation is telling of the motivation of local leaders to develop and 
support their own patronage networks, in order to ensure their continuity in 
office. In contrast, the centrally appointed officials are more likely to enjoy 
their status, without the hassle of developing extensive personal patronage 
networks, as it is only to their superiors that they are accountable to.  
There is a greater degree of circularity in the case of local government 
based party patronage phenomenon, as the ties with the party organization 
are much stronger than in the case of central appointees. On one hand, the 
stronger the local party bosses are, the more likely it is that they will form and 
develop their own patronage networks within the extensive administrative 
apparatus available to them, at the local government structures. Furthermore, 
they generally have projection power of appointment within the central 
administration, according to coalition informal algorithms, especially for state 
secretary positions. Key regional party leaders can go as far as to politicize 																																																								
12  Chapter 6 continues along the sphere of resource availability this discussion of 
administrative power relations, and how they support clientelistic relations between the ruling 
party leadership and local bosses in Romania. 
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such senior civil service appointments as general secretaries, within 
Ministries.  
On the other hand, the circularity of the situation is reflected in the fact 
that the strength of these appointment networks, promoted through party 
patronage and politicization are further contributing to increasing the standing 
of local party bosses. Even if a local party organization losses the mayoral 
race, the steady structure of informal linkages created can maintain their 
representation in the council bodies—local or county level. This situation is 
reflected in the analysis of General Secretaries of local governments. These 
civil servants perform similarly important functions as those in the bodies of 
the central government (i.e. Ministries), acting as effective gatekeepers to the 
institutional processes and functions in which they are employed. While the 
local government General Secretaries can frequently survive successive 
electoral cycles, this is generally attributable to a comfortable representation 
in the local councils of their patron party, as much as to their gained skills and 
experience. In other words, for patronage networks within local governments 
the criteria of appointments continue to be a combination of professional 
aptitude based on experience, and the strong ties with the cartelized political 
forces in the respective constituency.  
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania we find a parallel administrative 
system of centrally appointed regional leaders and locally elected decision-
making structure—mayors and county councils. In the case of Bulgaria the 
separation is based on the administrative size: regional local governments (for 
the oblasts) are lead by central appointees, and the smaller administrative 
units of towns and municipalities by elected leaders. Within the 28 regions, or 
districts, the governors of these oblasts can ensure the implementation of the 
governing strategy of the party in office. Complementing these broader 
administrative structure, the local divisions of the 247 municipalities run by 
elected officials, represent the opportunity for quicker responses to citizens’ 
interests. It is at this level that clientelistic exchanges can develop the parties’ 
roots in society.  
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In the case of Romania, the centrally appointed prefects act with similar 
prerogatives and functions as the county council presidents, and the county 
councils. For several years in Romania there have been ample discussions 
and political efforts on the part of various ruling parties, to create a similarly 
regional structure for Romania, as there is in Bulgaria. As such, there would 
be distinctive development regions, encompassing several counties, which 
would have centrally appointed officials. The regionalization would allow a 
better control to the central government of development targets and national 
strategies. In effect, the fact that the regionalization process failed in Romania 
is a testimony to the strength of the local governments, and especially local 
party bosses. Furthermore, with recent administrative reforms of 
decentralization (i.e. Law no. 339/2004, Law no. 195/2006) the local 
governments have received enhanced prerogatives (transferred from central 
government). Selected sectors include: health (e.g. sanitary inspections, 
diagnostic and treatment centers), environment (e.g. solid waste 
management, environmental permits for construction), education, culture and 
sports (e.g. children palaces, clubs and facilities), tourism (e.g. rating tourist 
facilities) etc.   
On the other hand, there are other similarities between Czech Republic 
and Romania in what concerns the size of the administrative units. Even if in 
these two countries, there is local elected representation at the town level, 
there are also these intermediary units run by an elected council that we do 
not find in Bulgaria. If in the case of Romania there are 42 such counties 
(judete) including the capital city of Bucharest, in the Czech Republic there 
are 14 such regions (kraje) including the capital city of Prague. The complexity 
of the local governments’ hierarchy is reflected in the levels of subnational 
spending as percentage of general government spending. In 2014 for 
example, subnational spending in Hungary represented 16% of general 
government spending, 23% in Bulgaria, 24% in the Czech Republic and 26% 
in Romania (World Bank Romania, Final Report on Romania’s Local 
Government, February 5, 2016:18).  
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In both the Czech Republic and Romania, the elected council voted for 
the council president—effectively a mayor, or a governor of the province. This 
structure ensured a very close relationship between the organizational power 
of a party in the territory—measured by its ability to promote a list of 
candidates rather than a charismatic figure, and the post-electoral control of 
the respective local government. Since 2012, the county council presidents in 
Romania have been elected nominally, like mayors. This deemphasizes 
slightly the significance of the party organization, and implicitly party 
patronage networks, and emphasize the personnel connections of the local 
party leader. 
In terms of the comparison between the local governments’ potential to 
politicize civil service appointments, and the central governments power, the 
Czech Republic is different from Romania. As previously mentioned, the local 
governmental apparatus is extensive in Romania, with many public services 
under its belt—ranging from social services, to health care, from parks and 
infrastructure, to education. These are all bits and pieces of the national 
services provided in each sector, but the fact that the local governments play 
a part, smaller or greater, in so many public sector areas makes them 
effectively poised to create patronage networks much larger than the civil 
service under their direct control. In contrast, in the Czech Republic, like in 
many other post-communist countries, there are national or municipal 
agencies that deliver local public services, and their control fall directly under 
the designated ministerial departments or sections. As such, the following 
section will reflect a much smaller depth (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) of the 
party patronage phenomenon from the central government (i.e. ministries) to 
agencies and executive institutions.  
In the case of Hungary, there is the highest concentration of local 
administrative power in the major towns. While every one of the 20 counties 
(megyek) has an elected council body, it is the mayor and councilmen of the 
23 towns with extended prerogatives (megyei jogu varos) that have 
overarching administrative and budgetary attributions. This division of power 
between central government and local government structure in Hungary is the 
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most nuanced in all four cases. On one hand there is a certain degree of 
administrative devolution between the national level, and the county level. But, 
on the other hand, the decision-making power and budgetary density is 
centralized again around certain power poles (megyei jogu varos). Similar to 
the Romanian situation, this administrative architecture creates advanced 
political power to the mayors of the towns with advanced prerogatives. 
The balance of administrative attributions between the central 
government and the local government tells us a lot about the internal power 
dynamics of ruling parties. In countries where local elected officials have 
advanced administrative prerogatives, such as Romania and Hungary, we can 
expect the local leaders to become patrons of local networks, adding to the 
density of the clientelistic system of a cartel party. As the results of expert 
surveys will show in the following section, Romania and Hungary score higher 
in party patronage, at the executive institutional level. This can be linked to the 
fact that advanced administrative autonomy, or prerogatives usually mean 
that many of the executive institutions become decentralized, falling fully, or 
partially under local governments’ control (e.g. municipal agencies) (Nakrosis 
2014).  
In contrast, we find the case of Bulgaria, where the administrative 
architecture places the balance of power definitively on the side of the central 
government. Firstly, the elected officials—best candidates to become political 
patrons, are restrained by the oversight of the centrally appointment regional 
governors. Secondly, the level of fragmentation of local governments—at the 
municipal level, makes it very hard for local officials to sum up the 
prerogatives and public resources necessary to create, and support 
patronage networks. Consequently, the concentration of the patronage 
phenomenon in the case of Bulgaria is within the central government 
structures—the ministries (see Figure 1)..  
2.2. Central and East European Patterns of Party Patronage 
In order to better contextualize the incidence of party patronage in Romania, it 
is helpful to look at the index scores, in a comparative perspective. As such, 
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Romania’s evaluation (0.48) is compared and contrasted with that of all the 
other post-communist countries for which a patronage index exists—Bulgaria 
(0.42), Czech Republic (0.34), and Hungary (0.43). Their similarities—from 
the political pathway, to the regional constraints, gives us the chance to see 
party patronage as a broader phenomenon, with broader implications, than a 
mere opportunistic, idiosyncratic informal political manifestation.  
Figure 1. Comparative Perspectives on Institutional Scores of Party 
Patronage 
 
Source: Kopecky et al (2012) and present research  
In terms of the institutional predominance of party patronage, we see a 
consistently higher incidence in the Ministries, in all three cases (see Figure 
1). This is a predictable pattern, as given the public administration structure in 
all of these countries, the Ministries’ leadership is subjected to open 
politicization. Still, the high score of party patronage in Romania, at the level 
of non-departmental agencies and companies (NDAC), is the second highest 
for all the European democracies. As such, we can deduce a much deeper 
degree of institutional penetration by party patronage in this country. This is 
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even more telling, as these institutions are the main drivers of state capacity 
in the Romanian Public Administration—with advanced prerogatives, but 
limited responsibilities—as they still fall under the direct political control of the 
ministerial leadership.   
At the central level, the momentary or continuous control of institutions 
may often be an ‘instrument of steering policy-making and implementation’ 
rather than a means to reward loyal party supporters (Meyer-Sahling and 
Veen 2012). Under external or internal constraints to support administrative 
professionalization, in the case of NDAC or executive institutions, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic and Hungary record much lower scores than for Ministries. 
Romania’s closer scores between the three different institutional categories 
suggest a much more limited progress in terms of professionalization of public 
jobs.  
The comparative assessment of the policy sector scores, for the four 
countries, is equally telling of Romania’s predilection for exploitative usage of 
party patronage mechanisms. As such, we find comparatively higher scores in 
such policy areas as Economy (0.65), Health Care (0.67), or Regional and 
Local Administration (0.52). These are areas with a high importance for public 
procurement contracts, or other advantages that private actors can derive 
from the governing party’s protection (i.e. privileged information on 
privatizations, state compensation on specific medication, infrastructure and 
rehabilitation works etc.). Hungary and Romania have similarly high scores of 
party patronage in the Media sector—0.67, and 0.69. We can easily see how 
the political control of the Media sector is useful for electoral mobilization.  
In all of the four post-communist countries compared in this section, 
there are similarly low levels of party patronage in such policy sectors as 
judiciary and finance. International pressures for judiciary independence, and 
professional capacity in the financial policy sector are main drivers for this 
situation. While for internal affairs all of the other three countries score equally 
low—Hungary 0.36, Czech Republic 0.37, Bulgaria 0.33, Romania’s 
patronage score for Military and Police is much higher—0.52. This is mostly 
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due to the long lasting institutional overlap between local public administration 
and internal affairs. Even if the two policy sectors are presently managed by 
two distinctive Ministerial entities, the overlap between the two persists in the 
territory, creating a communicating vessels mechanism of patronage diffusion. 
While Bulgaria and Hungary show distinctive predominance of party 
patronage based appointments, Romania and the Czech Republic seem to 
record strong determinacy of other drivers for appointment. As such, in the 
case of the Czech Republic we see a higher relevance of the professional 
background of appointees, while in the case of Romania there is a higher 
relevance of personal connections. Nevertheless, the most significant factor in 
CEE public appointments remains that of political connections, contrasting 
with the EU pattern (i.e. professionalism is most relevant appointment factor). 
The prominence of political connections in CEE supports the cartelization 
thesis (i.e. party-state interpenetration).  
Another important dimension of researching the predominant functions 
of party patronage is to evaluate the motivations behind it—rewarding loyal 
supporters, as opposed to controlling those institutions reachable by political 
pressure. In the case of Romania, the vast majority of respondents—over 
85%, considered both reasons to be central to party patronage. By 
comparison to the other post communist countries selected, a much higher 
percentage of respondents consider both the reward, and control motivations 
as concomitant drivers of party patronage. While in the Czech Republic, most 
of the respondents considered party patronage in their country to be 
motivated by the intention to control public institutions, in the cases of 
Hungary and Bulgaria, there was an even split between the power of reward 
and control motivations.  
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Figure 2. Comparative Overview of Policy Sector Scores of Party 
Patronage 
 
Source: Kopecky et al (2012) and present research 
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Figure 3. Comparative Overview of Qualifications of Appointees  
 
Source: Kopecky et al (2012) and present research 
Both the control and the reward motivation may have different ignition 
points. They can emanate either from the party leadership, leading to a top-
down imposition of personnel, or from the party’s active members, leading to 
a bottom-up pressure to intervene in support of an appointment. Thus, much 
of the Romanian political patronage is based on an intersecting web of 
interests, in which the party leadership’s personnel agenda meets the 
ambitions of different local power brokers. Either way, all the actors know that 
appointments are part of the perks of the political game in Romania, and they 
all expect to benefit to a certain extent from this resource—‚Power is all about 
offices and positions’13.  
 
																																																								
13 Victor Adîr, policy advisor to the mayor of Bucharest, interview with the author, 18.01.2013 
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Figure 4. Comparative Overview of Patronage Motivation Scores 
 
Source: Kopecky et al (2012) and present research  
In terms of the reward motivation, political patronage may be offered as 
a reward to party members as well as party supporters (outside the party 
base). When an appointment is intended to reward party members, it is mainly 
an organizational strategy, as it strengthens their commitment to the party, 
and ensures their contribution—material or logistical, to the party activity. For 
example, a school director appointed through political influence, may be 
expected to mobilize the school personnel at party rallies, and to be actively 
and openly promoting the party by means of its new position14. When an 
appointment is meant to reward a non-member supporter, it aims at 
maintaining a network of useful connections loyal, and, as in the case of party 																																																								
14 based on example from an interview, Mariana Popa, former school inspector, interview with 
the author, 30.01.2013 
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members, to ensure they are satisfied and continuously committed to 
supporting the patron electorally, and otherwise—‘you have to reward the 
people that put you there, otherwise you they may not help you next time’15. 
As I show in the last chapter of this thesis, given the cartelization process, the 
informal distribution of public resources often involves the acquiescence of 
non-affiliated party brokers.  
The second motivation to extend patronage is to control the various 
institutions, departments and offices to which appointments are being made 
on the basis of political influence. One of the key elements of ensuring control 
of these institutions is to ensure that it will extend longer than the political 
cycle of power. In other words, parties strive to obtain control over institutions 
even after they lose elections. This is the basis for inter-party collusion—
‘networks that transcend party organizations (rețele transpartinice) are 
especially powerful in the territory, where deals are usually made between 
local leaders, disregarding central party policy at times’16. Through such 
collaborations for the purpose of mutually reinforcing the patronage potential 
of the main political parties, different leaders ensure the endurance of their 
interests—economic or personnel wise, despite changing electoral cycles.  
2.3. Cartelization and Clientelistic Linkages in CEE 
One of the main elements of the cartelization model is the growing party-state 
interpenetration (Katz and Mair 1995). This can sometimes lead to state 
capture, as parties in office become discretionary managers of the public 
goods and prerogatives under their control. I consider political appointments, 
and discretionary allocations to be manifestations of this takeover of the state 
by parties in office.  
Still, we have to account for the way the state interferes in the activity 
of the political parties, either at the party system level, or within the political 
party organizations. By looking at how much the state draws from the party-
state interpenetration, we are able to understand the extent to which parties 																																																								
15Victor Adîr, policy advisor to the mayor of Bucharest, interview with the author, 18.01.2013 
16 Mircea Cinteză, former Minister of Health Care 2004-2005, and National Liberal Party 
official, interview with the author, 10.12.2013 
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can expand towards exploitative strategies of state capture. In other words, 
this section will explore the contemporary constraints that the state is able to 
enforce on political parties in new democracies.  
The party-state interpenetration layers of cartelization has been 
explored to date in several theoretical and empirical studies by looking at the 
extent of public funding for political parties (Hopkin 2004, Van Biezen 2000, 
Van Biezen and Kopecky 2008/2014, Krasovec and Haughton 2011, 
Haughton 2012, 2014, Casal-Bertoa and Van Biezen 2014). This approach 
allows us to understand the extent to which political parties are constrained 
and controlled through specific regulation. The premise is that whenever 
parties benefit from public subsidies, this would come with a greater or lesser 
cost of monitoring and regulation of their activities. From the point of view of 
the ability to exert patronage, within the political party, as well as outside the 
party organization, when in public office, we need to account for regulatory 
constraints. When looking at the time of the introduction of party regulation in 
the selected case studies, and at the changes it suffered throughout the past 
decades, we can assess the level to which it is able to constrain the activity of 
the competing political parties in these countries.  
According to the existing literature, as well as the empirical evidence 
presented in this thesis, the time and timing of setting up political parties in 
new democracies is very important to the way these associations act, react, 
and perform in elections. As such, some of the successor parties in the region 
have been especially successful at the start of the new democratic period, as 
they had a certain level of territorial organization and mobilization capacity 
already in place (e.g. BSP in Bulgaria, and PSD in Romania). The time and 
timing of the legislative provisions that guide and constrain the activity of 
political parties matter greatly. The sooner the party regulation is set up, and 
the less it is changed, the more likely it is that those provisions will be 
institutionalized, and effectively serve as the framework for the respective 
party system.  
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In all these post communist case studies, the newly constructed, or 
heavily amended Constitutions introduced the multi-party system before, or on 
the occasion of the first democratic elections (see Table 4). As such, the most 
basic legal framework for the operation of a democratic party system was 
ensured. Still, as a second line of enquiry it is important to see the time of the 
introduction of dedicated party legislation, regulating both the external 
relations of the political party (e.g. electoral provisions), as well as the internal 
life of political parties (e.g. party financing).  
Table 4. Party Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
 Introduction of multi-party systems Party Laws  
Bulgaria New Constitution 1991 
Political Parties Act 1990 
(subsequently amended in 
2003) 
Czech Republic New Constitution 1992 
Law 424/1991 on 
association in political 
parties and political 
movements 
Hungary 
Amended Constitution 
1989 (changed again in 
2011) 
Association Law 1989 
Romania New Constitution 1991 
Political Parties Law 1996 
(currently replaced by the 
Law no. 14/2003 on Political 
Parties) 
 
Law 336/2006 regarding the 
financing of political parties 
and electoral campaigns 
(currently replaced by Law 
113/2015 regarding the 
amendment of the Law 
336/2006 regarding the 
financing of political parties 
and electoral campaigns) 
Source: compiled by the author based on the national legislation of the selected case study 
countries 
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In the Czech Republic and Hungary the first party laws, passed in 
1991, and 1989 respectively, are still in force. This means that the political 
parties in these countries have been competing for the post communist 
period, on broadly the same rules. They both suffered changes, with the 
greater magnitude of change in the Czech Republic case (Casal-Bertoa and 
Van Biezen 2014), but the reference legislation has remained the same. In 
contrast, the Bulgarian and Romanian legislation on political parties suffered 
significant changes. The Bulgarian Political Parties Act from 1990 was 
substantially amended in 2003, while the Romanian legislation changed 
altogether.  
Not only did the party laws in Romania come into force only at the time 
of the second democratic election (i.e. 1996), but they were radically changed 
throughout the following decades. Some of the latest changes in both party 
and electoral legislation in Romania, create unmistakable clear support for the 
main parties and their incumbent office holders, given such changes as one-
off elections at the local level instead of two rounds, increased public 
financing for the parliamentary parties, and additional funding available for 
party affiliated foundations. Much like in the case of the Czech Republic, 
increased public funding for political parties, coupled with high thresholds for 
eligibility makes for a disproportionate political competition, in favor of existing 
political parties. The low electoral volatility score of the main political parties 
presented here in Table 1 show how the various new entrants in the party 
systems in CEE have had a modest electoral standing (Powell and Tucker 
2014).  
While in all the new European democracies the legislative changes had 
to account for the new plurality of a democratic party system, we find a 
different degree of the concern for other matters, such as party financing, or 
party organization. Furthermore, as in the case of Romania, electoral 
legislation changed several times over the past decade, which creates the 
suspicion of an instrumental use of the regulatory framework by the ruling 
parties. Such an inter-party collusion to keep outsiders or newcomers away 
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from power through artificial legislative barriers is again in line with the 
prescriptions of the cartel party model.  
 From the point of view of internal organizational constraints, it is 
useful to assess the territorial coverage of the main political parties in these 
countries. Using the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Dataset (DALP) 
we can see the extent to which the main political forces in these countries 
have a nationwide territorial presence. I use a compiled indicator of formal 
nationwide territorial presence, based on (1) the density and permanence of 
offices and paid staff at the local or municipal level17, and (2) permanent 
social and community presence18. For informal territorial presence I refer to 
the density of local intermediaries who operate of parties’ behalf, but are not 
part of the party organizations19.  
As we can see in Table 5, the expert survey data supports previous 
assessments of the organizational strength of successor parties in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it is only the successor parties that have 
managed to be successful contenders in the post communist setting—the 
Romanian Social Democrats (PSD), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and 
the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). For this category of parties, it is their 
pre-existing territorial networks that consolidated their nationwide presence. In 
addition to them, it is also the electorally successful newly established 																																																								
17 Question a1: Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and 
paid staff at the local or municipal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only 
during national elections?; Codes for answers: [1] Yes, the party maintains permanent local 
offices in MOST districts, [2] Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in SOME 
districts, [3] Yes, the party maintains local offices, but only during national elections, [4] No, 
the party does not maintain local office, [99] Don’t know. Author’s interpretation: Values in 
between 1 and 1.4 are labeled as nationwide. 
18 Question a2: Do the following parties’ local organizations maintain a permanent social and 
community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining ancillary 
social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives, or athletic clubs?; Codes 
for answers: [1] Yes, [2] No, [99] Don’t know; Author’s interpretation: Values in between 1 and 
1.4 are labeled as nationwide. 
19 Question a3: Do the following parties have local intermediaries (e.g. neighbourhood leaders, 
local notables, religious leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf, 
and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of 
voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to 
voters and supporters?; Codes for answers: [1] Yes, they have local representatives in MOST 
constituencies, [2] Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies, [3] No, they 
have almost no local representatives, [99] Don’t know. Author’s interpretation: Values in 
between 1 and 1.5 are labeled as nationwide. 
	 101	
Bulgarian (GERB) and Hungarian (Fidesz) populist parties that managed to 
develop both formal and informal nationwide coverage. For this category of 
parties, the territorial networks have been mostly built as parties in office. 
While the Romanian Democratic Liberals (PDL) have attempted a similar 
development strategy as GERB and Fidesz, they did not manage to maintain 
a nationwide informal presence.  
 
Table 5. Territorial Presence of CEE Political Parties 
 
 
Source: compiled by the author based on the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 
(DALP) 2008-2009 Dataset 
 
Predictably enough, all smaller parties in the four case studies cluster 
as not having either a formal or informal nationwide territorial presence. The 
Romanian Conservatives (PC), and the Bulgarian Attack parties are heavily 
reliant on their founders’ media reach. As such, these parties develop a more 
business-model party approach, than one developed on territorial presence 
and roots in society. In terms of parties representing ethnic minorities, we find 
the Bulgarian DPS achieving a nationwide presence, as its electoral base is 
more dispersed across the country, while the Romanian UDMR remains 
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bound to its stronghold counties (e.g. Harghita, Covasna, Mures). This is 
congruent with the subindicator values, as it has permanent offices and staff 
only in some districts, but maintains in those constituencies a permanent 
social and community presence.  
Beyond the question of organizational capacity, these figures allow us 
to see the reliance of political parties in new democracies on informal 
networks of intermediaries, even when they have a dense network of offices 
and staff. The Social Democrats seem to be good confirmatory cases of this. 
As such, we can align the empirical evidence with the previously made 
assumptions of this thesis, that in the post communist setting, clientelistic 
networks have a dual identity. In the case of successor parties, we find them 
as inherited instruments of electoral mobilization. In the case of newly 
established or reformed populist parties, we find them as substitutes for roots 
in society that have been created from scratch via clientelistic channels of 
distribution.  
The DALP dataset also allows us to see the extent to which political 
parties in Central and Eastern Europe engage in clientelistic exchanges. As 
showed in Table 6, most political parties deploy at least a moderate effort in 
deploying exchange mechanisms of mobilization. We use the full set of 
variables in the dataset, accounting for clientelistic exchanges involving: 
consumer goods 20 , preferential public benefits 21 , public, employment 22 , 
																																																								
20 Question b1: Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens 
consumer goods (e.g. food or liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building 
materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and 
parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods?; Answer codes: [1] A 
negligible effort or none at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major effort, [99] 
Don’t know.  
21 Question b2: Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens 
preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g. preferential 
access to subsidized prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police 
protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and 
parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?; Answer codes: [1] A 
negligible effort or none at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major effort, [99] 
Don’t know.  
22 Question b3: Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens 
preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private 
sector (e.g. post office, janitorial services, maintanence work, jobs at various skill levels in 
state owned enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as inducement to 
obtain their vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by 
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government contracts and public procurement 23 , and regulatory 
proceedings24.  
The scale for each observation (i.e. type of clientelistic practice 
employed by a party) is between 1 (i.e. the respective party makes little if any 
effort in deploying that particular type of clientelistic exchange) to 4 (i.e. the 
respective party deploys a makes major efforts in deploying that particular 
type of clientelistic exchange). As such, 1 can be seen a very weak 
engagement in certain clientelistic practices, while 4 a major engagement with 
them. Based on these values, I also allocate in Table 6  a color code to 
represent the intensity of clientelistic engagement, with green representing 
low engagement (i.e. values lower or equal to 2.5), purple representing 
average engagement (i.e. values higher than 2.5 and lower or equal to 3.5), 
and pink representing the high engagement with a specific type of clientelistic 
practice (i.e. values higher that 3.5). 
 From the main political parties in the selected set of post communist 
countries, we find that major efforts to exert clientelistic transactions in the 
case of the Romanian Social Democrats (PSD), the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP), and the Bulgarian Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). The fact 
that organizationally strong parties, like the successor parties (i.e. PSD or 
BSP) are the main employers of clientelistic provisions falls in line with this 
thesis argument. Clientelism develops an informal system of public 
																																																																																																																																																														
providing preferential access to employment opportunities? Answer codes: [1] A negligible 
effort or none at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major effort, [99] Don’t know. 
23 Question b4: Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens and 
businesses preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities (e.g. 
public works. construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding 
to companies whose employees support the awarding party) as inducement to gain their and 
their employees’ votes. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by 
offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement? Answer codes: [1] 
A negligible effort or none at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major effort, 
[99] Don’t know. 
24 Consider whether candidates or parties influence or promise to influence the application of 
regulatory rules issues by government agencies (e.g. more lenient tax assessments and 
audits, more favourable interpretation of fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to 
favour individual citizens or specific businesses as inducement to gain their and their 
employees’ vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the 
businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favour?; Answer 
codes: [1] A negligible effort or none at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major 
effort, [99] Don’t know. 
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provisions—meaning that clients get informally through party channels what 
they should have been able to receive from public service. This can be 
regarded as a similar process to Western democracies, where pork-barrel 
politics is a frequent form through which politicians and parties care for the 
interests of their constituencies. The more developed the party organization is 
(or the more stable the party supporters/clients base is), the more the patron 
party has to deploy clientelistic distribution of goods, services or regulatory 
favors. But, as I argue in Chapter 1, it is only through the party-state 
interpenetration that a patron party can ensure such a continuous and 
extensive flow of clientelistic provision. 
When looking at the type of clientelistic transactions, the most 
predominant in our set of cases are: providing preferential access to material 
advantages in public social policy schemes, and government contracts or 
procurement opportunities. Indeed there is a big difference between the two, 
as the preferential access to public benefits, which is predominant in the case 
of Czech political patrons, is a functional aspect of clientelism, as it benefits 
the clients most. In contrast, public procurement schemes, which are 
predominantly employed by Bulgarian parties, are much more exploitative in 
nature, involving mostly private benefits for political elites and private 
contractors, rather than for the voters.  
Only the Social Democrats (PSD) in Romania seem to rely most 
heavily on the provision of consumer goods (e.g. food or liquor, clothes, 
cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.). This might be 
attributable to the fact that in this country we find the most sizeable 
electorate—twice as large as in the other cases, and the highest poverty 
thresholds. The size of the electorate influences your ‘spending’ capacity as a 
clientelistic patron: there are not enough public sector jobs, or public 
procurement contracts to win majorities. As such, we can see the heavy 
reliance of ‘cheaper’ clientelistic transactions in Romania, such as vote buying 
(for details see Gherghina and Volintiru 2016) or the provision of consumer 
goods, much like in other poor settings (see for example Auyero 1999/2000). 
The overall poverty levels, especially in the rural areas, make promises of 
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consumer goods much more attractive than such long term promises as social 
policy schemes. In contrast, in the Czech Republic, if political parties engage 
any type of clientelistic exchanges, their focus is on preferential public 
benefits.  
  Finally, while we find similar patterns in terms of overall inclination to 
use informal exchange mechanisms to ensure electoral victories, differences 
between countries persist. It seems that smaller, Central and Eastern 
European countries like the Czech Republic, are not as inclined to engage in 
extensive clientelistic exchanges. Fidesz and MSZP employ to a moderate 
extent electoral exchanges in Hungary, but the other parties not so much. For 
Bulgaria and Romania, clientelistic exchanges seem to be employed across 
the political spectrum by parties in office.   
The variations across countries, as well as the variations within the 
same political system, across actors, suggest that the clientelistic 
phenomenon is best understood by in-depth assessments. As the following 
chapters will show, the same mechanisms have to be set up for the allocation 
of preferential public benefits—a functional usage of clientelistic channels, as 
well as for the preferential allocation of government contracts—a more 
exploitative usage of clientelistic channels. Different parties may employ 
different tactics in a predominant manner (e.g. consumer goods vs. public 
contracts), but the linkage mechanisms are the same, and they draw strength 
from the cartelization process.  
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Table 6. Clientelistic Provisions in CEE Political Parties 
 
Country Political Party 
Consumer 
Goods 
Preferential 
Public 
Benefits 
Public 
Employmen
t 
Government 
Contracts and 
Public 
Procurement 
Regulatory 
Proceedings 
Ro
m
an
ia
 
PSD 3.50 3.46 2.93 3.14 2.71 
PDL 3.00 3.00 2.43 3.00 2.71 
PNL 2.77 3.08 2.43 2.93 2.79 
UDMR 2.09 3.36 2.62 2.77 2.43 
PC 3.09 3.17 2.62 2.92 2.77 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
 
BSP 3.15 3.31 3.62 3.69 3.23 
GERB 3.00 2.67 3.30 3.33 3.17 
NDSV 3.11 3.22 3.44 3.56 3.33 
Attack 2.43 2.00 2.33 2.20 2.00 
DPS 3.60 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.60 
ODS 2.22 2.13 2.67 2.44 2.33 
DSB 2.10 2.08 2.40 2.36 2.09 
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 KDU-CSL 1.96 2.58 2.04 2.29 2.14 
ODS 1.83 2.04 2.00 2.48 2.39 
KSCM 2.00 2.61 1.96 1.76 1.86 
CSSD 2.04 2.67 2.05 2.26 2.30 
Green 1.59 1.95 1.85 1.84 1.81 
Hu
ng
ar
y 
KDNP 1.67 2.00 2.08 2.15 1.91 
MDF 2.09 2.69 2.45 2.42 2.22 
MSZP 3.00 3.29 3.15 3.29 2.92 
SZDSZ 2.17 2.57 2.54 3.08 2.50 
Fidesz 2.62 3.14 2.93 3.07 2.54 
 
Source: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) 2008-2009 
Dataset 
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Conclusion 
 The premise of this thesis is that informal linkages in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) develop in the prolific setting of institutional weakness, 
which is inherited from the previous regime, and enhanced by the transitional 
circumstances (e.g. weak regulation). In response to the poor 
institutionalisation of the party systems in this area, cartelization offered a 
solution of stabilisation. As I argue throughout the thesis, the cartel party is 
stabilised on the long term through clientelistic linkages that anchor patron 
parties in society. This chapter has explored these assumptions in the context 
of several post-communist European democracies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania. While there are variations across party organizations, 
and across the institutional setting, we can see that the context has been 
similar in this set of countries, involving both a high reliance on party-state 
interpenetration (i.e. cartelization), as well as ample opportunities for 
discretionary use of public resources (i.e. clientelism).  
 Looking at the political parties in the selected case studies, we can see 
a certain similarity between successor parties (e.g. PSD or BSP) who 
benefited from a greater territorial penetration than their counterparts, but it 
relied heavily on informal linkages. As such, I show that all political parties in 
CEE had a similar incentive/opportunity to tap into public resources in order to 
fuel their weak or non-existing local organizations. The high stability of the 
main competitors (see Table 1) (i.e. low electoral alternation volatility) relative 
to the CEE context suggests that the anchoring of these parties in society has 
been successful. As I show here, the instruments of this anchoring in society 
have been to a large extent informal linkages (e.g. party patronage, 
clientelistic provisions of goods, services or regulatory favours).  
Romania stands out in this set of cases as having: (1) the most stable 
major parties (i.e. lowest electoral volatility of vote shares), (2) the strongest 
concentration of administrative power in local governments (i.e. prerogatives, 
resources), and (3) it has the highest party patronage index score in the CEE 
set of cases (0.48), as well as the highest degree of institutional penetration 
(i.e. party patronage is not mainly deployed in Ministries, but also agencies, 
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and executive institutions). These circumstances recommend that the optimal 
setting for the in-depth investigation of informal linkage mechanisms is the 
case study of Romania, which will be analysed in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3.  Clientelistic Linkages and the Political 
Parties’ Organizations in Romania 
Political parties have become increasingly more reliant on the state for 
survival, either formally through public funding/subsidizing, or informally 
through state capture and clientelistic distribution of goods, services, or 
regulatory favors. In this context, the territorial political organizations are 
created/maintained through the discretionary allocation of public resources via 
clientelistic networks. This chapter shows that once we account for the variety 
of threats to the political survival of Romanian parties—from electoral and 
ideological volatility, to membership decline, we can see how cartelization and 
clientelism become needed responses to such organizational threats. I 
account for both the challenges residing in the party system (e.g. electoral 
competition) and within the party organizations (e.g. the balance of power 
between the center and the periphery).  
The literature on party organization is generally focused on electoral 
performance and internal selection/nomination procedures. Nevertheless, 
much less concern is devoted to how the latter aspect (i.e. internal 
procedures) affects the party’s performance (i.e. electoral and governing). In 
response to this, the present chapter looks at how the clientelistic methods 
deployed by ruling political parties are linked to the organizational, internal 
dynamics of those entities.  
For electoral and political organizations data (i.e. electoral volatility, 
party membership, renomination rate, electoral shares), I have conducted a 
systematic coverage over the reference period raging from 1992 to 2012, 
based mostly on already assembled data bases, and primary data from the 
Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) in Romania. For the purpose of my 
assessment of the internal dynamics of power, and the control over 
clientelistic networks of resource distribution, I triangulated existing indicators, 
with an in-depth analysis of the composition of and selection procedures 
within the party leadership structures. I obtained this data from the parties 
official records (i.e. statutes, website repositories, decisions), as well as from 
in-depth interviews with party officials.   
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, clientelism can be both an inherited trait of 
a societal organization relying heavily on informal linkages (e.g. Southern 
Italy), or an inherited linkage system developed by the former party-state 
systems of the communist period. Romania meets both criteria. These 
relational mechanisms aim at maintaining stable support, and roots in society 
for party organizations. In Western Democracies such linkages have been 
developed over time, through formal channels of representation and interest 
aggregation (e.g. trade unions). In CEE countries, the way the party system 
was reformed over night left out the option of such consolidated chains of 
representation. As a result, we find much less pork-barrel politics, and much 
more personalized informal resource brokerage, and patronage.  
3.1. Political Parties Formation and Evolution in Romania 
Comparing political parties in the selected case study of Romania, to 
the broader context of European new democracies, we can see that 
Romanian parties are much more likely to resort to clientelistic exchanges to 
achieve electoral success. Expert surveys conducted under the Democratic 
Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP)25 (2011) show that Romania has 
the third highest regional score, after Bulgaria and Greece, for how much 
effort politicians and political parties make to induce voters with preferential 
benefits to cast favorable votes. The Romanian party system as a whole is 
judged to be steering major efforts in clientelistic exchanges, as opposed to 
more moderate stances taken by other European new democracy case 
studies, such as Spain, Portugal, or Italy.  
As opposed to other Central and Eastern European countries, Romania 
does not seem to have changed its overall inclination for clientelistic linkages. 
According to the DALP data, Romanian politicians nowadays make the same 
efforts to provide preferential benefits to individuals or small groups of voters, 
																																																								
25 Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) 2008-2009 Dataset, Surveys for 
the collection were done in 2008 and 2009, Dataset collected under the auspices of the 
project “Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competitionand Economic Governance”, 
Principal Investigator Herbert Kitschelt, Department of Political Science, Duke University, 
Source http://www.duke.edu/web/democracy, last accessed on 4.06.2016. 
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as they did 10 years ago. In contrast, in Bulgaria, or Hungary, experts assess 
politicians make higher efforts today, than a decade ago to engage 
clientelistic linkages. The case of Romania thus stands out, as the relative 
stability of the clientelistic system suggests an early option for clientelism. 
Indeed, the Social Democratic Party (PSD)—the most successful successor 
party in the region, has been constantly a major political force in the post-
communist period. Its ability to provide preferential benefits to individual and 
smaller groups has always been strong, given its dense territorial presence. I 
argue that it is because of the successful and early deployment of informal 
exchanges that this party has managed to effectively fend off competitors on 
the left wing spectrum (e.g. nationalist or extremist parties) in a manner that 
other cartels in CEE have not been able to do.  
Even if some parties are older than others, in the short timespan of a 
new democracy, it might be misleading to attempt to characterize the 
organizational specificities of each political party, as they change substantially 
under contextual pressures. Some distinctive traits exist, largely based on the 
specific resources and electoral base of each party, but the cartelization 
process ensures a homogenization of organizational strategies (i.e. 
clientelism). 
The main political parties, dominating the electoral competitions for the 
past two decades are the Social Democrats (PSD), the Democratic Liberals 
(PDL), and the National Liberals (PNL). The present research focuses 
specifically on the organizational dimensions of these three statewide parties. 
They have a national presence, and as such can be compared in terms of the 
inner-party dynamics, when in power. At times I account for another party—
the ethnic party of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 
which has been controlling a much smaller fraction of the electorate—up to 
5%, but is a significant coalition partner26 (i.e. holding important portfolios) 
																																																								
26 Several interviewees have mentioned a popular joke in reference to this striking stability of 
UDMR in office: „Why are there Parliamentary elections in Romania? Because the UDMR 
needs to figure out with whom it will govern in the next cycle.” 
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since 1996. As such, their organizational and survival strategies will also be 
represented by some of the empirical evidence analyzed in this chapter.  
The electoral performance of the main Romanian political parties 
shows a relatively stable electoral base for the leftist Social Democratic Party 
(PSD). On the left we can also see that the electoral scores are augmented 
from the late spring local elections to the late autumn national elections, at 
each cycle. As the Social Democrats have always had their alliances settled 
before the local elections, we can only attribute this increase to the 
mobilization efforts of newly elected local leaders. In contrast, the right wing 
does not present distinctive traits. Furthermore, beneath the umbrella of the 
Right, there is a multitude of parties, alliances and mergers. The 
fragmentation of the right, and the dominance of the left by a single major 
party make Romania an interested case study for strategies of political 
mobilization. Furthermore, in 2009, and 2012, some of the main right wing 
parties (i.e. PDL in 2009 and PNL in 2012) engaged with the left (i.e. PSD) in 
governing coalitions.  
In terms of personnel and organizational networks, the Social 
Democrats have largely benefitted from the logistical inheritance of the former 
Communist Party. This party has continuously strengthened its local 
organizations, given a predominantly rural electorate, and the incumbency 
advantage of multiple local party leaders. As such, PSD is by all accounts the 
Romanian party with the strongest territorial presence, and the clearest 
ideological positioning. As shown in the DALP figures presented in the 
previous chapter, PSD is also the only political party in Romania to have an 
equally dense nationwide network of organizations (i.e. formal 
representatives) and brokers (i.e. informal representatives). Subsequently, it 
scores the lowest average electoral volatility, per ideological group, in the new 
democratic setting (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011).  
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Figure 5. Electoral Scores27 in Romania (1996-2012)28 
Source: Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), http://alegeri.roaep.ro/, last accessed on 
19.06.2016 																																																								
27 National election scores are the average of Senate and Chamber of Representatives 
results for each party 
28 1996: Left is PSD (under its former name of Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR); 
Right is the Democratic Romanian Conventions, a coalition consisting of the historical 
Agrarian Party (PNȚCD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and smaller fractions, including the 
Democratic Hungarian Alliance in Romania (UDMR) only for the national elections 
2000: Left is PSD (under its former name of Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR); 
Right is the sum of former coalition parties standing separately in local elections, Democratic 
Party (PD) (9.9%), Democratic Romanian Convention (CDR) (7.47%), and National Liberal 
Party (PNL) (6.9%). At the national elections only the Democrats (PD) (9.14%) and the 
Liberals (9%) passed the Parliamentary threshold, with the second largest Parliamentary 
party after the Social Democrats being the Great Romanian Party (PRM) (25.39%) a 
nationalistic Party driven by its presidential candidate Vadim Tudor. 
2004: Left is PSD in alliance with the Conservative Party (PC); Right for the local elections is 
represented by the National Liberal Party (PNL) (15.98%), and the Democratic Party (PD) 
(12.79%) standing separately, and for the national elections standing together in the Truth 
and Justice Alliance (31.49%). 
2008: Left is PSD in alliance with the Conservative Party (PC); Right is the National Liberal 
Party (PNL) (18.20% at local, and 18.7% at national), and the Democratic Party (PD) (28.92% 
at local, and 33% at national) standing separately. 
2012: Left is the Social Liberal Union (USL) comprising the Social Democrats (PSD) and the 
National Liberal Party (PNL); Left is the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL, former Democratic 
Party) standing alone at local elections, and standing in coalition with the Agrarian Party 
(PNȚCD) at the national elections.  
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The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) also traces its genealogy back to 
the National Salvation Front (FSN), but it is less of a successor party, in terms 
of organizational, or ideological inheritance. It has also been in power for 
multiple electoral cycles, under various coalitions. Given its genealogy and 
times in office, it also has a very well established presence in the territory. 
This latter trait is sooner the result of recent efforts to establish roots in 
society, rather than a prerequisite of the old regime, like in the case of PSD. It 
has the least coherent ideological positioning from all the statewide Romanian 
parties.  
The National Liberal Party (PNL) is the only historical party with a 
consistent record in terms of electoral success. While it has never managed to 
win national elections on its own, it is collecting significant local victories, in 
key positions of mayors, county councils, and local councils, so as to have a 
strategic positioning in terms of informal resource allocation. It has been a 
ruling party, under various coalitions, but is has the least penetrating local 
networks from all the three major parties. One of the reasons for this is that it 
has a predominantly urban electorate, and has generally relied on a 
centralized organizational structure—a tendency that is currently tentatively 
changing. Much like the Social Democrats, PNL is also a relatively stable 
party from the ideological point of view, and as such, it also enjoys a low 
average electoral volatility over the past two decades (see Table 7).  
The absorption of Liberal Democrats (PDL) by the National Liberals 
(PNL) in 2015 proved to be a poor electoral leverage. After the merger, the 
new National Liberal Party (PNL) saw its electoral rankings fall bellow the sum 
of the two parties standing alone. This can be explained by the shift of many 
of the traditional voters of the National Liberals (PNL) to newly established 
parties, embodying the “true liberal values, rather than that of populism”29 
Ideological orientation variation in Romania seems to be weak on the 
political spectrum, as political parties often enter electoral alliances or 
international affiliations that seem antagonistic to their platform. One of the 																																																								
29 Popescu-Tăriceanu, former party leader of the National Liberal Party (PNL) 
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most drastic ideological changes was that of the former Democratic Party 
(PD), renamed as Liberal Democratic Party (PDL), renounced its’ affiliation to 
the Socialist International 30 , to later become in 2005 a member of the 
European People’s Party (EEP).  Similarly, the National Liberal Party (PNL) 
joined forces with the leftist PSD in 2012, in a very successful electoral 
alliance (50.27% at local elections, and 59.37% at national elections). While 
this might seem to be a widespread tendency of crowding the middle or 
narrowing policy space, it is also a particular symptom of post-communist 
democracies. Throughout Eastern Europe empirical data collection like the 
European Values Survey or the World Values Survey point to a much smaller 
differentiation between left and right at the population level (Bădescu and Sum 
2005, Voicu and Voicu 2007). Indeed, both self-placed people on the left and 
right wing expect public spending, and a powerful state, with the only 
variations appearing as to what sectors the state should concentrate its 
resources31.  
The Romanian Party System has struggled to achieve 
institutionalization in the post-communist democratic setting. As such, the 
Romanian political parties had to overcome such issues as the instability of 
interparty competition, having shallow roots in society, and most of all, not 
having a clear ideological identification (Volintiru 2012b). The high frequency 
of organizational changes, such as alliances, or mergers between parties, as 
well as the high frequency of politicians switching their political parties 
(traseism politic), all prove to be salient challenges to the institutionalization 
process. 
The challenges of the transition period are reflected in the highest 
levels of electoral volatility Romania recorded for the 1992 elections. The 
initial levels of volatility, some of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe, 
left the Romanian party system with the mark of ‘extreme volatility’, in the first 																																																								
30 The Democratic Party was accepted as a full member of the Socialist International in 1996, 
under the leadership of Petre Roman (Prime Minister 1989-1991). He was the son of Walter 
Roman (communist politician and fighter of the International Communist Brigades in the 
Spanish Civil War). 
31 Survey data from the Willing to Pay? ERC project, data collected on Romania in 3 waves, 
2013-2016  
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decade after the fall of communism (Epperly 2011, Dassonneville and Hooghe 
2011). Some of the existing measurements of this indicator, based on the 
Pedersen Index, show that subsequent elections have seen a substantial 
improvement in terms of the stability of voting preferences, with only the 2004 
elections seeing a slight surge in the overall trend (Epperly 2011, 
Dassonneville and Hooghe 2011). As I show in Table 1 (see Chapter 2), the 
electoral volatility scores for CEE are much lower once we account only for 
stable parties: Romania has the lowest electoral volatility of alternation (i.e. 
Type B) in CEE, scoring only 7. According to Powell and Tucker (2014: 143), 
the study of volatility in Central and Eastern Europe has long been a reflection 
of values primarily derived from party entries or exists from the party system: 
Table 7. Electoral Volatility in Romania (1990-2008) 
 1990-1992 1992-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008 
Social 
Democrats 
0.24 0.07 0.28 0.03 0.28 
Liberals 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.44 0.01 
Source: Gherghina and Jiglau 2011 
The volatility levels are usually recorded for a party system as a whole, 
but for the purpose of our analysis, in which we attempt to distinguish 
between the each political party’s specific organizational challenges, it is more 
relevant to look at the level of electoral volatility at a more granular level. 
Compiling volatility indices for each major party in Romania is not feasible, as 
most of them went through major organizational changes throughout the past 
decades. For some of the parties that can be traced over multiple electoral 
cycles (i.e. the main political competitors) this exercise can be done. As such, 
as such, recent studies (Gherghina 2014: 65) show that Romania comprises 
some of the extreme scores of low volatility (i.e. up to 20) in Central and 
Eastern Europe for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and for the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).  
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The Social Democratic Party (PSD) has scored consistently around 
35% of the votes, for list-based electoral competitions, either at the local (e.g. 
county or local council), or legislative elections (e.g. House of Representatives 
or Senate). Such list-based polls are telling of the parties actual level of 
support, based on organizational performance—developing and maintaining 
strong ties with the electorate. In contrast, success in personalized 
competitions can be driven by additional factors such as charisma, and are 
not necessarily telling of a political parties need or opportunity to resort to 
clientelistic linkages.  
I refer to ideological families, to see the extent to which parties of a 
specific relative positioning face electoral volatility. Using Birch’s (2001) 
methodology 32  Gherghina and Jiglau (2011) calculate this volatility in a 
relative manner, reporting the difference of vote shares to the total of votes 
received by the party in both elections. They find that Romania has reached a 
certain level of electoral continuity and stability in recent years, but the 
‘electoral support of each family is too fluid and makes it impossible to claim 
that the ideological families have strong roots in the society’ (Gherghina and 
Jiglau 2011).  
This situation is reinforced by the discrepancies between rural and 
urban communities. While the rural electorate maintains consistent political 
options, most of which are supported through traditional clientelistic linkage, 
the urban electorate is both politically volatile, and predominantly targeted by 
short-term clientelistic exchanges (Volintiru 2012a). As such, the Romanian 
political parties show significant disparities from rural to urban environments, 
both in terms of their electoral support, but also in terms of their linkage 
strategies.   
The organizational strength of a political party is partially based on its 
number of party members. While being a party member is not the same as 																																																								
32  
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being actively involved in campaigning, in the absence of figures on the latter 
category, we look at membership numbers as proxies of organizational 
strength, from the human resource perspective. As such, we see an overall 
decreasing trend for the last two electoral cycles (see Figure 6). The only 
party that records an increase in its party members is the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD). Still, similar to all European democracies, the percentage of 
party members in the electorate is mostly marginal. As such, it is highly 
unlikely that the roots in society are developed on the basis of formal political 
activism.  
These low numbers of party membership are sooner indicative of the 
informal linkages systems deployed by all the major Romanian parties. Still, 
the decreasing level of party membership falls well within the broader political 
trends at the European level, and within the predictions of the cartel party 
model. As such, parties become increasingly more reliant on a 
professionalization of the electoral competition—the business firm model 
(Hopkin and Paolucci 1999), as they loose the advantage of stable 
organizations—decreasing membership, and stable electoral support—
increasing volatility. 
Finally, another dimension of the main Romanian parties evolution 
throughout the past two decades is that they have displayed inclusive 
coalition formation patterns in the sense that each party joined a coalition with 
every other party. Additionally, the elite is relatively homogenous and rarely 
changes: a large amount of the members of Parliament (MPs) is re-nominated 
and re-elected in consecutive terms (Stefan et al. 2012). Even when new 
parties emerge, the majority of their candidates were previously members of 
one or several of the major political parties (Gherghina & Soare 2013).  
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Figure 6. Party Membership as Percentage of the Electorate in Romania 
(2008-2012) 
 
Source: compiled by the author based on Official Party Registry in Romania (2012), similar to 
those reported in Gherghina (2012) 
3.2. Distribution of Power Between the Centre and the Periphery 
This process of cartelization generates a communicating vessels type 
of transfer of clientelistic strategies between the main political parties. As 
such, the organizational specificities of each party remain useful in 
distinguishing between the specificities of the linkage mechanisms (e.g. 
relying more heavily on local brokers/distribution of goods vs. relying more 
heavily on third party intermediaries/distribution of regulatory favors), but in 
general terms it can be asserted that all parties use clientelistic means to a 
certain extent.  
Inner organizational dynamics of the competing political parties are 
frequently reflected in their electoral strategies. For example, the more 
centralized a party organization is, the more it relies on such specific drivers 
of electoral success as: charismatic leadership, external funding (i.e. 
donations from non-party members), or even logistic support (e.g. campaign 
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materials/events). The more powerful the local leaders seem to be within the 
party organization, the more they are able to organize their campaigns and 
ensure electoral success in their constituencies without relying too much on 
support from the central leadership.  
Local Government leaders in Romania (e.g. mayors, county council 
presidents) are elected. In this electoral grid33, all the main political parties 
discussed in this chapter have a dense territorial presence, judging by their 
organizational bases. The Social Democrats (PSD), are (and have always 
been) the best represented party in the territory; it accounts for 13.832 
organizational bases in Romania, which means it has a dense capillary 
network down to village-level. The other two major parties, the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL), as well as the National Liberal Party (PNL) have, by all 
accounts 34 , a substantial territorial networks as well, covering all the 
municipalities and towns in Romania.  
As mentioned in the previous section, given the ever-diminishing 
number of party members, across the entire Romanian party system, political 
parties appear primed to employ clientelistic linkage strategies. In this context, 
the territorial organizations become key platforms for the clientelistic 
distributional system. Party members from territorial offices thus become 
brokers—intermediating the distribution of public resources to beneficiaries. 
The distributive politics has been well covered by the existing literature 
(Kitschelt and Kselman 2013, Stokes et al 2013), but it is important to 
distinguish between the local party leaders quality as brokers, and their 
potential quality as patrons. This latter status is specifically linked to their 
ability to produce, or distort in a discretionary manners flows of public 
resources.  																																																								
33 Formed of 42 counties, out of which one is the capital city of Bucharest. Bellow the county 
level, there are 103 municipalities, 217 cities, and 2856 communes, totaling over 3,000 Local 
Governments (LGs) in Romania. The electoral stakes at the county level target the positions 
of County Council President, and County Council members. For every other administrative 
sub-division—municipality, city, or commune, the electoral competition targets the positions of 
Mayor, and Local Council member. There are 12955 villages in Romania, forming communes, 
but they do not have any electoral stakes of their own. 
34 the central offices of these parties were unable to communicate the exact number of 
territorial organizations, but multiple sources confirmed that they have a statewide presence 
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If local party leaders are only distributors of clientelistic resources 
generated from above, then their power within the party organization will be 
limited. Reversely, if they are patrons in their own right (i.e. able to mobilize 
human and material resources which are then distributed for electoral 
purposes), then it is to be expected that their power within the party 
organization will be higher—sometimes even surpassing that of the central 
leadership. This latter distribution of power—higher local organizational 
strength than that of the central leadership, is generally reflected in the ability 
of local party bosses to influence central decision-making.  
As both the central and the local party leaders are beneficiaries of the 
clientelistic system they uphold, I do not find evidence of open contestation 
from local leaders towards central leadership. Rather, there is ample evidence 
of pressures from local branches to have representation, and decision-making 
power at the national level. This ability is a key factor of their survival strategy. 
Firstly, local party leaders, in their elected capacities (e.g. mayors, county 
council presidents), can secure funding that consolidates their local patron 
function, and consequently, their electoral success. Secondly, they can exert 
patronage with more largesse, when they can offer central executive functions 
to their brokers, and supporters. As a consequence of appointing their people 
in central institutions, they also reinforce their chances to receive 
governmental transfers, thus extending their distribution capacity.  
3.2.1. Party Leader Selection 
When looking at the leadership selection procedure, it is useful to 
distinguish between the party leader—whose selection can be influenced by 
other factors such as charisma, and the central decision-making body—
whose composition is dictated to a greater degree by party organizational 
rules and procedures. The selection procedure of the party leader contains 
certain representation features that are telling of how big a role can local party 
leaders, or local representatives play.  
Based on party statutes, and official accounts of conventions Chiru and 
Gheghina (2012) compare the leadership selection regulation of the 
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Romanian political parties (see Table 8). This evidence shows that all the 
main parties in Romania have a similar procedure in terms of the presence of 
central representatives, and territorial delegates. But, this apparent 
equilibrium of representation is shadowed by the fact that most parties do not 
have a clear representative formula for delegates (see Table 8). In other 
words, it is still the central leadership that decides who will atend the selection 
convention, thus creating significant bias in favour of the leadership candidate 
supported from the centre.35  
Table 8. Leadership Selection Regulation of Romanian Political Parties 
     Provision PSD PDL PNL UDMR 
Ex officio delegates (central 
leadership) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Territorial Delegates ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Central leaders decide on the 
representation algorithm of 
delegates 
✓ ✓ ✓ - 
Clear procedure for the 
representation algorithm - - ✓ n.a. 
Reserved mandates for youth 
members - - - ✓ 
Delegates of corporate 
organizational - - - ✓ 
The National Convention can 
dismiss the president - - ✓ ✓ 
President elected with leadership 
team - ✓ ✓ - 
Source: adapted by the author based on Chiru and Gherghina (2011) 
Another important element of the selection of the party leader is 
whether he is tied to a specific team, or whether the other members of the 
central decision-making body will compete on their own. In the case of the 																																																								
35 PSD Statute 2001/2005/2006, PDL Statute 2001/2003/ 2005/ 2007, PNL Statute 
2001/2002/2005, UDMR Statute 2003/2007 
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Democratic Liberals (PDL), and the National Liberals (PNL), the president of 
the party is elected on a list that comprises its selected leadership team (i.e. 
vicepresidents). The Social Democrats (PSD) do not require the leader to tie 
itself to any specific team, thus leaving more positions open for 
competition.This internal struggle for power influences clientelistic strategies 
deployment as well. The more hierarchically accountable a political party is, 
the more likely it is to see effective transversal clientelistic linkages. These 
would start with politicization of key appointments at the national level (e.g. 
state agencies), to the strategy of deploying political allocations to 
complement electoral strategies—forging political alliances, and further down 
to mobilizing human (i.e. voters) and material (i.e. donations) resources in the 
territory. A fractionalised internal party organization would not be in a similarly 
advantageous position to make use of the full extent of the clientelistic 
system.  
Finally, the level of competitiveness in the leadership selection process 
is associated with critical junctures in the life of political parties, such as a 
poor electoral performance (Chiru and Gherghina 2012:530). Incumbent rate 
of success are high across the entire political party spectrum. In fact, it is 
mostly through electoral failures that party leaders lose their position, by 
having to step down. If in the case of the ethnic minority party (UDMR) the 
incumbent rate of success is 100% for the entire post-communist period, for 
the other three major parties it varies from 75% (Social Democrats, and 
National Liberals) to 83.3% (Democratic Liberals) (Chiru and Gherghina 
2012).  
Even when the leadership selection was more than a mere formality, it 
still was a rather ermetic confrontation, in which not more than two candidates 
had real chances of success. For the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) for 
example, from 18 Congresses since the ’89 Revolution, only 4 had more than 
one candidate (Soare 2016). Moreover, even if contenders do announce 
themselves beforehand, they drop out of competing before the Congress 
dates. The turnout of delegates are equally impressive, as for the latest 
internal elections, the Social Democrats had at their Congress 435,172 
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members present, out of a total of 535,699 registered members (Soare 2016). 
Consequently, in the PSD we see a much bigger competition for ‚second-tier’, 
or middle leadership positions, than in the case of other parties. Largely 
attributable to its territorial network and stratachy organization, this trend is 
also explained by the custom of selecting leaders who previously held internal 
executive positions for several years (e.g. Adrian Năsatase, Victor Ponta, 
Liviu Dragnea). The specificities of the leadership selection procedures 
demonstrate a structural inclination to consolidate the dominance of the 
central leadership over that of various challengers—from local leaders, or 
from other contenders within the central party.  
3.2.2. Party in Central Office: Representation in Party Leadership 
Forums 
As mentioned before, a suggestive context of power distribution 
between central party representatives, and local party bosses is the national 
decision-making body, which traditionally comprises both the leaders of local 
organizations, and national politicians. It is labeled differently by the 
Romanian political parties: for the Social Democrats (PSD), and the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) the central decision-making forum is called 
the ‘Permanent National Bureau’ (Biroul Național Permanent), while in the 
case of the National Liberals (PNL) it is called the ‘National Political Bureau’ 
(Biroul Național Politic). The number of members comprised in such 
structures varies as well, with the National Liberals (PNL) making room for 32, 
while the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), and the Social Democrats (PSD) 
settle for 22, and respectively 21 (see Table 9).  
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Table 9. Composition of the Parties' Leadership Forum* 
 
Party Centre Vice-Presidents Regional Vice-Presidents Total  
Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) 8 
Rovana Plumb (Labour 
Minister); Eugen 
Bejinariu; Dan Șova 
(Infrastructure and 
Investment Minister); 
Nicolae Bănicioiu (Health 
Minister); Titus Corlățean 
(Foreign Affairs 
Minister); Corina Crețu 
(MEP); Dan Nica 
(Energy Minister); 
Ecaterina Andronescu 
(MEP) 
12 
Paul Stănescu (Olt); Olguța 
Vasilescu (Craiova); Mircea 
Dușa (Harghita); Iona Călinoiu 
(Gorj); Ioan Rus (Cluj); 
Gabriela Firea (Ilfov); Ion 
Mocioalca (Caraș-Severin); 
Mircea Cosma (Prahova); 
Marian Oprișan (Vrancea); 
Robert Negoiță (București, S3); 
Constantin Niță (Brașov); 
Marian Vanghelie (București, 
S5); Gheorghe Nichita (Iași) 
21 
Democratic 
Liberal Party 
(PDL) 
21 
Cătălin Predoiu; Anca 
Boagiu; Liviu Negoiță; 
Andreea Paul; Dorin 
Florea; Gheorghe Flutur; 
Radu F. Alexandru; 
Roberta Anastase; 
Alexandru Nazare; 
Sulfina Barbu; Alin Tise; 
Ștefan Gheorghe; 
Raluca Țurcan; Cristina 
Dobre; Romeo Raicu; 
Ioan Oltean; Ioan Bălan; 
Cezar Preda; Bogdan 
Cantaragiu; Marian Jean 
Marinescu; Alin 
Popoviciu 
1 
Mircea Hava (Oradea) 
22 
National Liberal 
Party (PNL) 14 
Daniel Chițoiu; Eugen 
Nicolăescu; Norica 
Nicolai; Varujan 
Vosganian; Puiu Hașotti; 
Dan Motreanu; Tudor 
Chiuariu; Ovidiu Silaghi; 
Florin Alexe; Mihai 
Stănișoară; Mircea 
Roșca; Marius Nicoară; 
Cristian Buican; Marius 
Obreja 
18 
Klaus Iohannis (Sibiu); Rareș 
Mănescu (București, S6); Mihai 
Voicu (Dolj); Marcel Vela 
(Caraș-Severin); Cristian 
Adomniței (Iași); Cristian Bîgiu 
(Buzău); Ilie Bolojan (Oradea); 
Aristotel Căncescu (Brașov); 
Ciprian Dobre (Mureș); Radu 
Filipescu (Călărași); Sorin 
Frunzăverde (Caraș-
Severin);Mircea Moloț 
(Hunedoara); Marian Petrache 
(Ilfov); Cornel Popa (Bihor); 
Nicolae Robu (Timiș); Marius 
Stan (Galați); Romeo 
Stavarache (Bacău); Florin 
Turcanu (Botoșani); Horea 
Uioreanu (Cluj) 
32 
Source: official party data on websites, last updates in April 2014 
*Analysis focused on the three major parties 
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Other internal party structures can also play a role in increasing the 
influence of certain party members, even if it is more informally. For example, 
a ‚shadow cabinet’ system was developed in the PSD with specialised 
departments (Departamente) created under the National Council of the party, 
to analyse and develop sectorial public policies. While this organizational 
structure has been largely dismantled, when it was initially created by the 
former Prime Minister and party leader, Adrian Năstase, it was populated with 
some of his closest collaborators. The Liberal Democrats (PDL) attempted a 
similar system of designating ‚portfolio specialists’ within their organization, as 
a means to suggest who their nominations would be in a future Cabinet, and 
once again give them a boost of informal power. 
Electoral victories, and strong administrative dominance in the territory 
(e.g. consecutive terms in office as local elected official) are amongst the 
elements that consolidate the power of local leaders vis a vis the center. 
Examples include Marian Oprișan (PSD)—4 consecutive terms as Vrancea 
county council president, or Romeo Stavarache (PNL)—3 consecutive term as 
mayor of the city of Bacău. Still, there are numerous powerful local party 
leaders who do not have a seat in this decision-making forum. In contrast, 
many ‘newcomers’ have a seat at the table. Such examples would include 
Olguța Vasilescu (PSD), former mayor of Craiova municipality, or Marian 
Petrache (PNL), Ilfov county council president. Such examples show the 
balance that is usually struck between bottom-up (i.e. local party leaders 
joining the national forum) and top-down (i.e. national leaders that have 
assumed offices in the territory) nominations.  
Not only are the local leaders well represented in the national decision-
making bodies in the case of the Social Democrats (PSD), and the National 
Liberals (PNL), but they are also majoritarian, covering approximately 60% of 
the vice-presidential positions. If we look at the political offices of the regional 
vice-presidents of the selected political parties, we find that the vast majority 
of them are mayors, or county council presidents in the counties where they 
are organization leaders. In other words, they have been the first hand 
beneficiaries of the organizational and political capacity they helped build or 
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support. This is an obvious element of electoral success, and a partial 
explanation of the incumbency effects that the political leader holding a public 
office will automatically develop; thus, strengthening its political organization, 
and reinforcing its chances of reelection. 
The distribution of seats in these party leadership bodies is structured 
after the 2012 electoral cycle, which brought the union of Social Democrats 
(PSD), and National Liberals (PNL) to power, by ousting the Democratic 
Liberals (PDL). As such, one reasonable explanation for the majoritarian 
predominance of central politicians in the Permanent National Bureau of the 
PDL is that it does not have to govern, or win elections, with the help of local 
party leaders, as they no longer hold a significant share of the local elected 
offices, since the local elections of 2012.  
Thus, beyond the strategic organizational tendencies of each political 
party, it is mostly the control of an elected public office that makes a political 
leader both semi-autonomous in terms of clientelistic resources (i.e. controls 
public resources through his own position), and subsequently influential with 
regards to the party leadership. Still, it is not an automatic condition to have 
representation in the national forums, as many powerful local leaders, with 
consecutive terms in office, and a stronghold over public resources can still be 
marginalized.  
Such examples would include Radu Mazăre (former Mayor of 
Constanța) (PSD), or Tudor Pendiuc (former Mayor of Pitești) (PSD). As many 
other strong local leaders disenchanted with their relative power within the 
party, the latter ran in the 2016 elections as an independent, and lost to the 
PSD candidate. This example suggests that the local networks are hard to 
transfer outside the label of the party, even when they are managed by local 
bosses.  
A first explanation for the exclusion of notable local leaders from 
central party leadership is intra-party patronage networks36. When the leader 
of one of the main political parties changes (e.g. Victor Ponta took over the 																																																								
36 based on interviews with party officials, conducted between 2011 and 2014 
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PSD presidency from Mircea Geoană in 2011), the leadership forum will 
change subsequently. The leadership forum is essentially ‘nothing more than 
the leader’s camarilla’37.  
Another explanation of why certain powerful local leaders become 
marginalized is that they have been sullied by corruption allegations and 
investigations. The interesting part of such explanations is that the official 
prosecutions on their corruption deeds only came after they were 
marginalized from the party leadership (e.g. Radu Mazăre). It is therefore 
plausible to suspect that the party leaders knew about the local bosses 
exposure beforehand. In their desire to become increasingly more powerful 
within the party, many of the local bosses, from all the three major parties, 
created an ‘overload’ of the clientelistic system, dilapidating local public 
resources at an increasingly unsustainable pace. As the final chapter of the 
thesis will show, both the mechanisms for doing so, as well as the actors 
driving such spoliation at the local level can become liabilities to their party 
when they engage the clientelistic instruments for personal benefit. Merely 
excluding them from the party leadership is obviously a poor solution, but it 
can be regarded as a first step in an attempt to take distance from potential, 
and sometimes actual criminal offenders. Even worse from the party’s point of 
view, such disavowed brokers fail to comply with the goal of the clientelistic 
system: reinforcing the organization.  
The importance of becoming part of the leadership team of a political 
party has much to do with becoming a semi-autonomous patron. As such, 
when a local party leader becomes a part of the national decision-making 
body he can develop his territorial base and political power not only by 
distributing public resources, but also by advancing the career of its clients. 
On one hand, patronage can be deployed with regards to appointed public 
offices, including those of civil servants (see Chapter 4 and 5). On the other 
hand, a political patron can much more easily deploy protection with regards 
to the political careers of its clients, specifically by supporting their nomination.  																																																								
37 Radu Magdin, political analyst and advisor to the Prime Minister (2014-2015), interview with 
the author, 6.10.2014 
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3.2.3.  Electoral Candidate Selection 
One of the elements that can be most informative on the issue of intra-
party patronage, or how the power relations form within party organizations, is 
the renomination rate of candidates. Taking into account existing 
computations of the renomination rate of Members of Parliament (MPs) 
candidates (Gherghina 2015), I assess the different strategies of nomination 
the main Romanian political parties had throughout the past decades. I 
compare and contrast the renomination indicator for each party, for each 
legislative election since the fall of the communist regime, and up to 2008, 
with the electoral shares obtained by those parties. The electoral shares refer 
to both the number of votes each party obtained in the elections, and the total 
number of seats each party obtained in the same electoral round. 
With every election in Romania, we can find various changes to the 
process by which parties compete. For example, the first electoral round had 
only minimal differences between the share of votes, and share of seats in the 
House of Representatives gained by each party. Subsequently, following 
legislative changes, the major parties were in an more advantageous position 
compared to the smaller parliamentary parties, as a marginal votes 
redistribution system enhanced their share of seats over their electoral 
performance. Still, in terms of the clientelistic network, the focus of the 
electoral process remains the same: increasing one’s power to promote as 
many of ‘his people’ on eligible positions – either directly elected, or 
redistributed. The same process applies to local councils too.   
In terms of the level of the renomination indicator, its yearly value can 
be explained to a great extent by each party’s specificities, in terms of size 
and electorate, as well as its electoral strategy. While both the PSD and the 
PDL can be considered successor parties, as they both stream from the initial 
mammoth—the National Salvation Front (FSN), the latter’s electoral 
performance is much less based on party organization, and territorial 
presence, as it is on mergers and electoral alliances.  
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Table 10. Renomination Rates for the Major Romanian Parties and their 
Electoral Shares (1992-2008)  
    PSD PNL PDL UDMR 
1992 Renomination Rate 23 n.a. 34 32 
 
Electoral Share*  34.36% n.a. 23.77% 8.39% 
  Electoral Share** 28.29% n.a. 20.16% 7.58% 
1996 Renomination Rate 25 n.a. 37 40 
 
Electoral Share*  21.52% n.a. 30.17% 6.64% 
  Electoral Share** 26.53% n.a. 35.57% 7.29% 
2000 Renomination Rate 37 32 42 43 
 
Electoral Share*  36.61% 6.80% 7.03% 6.80% 
  Electoral Share** 44.93% 7.83% 8.99% 7.83% 
2004 Renomination Rate 37 36 23 42 
 
Electoral Share*  36.64% n.a. 31.26% 6.20% 
  Electoral Share** 39.76% n.a. 33.74% 6.62% 
2008 Renomination Rate 47 45 34 39 
 
Electoral Share*  33.10% 18.60% 32.40% 6.20% 
  Electoral Share** 34.41% 19.47% 34.44% 6.59% 
Source: based on Gherghina 2015, and Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) data 
The main coalition partner of the PDL has been the third biggest party 
in Romania—the PNL. These two parties ran on common lists for the 
legislative election in Romania in 1992, 1996, 2004, and have merged in the 
autumn of 2014, under the name of the National Liberal Party (PNL). Under 
common lists, it is harder to control the renomination process to the same 
extent. Still, PDL’s rate of renomination remains high, with the exception of 
2004, when it scored well bellow the regional average, due to internal power 
struggles, and divisions within the party leadership. On the smaller party 
spectrum, we see that the UDMR had a steadily high level of renomination, 
especially since it has a smaller number of potential candidates, being an 
ethnic  minority party. This strategy proved to go very well with its relatively 
constant share of the votes, even if it is going through a slightly decreasing 
tendency lately.  
The level of centralization in the decision-making process of candidate 
selection is telling of the general organizational approach of a political party. 
Expanding on previous scaling methods of candidate selection (Lundell 2004), 
Gherghina (2014) is customizing Romanian’s political parties’ level of 
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centralization regarding candidate selection. As such, we have a full spectrum 
of positions, ranging from the decentralized nominations (1), where selection 
of candidates is done at the local level, to centralized nominations (6), where 
selection is done by the party leader, or central decision-making organs. The 
specificity of this approach is that it accounts for the distinction between local 
nominations (3)—selection takes place at the local level, but the national level 
has final say over the candidate list, and mixed nominations (4)—internal 
algorithm of distribution (e.g. ½ or 1/3 of the candidates selected by the local 
organizations, and the rest by the central organizations).   
Figure 7. The Index of Candidate Selection in CEE Political Parties 
 
 
       1           2          3          4        5       6 
 
Selection at                         Selection at  
local level                           central level 
 
1 – Decentralized 
2 – Local authority 
3 – Local nominations 
4 – Mixed nominations 
5 – Central nominations 
6 – Centralized 
 
Sources: Gheghina 2014 
This internal process of candidate selection is telling of how the 
organizational specificities of each party might impact on the personnel 
policies, or patronage endeavors of those parties once they access 
governmental power. The scale of mixed nominations (4) proves to be a 
highly relevant organizational structure, especially for the candidate selection 
and appointment procedures of broad coalitions. Thus, the Social Democrats 
(PSD) have demonstrated a general predilection for this form of internal 
candidate selection (see Figure 7), but as this thesis shows, this process has 
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been largely reproduced in terms of the central appointments after winning 
elections. More specifically, a certain proportion of candidates, or 
appointments is controlled, or are the prerogative of local party leaders. This 
reinforces the strength of local bosses, in terms of their patronage power, but 
it also links them more tightly to the central organization, as recipients of 
political favors. 
We can observe the changes some of the Romanian parties attempted 
to do regarding their internal candidate selection procedures (see Figure 7). 
As such, we see shifts of positions in the case of the Social Democrats, in 
2004, towards greater decentralization, which was promptly reversed by the 
next elections. We also see a more stable change of positioning in the case of 
the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), which also steered towards local 
nominations in 2004. In this latter case, the decentralization tendency seems 
to hold, suggesting there is greater support from the central leadership for 
such distribution of power in the internal selection procedures.  
To connect the candidate selection procedure within the political parties 
under discussion with the clientelistic structures, we can look at the density 
level of local intermediaries, and the local power of selection in each case 
(see Table 9). Thus, we find that those all the statewide parties—Social 
Democrats (PSD), Democratic Liberals (PDL), and National Liberals (PNL), 
record a high density of local intermediaries. Inversely the significantly smaller 
parties of ethnic minority (UDMR), or the Conservative (PC) have a low 
density of local intermediaries. The density of local intermediaries is a very 
close reflection of the organizational capacity of each Romanian party. As 
such, it is easy to assume that organizational strength can be translated into 
clientelistic network capacity.  
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Table 11. Density of Local Intermediaries and Power of Candidate 
Selection in Romanian Political Parties 
 Low Density of Local 
Intermediaries 
High Density of Local 
Intermediaries 
Low Local Power of 
Candidate 
Selection 
UDMR (Democratic Alliance 
of Hungarians in Romania) 
PSD (Social Democratic Party) 
High Local Power 
of Candidate 
Selection 
PC (Conservative Party) PDL (Democratic Liberal Party) 
PNL (National Liberal Party) 
Source: adapted and interpreted by the author based on data from the ‘Project on 
Democratic Accountability and Citizen-Politician Linkages around the World’ (2013), Duke 
University38 
Still, as this chapter set out to achieve, it is important to assess to what 
extent local clientelistic linkages influence the internal balance of power of a 
political party. In order to do so, we compare the density of local 
intermediaries with the local power of selection. In other words, I am trying to 
approximate to what extent the clientelistic activities in the territory can be 
capitalized as power leverage over the central leadership.  
The more local power of candidate selection there is, the more 
important the local clientelistic networks are to the parties’ survival.  
Congruent with the previous estimates of centralization (Gheghina 2014), the 
Social Democrats (PSD) appear to value the least their local intermediaries, 
from all the three main parties analyzed here. In contrast, the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL), and the National Liberal Party (PNL) appear to be 
granting a higher candidate selection power to local leaders (see Table 11).   
																																																								
38 expert-survey raw data, at the party level, for Romania, in the DALP dataset. The present 
analysis on the density of local intermediaries is based on the experts’ evaluation of the 
number and territorial coverage of political parties’ intermediaries in the field (variable a3).   
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3.2.4. Party Switching  
In terms of the subsequent behavior of the nominated candidates, we 
can see a high degree of instability. In contrast to the expectations of the 
consolidation theory, the frequency of changes of party affiliation by the 
members of the Romanian Parliament has not diminished, but doubled. Chiru 
(2013) shows that throughout the period 1992-2004, the number of party 
affiliation changes (traseism politic) would vary within the interval of 10-15% of 
the total number of Members of Parliament (MPs).  
But, it is since 2004 that almost a quarter of the MPs have had at least 
one change of party affiliation (Chiru 2013). This trend of diminishing political 
loyalty is even further enhanced by some of the legislators’ habit of party 
switching multiple times, during the same term in office. Still, at the legislators’ 
level it is seldom the case of them being semi-autonomous patrons of their 
own patronage networks that they place at the service of a party, as opposed 
to local public officials. The party switching phenomenon at the legislative 
level is mostly based on the fact that throughout the past electoral cycles 
parliamentary majorities were not so much a reflection of the electoral results, 
as much as that of coalition negotiations. As such, additional MPs bought in 
with various prerogatives of public office are an easy way into power.  
There are two main drivers of party switching in Romania: winning 
elections, and forming ruling coalitions. In the case of members of Parliament 
these two drivers converge much more than in the case of local 
representatives. As such, we can look at the high levels of party switching in 
Romania as a manifestation of both personal interests—winning a seat in 
Parliament, or benefitting from appointments to specific Parliamentary 
Commissions, as well as a proactive survival strategy of political parties. This 
latter aspect is directly linked to patronage and clientelistic exchange 
mechanisms, as it is mostly through them that elected MPs are usually 
convinced to change their party affiliation. The degree of autonomy of 
Romanian MPs vis-à-vis their local party boss is generally relatively low within 
major parties, as it is the organizational infrastructure of the local leader that 
pushes up their winning chances.  
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Figure 8. Parliamentary Party Switching in Romania per Legislative 
Term (1992-2012) 
 
Source: Chiru (2013) 
Still, notable exceptions of high autonomy are found in the case of the 
numerous MPs that “buy their way into Parliament”39. These are candidates 
that either finance their own campaigns, even if they candidate within one of 
the major parties, or run under the umbrella of smaller popular, or 
personalistic driven parties (e.g. PPDD). In the first case, local leaders might 
allow such self-funded candidates if they do not have the organizational 
strength (i.e. resources, manpower), or if the electoral victory margin is slim. 
In the second case, the entire purpose of these top-down, barely formed 
parties is to recruit new leaders, with financial strength, and electoral 
ambitions. Such politicians might more often than not be motivated by the 
legal cover of immunity granted to MPs in Romania, or by the objective of 
tapping into the informal linkage systems covered by the present research 
project—“being an MP is not much in terms of power, but your in the ‘market 
place’ [i.e. meeting point of business interests, usually connected to public 
contracts]”40. A detailed analysis on the clientelistic mechanisms behind party 
financing can be found in Chapter 6, in the present thesis.  
																																																								
39 F.G., local campaign manager for the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL), interview with the 
author 28.10.2014 
40 B.D., Member of Parliament, interview with the author 25.09.2012 
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One of the most telling examples of the appetite and dynamics of party 
switching in Romania is the quasi-experimental situation created by the recent 
passing of an Emergency Ordinance (ordonanță de urgență a guvernului) 
(OUG). In August 2014, during the Parliamentary break, and in the heat of the 
campaign preparations for the presidential elections of the fall, Ponta cabinet 
passed an emergency ordinance (Emergency Ordinance No. 55/2014). 
According to its provisions, it allowed for a period of 45 days for elected 
officials, at the local governmental levels (i.e. mayors, deputy mayors, county 
council president, local and county councilmen), to change their party 
affiliation, if they wished, without losing their mandate. The current legislation 
allows for members of Parliament (MPs) to change their affiliation during their 
term in office, but it is forbidden for local elected officials to do so41.  
The promotional argument behind this decision was the fact that the 
ruling coalition broke, leaving in power the Social Democratic Party (PSD), 
and the Conservative Party (PC), and in the opposition its former governing 
partner—the National Liberal Party (PNL). The coalition of these three 
parties—the Social Liberal Union (USL), won more than 80% of the total 
number of elected positions, both at the national, and at the local level, in 
2012. Still, the exit from power of the PNL, and the merger with the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) supported the electoral victory of their 
presidential candidate—Klaus Iohannis, in the fall of 2014. This shift of sides 
was even more dramatic when coupled with splits from within all major 
parties: Democratic Liberal Party (PDL)—the Popular Movement Party (PMP), 
National Liberal Party (PNL)—the Reforming Liberal Party (PLR), and the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD)—the United Romania Party (PRU). While all of 
the splits are marginal from the point of view of Parliamentary mandates, they 
presented further supporting arguments in support of this limited period of 
freedom of “re-affiliation” at the local governmental level. 
The predictable consequences of this “window of opportunity” was a 
major shifting movements: 1,500 local elected officials changed their party 																																																								
41 According to Law 393/2004 regarding the status of local elected officials. 
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affiliation, out of which the vast majority went to the ruling Social Democratic 
Party (PSD). The drivers for this migration belong both to realm of personal 
motivations, as well as that of survival strategy on the part of the political party 
leaders. On one hand, the local public officials (e.g. mayors, councilmen) go 
to the ruling party in order to get additional benefits (e.g. promotions for 
members of the family employed in public institution, public contracts through 
intermediaries).  
On the other hand, the ruling political parties are willing to offer 
additional benefits to newcomers, even when they know these are not 
necessarily trustworthy, or would create tensions at the level of the local party 
organizations, with the sole purpose of consolidating their majorities in local 
forums. This is important especially in the frequently met situation in which the 
electoral cycle began with a coalition, which broke down along the way—the 
PSD and PNL won elections in 2012 on common lists, but currently PNL 
merged with PDL, and the fight for a new majority is led at the local forums, as 
well as in Parliament.   
While the Romanian Constitutional Court currently contests the 
emergency ordinance, and the party switching may not be after all 
recognized, there is a remaining powerful proof on the volatility of elected 
officials in Romania. The party switching elected officials represent less than 
10% of the total number of elected officials, but their numbers are still 
suggestive of the strength of political clientelism in Romania. This is because 
most of these switching mayors had the objective of securing and expanding 
their central transfers based on intra-party affiliations with the ruling 
government. As one interviewee put it: “it is no problem to get all your arrear 
payments from him [i.e. the Budget Minister], as long as you are red [i.e. the 
trademark color of the PSD]”42. The issue of local governments’ dependency 
on preferential budgetary transfers from the central government will be further 
discussed throughout the thesis.  
																																																								
42 M. I., employee in a public utility company, interview with the author, 27.10.2014 
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Coming back to the Parliamentary arena, even if the general level of 
party switching is telling of the level of relative instability of party 
organizations, and the openness towards clientelistic exchanges, it is not 
helping us discern between the organizational specificities of each political 
party. An analysis for the legislative term 2008-201243 shows that the Liberal 
Democrats (PDL) records the highest number of changes of party affiliation—
56, followed by the Social Democrats (PSD)—43, and by the National Liberals 
(PNL) with only 20 MPs. In this assessment, I only considered those that 
chose to leave each of the major political parties in Romania, and not those 
than came in. In other words, I looked at outward party switches, because in 
fact, the destination of most of these MPs’ change was still one of these three 
political parties. The high number of party switches from the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL) is telling of its demise in 2012, after a Parliamentary 
impeachment vote. More than half of the party switchers chose to defect in 
the days preceding this impeachment vote. Thus, it is highly probable that it 
was not an ideological shift, but rather an interest driven, clientelistic one.  
In contrast, the empirical evidence collected for the present research 
suggests that for the latest electoral cycles local elected officials shift their 
political affiliation in a much smaller proportion—an average level of 3% per 
year. A temporary hike can be associated with a legislative provision (i.e. 
Emergency Ordinance 55/2014) that was subsequently revoked, which 
attempted to protect those local elected officials that wanted to change their 
affiliation. Still, the overall diverging tendencies between national, and local 
candidates’ loyalty towards the political party they represent are consistent 
with this chapter’s assumption that local organizational ties can be stronger 
than central ones.  
One explanation can be that local patronage networks (i.e. mayors, 
local councilmen, county councilmen) develop a higher loyalty (given 
personalized bonds), than national ones (i.e. parliamentarians, state 
secretaries, ministries). Bonds at the local level have been forged over longer 																																																								
43 http://www.openpolitics.ro/noutati/homepage/parlamentarii-migreaza-cauze-consecinte-si-
explicatii-comparative.html, last accessed 02.06.2014  
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periods of time, and party activists at the local level are usually the last 
remaining relics of a time of professional party politics, while the ones in 
central government can be more easily suspected of a mercenary mentality. 
Still, it is hard to empirically prove such expectations due to the fact that the 
legislation is also more restrictive towards party switching at the local level, 
than it is at the central level.  
Another explanation is that local party leaders enjoy the control of 
vaster public resources (be they conditional on executive decisions) than MPs 
or state secretaries. Therefore from an economic perspective, for an MP, 
switching the party is less costly (from the clientelistic perspective) than for 
the leader of a Local Government. The resource-conditioning logic is 
confirmed by the fact that no acting Minister (the only national function that 
controls more public resources than Local Government leaders) has ever 
switched parties in Romania. 
When looking simultaneously at the candidate selection procedures of 
the main political parties in Romania, and the stability or loyalty of the party 
representatives in Parliament, I find that candidate selection at the local levels 
seems to yield fewer instances of party switching. The change of political 
affiliation is obviously linked to more contextual factors, than the mere 
selection procedure, but it seems likely that the stronger the linkages of the 
local organization are towards legislative candidates, the less likely they will 
engage in party switching. 
3.3. Changing Roles: From Local Brokers to Political Patrons in the 
Romanian Clientelistic Networks 
The analysis of various traits of Romanian political parties—from their 
evolution to their internal distribution of power, has been a useful 
contextualization exercise for the assessment of the clientelistic mechanisms 
that firstly take form within party organizations. This research project aims to 
uncover the emergence of such informal linkage systems, and how they 
spread throughout the public administration. Thus, I attempt to pinpoint the 
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structural elements of the incipient phases of clientelistic strategies emanating 
from within the party organizations.  
One of these very important structural elements is the people that 
comprise the clientelistic pyramid of the distributing public goods and benefits. 
In much of the literature that covers contemporary incidences of clientelism, 
we find this hierarchical structure that is presided over by one or more party 
leaders, and reaches the clients (i.e. voters) in a cascade like system of 
mediation through intermediary layers of political brokers. This perspective is 
congruent with the characteristics of a nationwide party territorial organization. 
In the Romanian case study we find reminiscences of a mass-party in the 
case of the Social Democratic (PSD) successor party, and elements of catch-
all party organizational approach in the case of the Democratic Liberal Party 
(PDL).  
Still, while clientelistic linkages can be traced to all of the major 
Romanian parties, we have very weak evidence on the type of hierarchical 
system described above—most notably found in Latin American, and South 
European new democracies. If we were to stop at this fractured exchange 
system within the party organizations, we might have to infer that clientelism 
is not a frequent, or well developed phenomenon in the Romanian case study. 
This is not the case.  
 The empirical evidence from the in-depth analysis of the Romanian 
case study shows how the internal balance of power of the nationwide parties 
is also a component of the form and size of clientelistic mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the reach of these informal linkage systems is also shaped by 
the administrative powers gained, and retained over multiple electoral cycles, 
by local party leaders. As such, we find a much more significant share of 
functions and attributions at the local government level, in this case study, 
than in the case of most of the other post-communist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This increase of administrative prerogatives, based partially 
on convergence with the EU principles of multi-level governance (MLG), and 
the leftist cabinet of Adrian Nastase’s administrative reform intended to 
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reinforce the local organizations of the PSD, has lead to a growing strength of 
local officials starting with 2000.  
After the electoral reform of 200844, Mihail Chiru finds that there was a 
„general move towards more local patronage-oriented recruitment, determined 
by the importance in this process of local party officials (presidents of county 
councils and mayors) as well as of private sponsors” (2010:4). As mentioned 
before, most of the institutional and legislative reforms in CEE have been 
developed by parties in office, according to their own survival interests. Cartel 
parties in Romania managed to develop a territorial presence through 
clientelistic exchanges. Therefore pushed for such an electoral reform that 
was placing an emphasis on their local organizations. Furthermore, these 
local organizations have been fuelled with central budgetary transfers (see 
Chapter 5) and as such were now expected to foot the electoral bill, or at least 
share the burden—parties „chose to delegate much of the campaigning costs” 
at that time (Chiru 2010:1).  
As a consequence, we see a dual clientelistic system in Romania: one 
emanating from the central government, fueled by centrally controlled 
resources and prerogatives (via party-state interpenetration), and one 
emanating from the local government level, fueled by locally controlled 
resources and prerogatives. This dual patronage is the solution to the 
decreasing mass mobilization capacity of political parties, as local leaders 
take increasingly bigger responsibilities in ensuring electoral victories in their 
constituencies (for both local and national elections).  
 This is not to say that every local leader can turn from being a broker 
within the clientelistic pyramid of its own party, into a semi-autonomous 
political patron. The process is much more nuanced, as it is an evolutionary 
process that involves a self-enforcing gradual spiral of accumulating both 
administrative powers, and political powers within the party (e.g. becoming a 
member of the leadership forums of the political party). More importantly, the 																																																								
44 „shifting from a complex proportional representation system based on county-level party 
lists to a complex uninominal system in which each district for the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate elects one representative” (Marian and King 2010) 
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relative positioning in the clientelistic pyramid is very much based on the 
consolidation of any party leader in office—the number of mandates. The 
more a local leaders, or a national leader, stays in power, the more likely it is 
that she or he will be able to control effectively the necessary resources to 
develop one’s own informal exchange networks.  
 In general, the central government remains the principal patron in the 
clientelistic linkage system, as it is through the process of cartelization that 
continuous access to public resources is granted to clientelistic channels of 
informal distribution. Furthermore, in the case of ruling parties, the party 
leader and prime-minister tended to be the same person. As such, the 
concentration of power over the state (and implicitly its resources) is clearly 
traceable to the party leader and close collaborators.  
 As will be further discussed in the other chapters of this thesis, 
clientelism employs various distributional schemes—from public employment, 
to development projects, or even discretionary capital transfers. This system 
works with the cooperation of local political elites that have also managed to 
secure elected official positions. From the national party leadership point of 
view, there are advantages and disadvantages to this rising prominence of 
local party bosses.  
One of advantages is that they take upon themselves the 
organizational efforts of setting up the clientelistic exchanges and patronage 
networks. This is not only significant in terms of time and effort, but also in 
terms of exposure. As many of the informal exchanges on which clientelistic 
systems are founded are based on infringements of the legislation, the 
political patrons who use public resources in this sense are usually liable in 
the face of the law. In this sense, the more emancipated a local clientelistic 
system is, the more responsibility falls on the local party representative, and 
not the national ones. Also, in a context of political instability, judged by the 
level of party switching, then the local party leaders have a clear advantage in 
terms of the effectiveness of clientelistic linkages, given their better selection, 
and continuous monitoring system, within the smaller territorial organization. 
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In other words, if clients of local party leaders are more likely to be 
loyal, and less prone to party switching, and other forms of political desertion, 
then this is also a better clientelistic exchange for the party as a whole. Thus, 
from this perspective, not only can local party leaders change their status from 
political brokers to political patrons, but also they are more likely to be more 
efficient patrons than central party leaders. The efficiency of the local party 
patrons is in this case reflected by their enhanced ability to control or monitor 
their appointments. This line of argument is reflected in the empirical evidence 
in Romania, but it is also supported by the fundaments of the clientelistic 
linkage theory, as Scott initially referenced it as a “dyadic bond” based on 
trust, between the patron and the client (1972). Therefore, a local patron can 
have a stronger connection with its protected appointee, than the central party 
leadership would.  
 Finally, the emancipation of local party leaders also presents some 
significant disadvantages. One of the main pitfalls of the clientelistic 
“subcontracting” system is that the organizational autonomy of local party 
leaders may allow them to change sides, switching to another party, and 
bringing his entire machine along (e.g. former county council president of 
Buzău, Victor Mocanu). Thus, losing a popular figure in the territory might be a 
big enough blow to the electoral standing of a nationwide party, but losing the 
organizational machine in the territory is generally fatal in terms of election 
outcomes. Still, the full transition of an organizational network from one party 
to the other is hard to achieve, and the local leader has to be at the height of 
its power, otherwise he becomes a victim of the political machine he helped 
built (e.g. former mayor of Pitești, Tudor Pendiuc).  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, when local party leaders become 
members of the national party leadership forum they become part of the party 
patronage decision-making structure, as long as these are informal linkages 
upheld by the political party. As such, they earn the power to influence 
appointments and nominations at the national level, not just in their regional 
base. If a leader of a territorial organization will exert patronage and support 
one of its clients to a national position (e.g. Member of Parliament), then this 
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will not only be an extension of clientelistic powers, but also a better 
deployment, compared to centrally-driven patronage.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has showed how the main Romanian political parties 
share a set of common features. Firstly, the main political parties (i.e. PSD, 
PDL, PNL and even UDMR) are remarkably stable. I assert this based on the 
low volatility of alternation in the Romanian party system (Powell and Tucker 
2014), as well as party-level “extremely low” electoral volatility, in the case of 
PSD and UDMR (Gherghina 2014). This is the main puzzle of this thesis, as 
the Romanian party system, like all the others CEE cases has been marked 
as highly volatile at the beginning of the transitioning period. Secondly, the 
main Romanian political parties are remarkably effective at combating new 
entrants, especially on the left wing spectrum which is dominated by the PSD 
for the entire post-communist period. Thirdly, these parties have engaged in 
frequent coalitions, across the ideological spectrum.  
Such traits of the stability of the Romanian party system (judged mainly 
on the major parties) are furthermore contrasted in this chapter with the usual 
indicators of organizational decay or inherent weakness. Firstly, we see the 
same tendency of diminishing party membership, as in the case of all 
European political parties. Secondly, there are indicators that the Romanian 
parties did not have strong roots in society based on ideological positioning, 
formal party activities or representation of class interests. The poor ideological 
positioning appears both on the part of the political offer (i.e. main political 
parties), as well as on the party of the electorate.  
Given the remarkably stable party system in Romania, and the 
presence of similar organizational traits as in Western party systems, it is this 
thesis argument that the process of cartelization has ensured the electoral 
success of the parties presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, as opposed to 
the theoretical prescriptions of the cartel party model, we find that there are no 
fringe competitors in Romania, and parties do enjoy a extended territorial 
presence (i.e. no stratarchy).  
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This chapter therefore also explores how the clientelistic linkages 
within the party have developed, maintained or integrated local party leaders 
as agents of systematic clientelistic exchanges. The predictability of the 
clientelistic exchanges (given continuous access to public resources through 
cartelization and state capture) has consolidated the local party organizations 
and local leaders. As such, on one hand, local organizations become key 
platforms of ensuring electoral victories given the weakening of mass 
mobilization (through both human and material resources they control). On the 
other hand, some local leaders have become semi-autonomous patrons of 
local networks.  
Local leaders in Romania could achieve this because: (1) they are 
elected representatives, not appointed (see Chapter 2 for further comparative 
details), and (2) successive electoral and administrative reforms have 
enhanced their control over public resources and electoral role in both local 
and national elections. Consequently, this quasi-emancipation brings local 
leaders closer to the party leadership than in the cartel model prescriptions. 
Nevertheless, given that their positions rely on clientelistic exchanges, and 
they in turn rely on the continuous access to public resources provided by the 
Central Government, I find no evidence of challenges to the party leadership. 
This can also be attributed to the fact that in Romania, the leader of winning 
parties has always been the appointed leader of the executive concentrating 
both the political and the administrative power. Clientelism therefore should be 
seen as a complement to cartelization, as it ensures the partial mobilization of 
the electorate and the cooperation of local party leaders/territorial 
organizations.  
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Chapter 4. Party Patronage and Politicization: Civil 
Servants as the Linchpin of Clientelistic Linkages 
The practice of party patronage in Romania has found its way from the ashes 
of the communist system to the organizational core of the new democratic 
political parties. Successor parties have initially relied on inherited networks of 
former elites. Gradually, given the process of cartelization, all parties in office 
have developed networks of appointees in the civil service and other public 
institutions. Through these channels of appointments, governing political 
parties have fueled their organizations with public resources, in the attempt to 
ensure continuous electoral success, and to develop their organizations. As 
gatekeepers of state resources, party line appointees are an invaluable 
resource for cartel parties. I argue that political appointments in the civil 
service (especially in Senior Civil Service positions) are the linchpin of 
clientelistic exchanges. 
This chapter will explore in-depth the mechanisms through which 
Romanian political parties have been penetrating the public institutions and 
the state apparatus. Through political patronage, different employment and 
appointment procedures are manipulated to fit the best interests of the 
political patron—be it a party organization, or a party leader. For party 
patronage data, I have generated the data for the case study of Romania, 
based on Kopecky et al’ (2012) methodology; it involved an expert survey 
over nine policy areas. The interviewees were selected based on their public 
reputation, familiarity with the current institutional processes, and availability; I 
conducted 37 in-depth interviews45 with representatives of the academia, civil 
service, media, party officials, and private sector representatives.  
The first section of this chapter provides evidence on the scope and 
goals of deploying patronage in the selected case study of Romania. The 																																																								
45 Some of the interviewees for the Party Patronage Index score on Romania are mentioned 
in the interviews list (see Annex 4) by name, and others who wished to remain anonymous 
are mentioned by name initials, rank and positions (where even the initials would have been 
indicative of their identity, I use only the rank and position). All the interviews for the present 
thesis (not only the Party Patronage Index expert survey) are labeled with the date on which 
the interview took place. 
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second section of this chapter looks at the context in which patronage 
manifests itself. I assess here the structural opportunities and constraints for 
political appointments in the Romanian civil service. Finally, the third and final 
section of this chapter focuses on the specific mechanisms of politicization, 
and the extent to which they fall within or outside the formal procedures.  
4.1. Party Patronage in Romania 
4.1.1. Perceptions and Figures on Public Employment 
There is a continuous debate, in the Romanian public discourse, on the size 
and expenditures of the Romanian state administration. In 2010, based on the 
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the state 
assistance programme, the salaries of state employees were cut by 25% 
across the board (Law no. 118/2010). Additionally, all the bonuses and 
performance rewards were cut, which implied a de facto reduction of up to 
50% for most public employees.  
With the lowest salaries in the European Union for many of these 
categories, the wage cut reform was deeply contentious, and most of the 
measures were subsequently reversed through judiciary decisions. However 
disgruntled the targeted employees were, the interesting part of this process 
was that there was no noticeable wider societal outrage. This apparent lack of 
social solidarity is explained by the fact that the state apparatus is generally 
perceived in Romania to be oversized, wasteful, corrupt, as well as 
discretionary46. These perceptions are often reflected by assessments on the 
wider set of new democracies: “a striking aspect of post-communist state 
exploitation is the discretionary expansion of state administration” (Grzymala-
Busse 2007:133).  
Public perceptions have been mostly focused on the size of the state 
apparatus. The empirical evidence however does not necessarily prove it. 
Over the past 5 years, the employees in the public administration represent 																																																								
46 According to the Global Competitiveness Reports (2007-2011) compiled by the World 
Economic Forum, based on expert opinion surveys, Romania scores consistently well below 
the international average, in such categories as: diversion of public funds, government 
favouritism, and wastefulness of public spending 
	 148	
9% of the total public employment, and only 2-2.5% of total employment in 
Romania. 47 The data for civilian state employment48 show a total of 998,000 
people in 2008, and 1,005,800 people in 2010, while the total state 
employment49  is estimated by the Ministry of Public Finances to include 
1,362,463 persons in 2010. In addition, the public sector also includes the 
personnel of the various non-departmental agencies and commissions 
(NDACs) and executing institutions, which are autonomous or quasi-
autonomous. In this latter category, recent data estimates a total of approx. 
400,000 employees. Technical assistance programmes have concluded that 
Romania ‘is not a classic situation of an oversized system, but rather one that 
is inefficient and expensive’50. 
Figure 9. Number of Employees in the Romanian Public Administration 
 
Source: National Statistics Institute (INSSE) 
Still, with over 1,7 mil. employees in the public sector51, Romania is 
positioned amongst the countries with the highest share of public employees 
of the total labour force52. Furthermore, public sector jobs, in various forms, 
and especially the public administration (see Figure 9), have expanded over 
the years. Revealing to the present analysis is the exact number of 																																																								
47 according to INSSE data 
48 including public administration, healthcare and education, but excluding army, police and 
intelligence personnel 
49 including public administration, healthcare, education, AND army, police and intelligence 
personnel 
50 Arntraud Hartmann, managing director of the World Bank mission in Romania, mediafax, 
15.01.2010 
51 UNECE estimates for 2008, 1.723 mil. persons in the Romanian public sector 
52 Government at a Glance reports, OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org  
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employees in the Romanian public administration is uncertain. While the 
number of civil servants, and civil service jobs (see Figure 10) is monitored 
and recorded by the National Agency for Civil Servants (ANFP), the rest of the 
personnel in public administration—contractual personnel, temporary 
appointments, transfers from other public institutions etc., are not recorded in 
a centralized, consistent manner53.  
Figure 10. Evolution of the Number of Civil Servants 
 Source: compiled by the author based on annual reports of the National Agency for 
Civil Servants (ANFP) 
According to the official procedure, the local branches of the National 
Employment Agency (AJOFM) should register into the centralized digital 
system (REVISAL) of the Labour Inspection any new employment or 
dismissal. In practice, this data it is not however systematically correlated with 
the local governments as employers. According to officials from the Ministry of 
Finance: “for salaries, we make budgetary transfers based on their necessity 
estimates, we do not follow how many employees they have, or what is the 																																																								
53 according to an internal memo of the National Agency for Civil Servants (ANFP)—Analiză a 
riscurilor privind administrația publică din România, 2012 
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salary of each, as both quantitative quotas on numbers and wages are 
provided by the legislation”54. As such, the head of local governments decide 
freely on appointments and rewards, as long as they comply with the 
legislative ceilings (established based on the population levels in each 
constituency). 
This situation is extremely discouraging to public policies approaches 
towards assembling a coherent personnel policy, or informed analysis. And it 
is these poorly monitored offices that are the most prolific reservoir of 
politicized appointments. Estimates of the total number of employees in the 
public administration reflect a steady increase over the last couple of 
decades, in Romania (see Figure 9).  
Consequently, the public expenditures with public administration 
personnel have grown: 5% of the GDP (2004), 8% of GDP (2008), and 6.7% 
of GDP (2011). Only the increased expenditures of 2007-2008 can be 
correlated with actual GDP growth. Furthermore, the data shows that as a 
general trend the increase of the personnel expenditure at the local level was 
double the one at the central level. This suggests a decentralization tendency, 
which is equally reflected in the growing share of local governments’ (LGs) 
available positions, within the total share of public administration available 
positions (see Figure 10). 
As argued throughout the thesis, the clientelistic strategies vary based 
on the organizational structure of each ruling party, and on the broader 
governing context (i.e. whether it is part of a larger or smaller coalition). In 
2010-2011 there was a growth of the central state apparatus55, doubling its 
size from 9,656 civil servants in 2010, to 17,845 civil servants in 201156. This 
strategy was masked by the decrease of territorial offices of the Central 
Government (i.e. decentralized service). Thus in official records, there is a 
slightly negative comparative figure for the period. In fact, the predilection in 																																																								
54  Anca Iordache, official in the Ministry of Public Finance, interview with the author 
20.05.2015 
55 state apparatus is here understood to represent the central public administration (CPA) 
without regional offices 
56according to ANFP annual data 
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this period was to fuel the patronage networks of the party leadership—those 
that held governmental positions at the time, as opposed to fueling the 
territorial bases of the organization, or the networks of the local bosses. This 
trend is congruent with the dominant ruling party’s organizational composition 
at that time. In contrast to the Social Democrats who have a wide-developed 
territorial base of clients, the Populists had a much more pronounced 
centralized cartel organization.  
The official policy of all governments since 200057 has been to reduce 
the size of the Romanian public administration, but in effect, the total number 
of available positions in the civil service has generally been increased. Formal 
limitations existed when an official rule of hiring only 15% of the vacated 
positions58 (generally interpreted as 1 enters for 7 that exit the system) was 
applied in 2009. In practice, these austerity-led quantitative limitations did not 
have significant consequences on the organizational structure of the 
Romanian public administration apparatus as the eliminated positions were 
the ones that were already void and undesirable. 
The appeal of civil service in Romania remains generally low, as it is 
poorly paid, and the available positions are not transparently open for 
competition: ‘the legislation and the [contest] organization norms have 
lacunae, making the employment contest a mere formality’59.  
The result is a decreasing occupancy rate of available positions, less 
than 2 candidates for a position at each employment examination60, and a 
predominantly aged civil service body—almost 40% of civil servants are older 
than 5061. It is this opaque environment of quasi-null contestation that is most 
prolific for patronage and discretionary appointments—‘no one walks up to a 
job contest from the street’62.  																																																								
57 usually included in their government programs 
58 according to Government’s Emergency Ordinance (O.U.G) 34/2009 
59 Cristian Botan, governmental advisor, interview with the author 25.01.2013 
60 according to ANFP annual data 
61 according to an internal memo of the National Agency for Civil Servants (ANAF)—Analiză a 
riscurilor privind administrația publică din România, 2012 
62 C.P., director general of an executing institution of the Romanian local public administration, 
interview with the author 07.02.2013  
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The relatively few applicants to public administration jobs, especially in 
the Central Government is both a cause, and an effect of the proliferation of 
political appointments: ‘I seriously doubt that candidates for an open position 
in the board of directors [of a public company] will have the courage to apply, 
without connections, even if we ensure adequate advertisement, and conduct 
the selection procedures with full openness and fairness’63.  
The circular mechanism starts with the poor attraction to such 
positions, mostly due to very low wage levels, as set within the framework of 
austerity-driven legal provisions (Law No 330/2009, and its subsequent 
modifications). Currently, there is widespread support on the implementation 
of the unitary wage system (Law No 284/2010), but this is not possible 
because of the fiscal stability engagements (Law No 69/2010) adopted by the 
Romanian Government, based on its agreements with the World Bank, IMF, 
and the European Commission.  
In such circumstances, the competent personnel tends to be motivated 
by informal linkages. It is only after this second phase of the consolidation of 
informal linkages between political parties, and the public administration that 
the politicization phenomenon takes off. The more consolidated the party 
patronage networks are, the more politicized personnel decisions will be. This 
self-enforcing system of party patronage can be subsequently applied by the 
cartel parties over successive electoral cycles.  
4.1.2. Scope and Functions of Party Patronage 
The extent of party patronage in Romania was evaluated based on the 
expert interview methodology developed by Kopecký et al (2012). The 
collected evidence shows that Romania records the one of highest score of 
party patronage in the EU –0.48 (see Table 12). As it is to be expected, the 
Ministries are generally perceived as the main hubs for political appointments, 
even though most positions are procedurally outside political parties’ reach. In 
effect, not only do political parties influence appointments at the top levels, but 
they are equally perceived of doing so at most hierarchical levels. Many of the 																																																								
63R.C., Ministry official, interview with the author, 16.02.2013 
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interviews experts think that all public offices are, to a greater or lesser 
degree, subjected to political patronage.  
Table 12. Index of Party Patronage in Romania 
Romania 
Ministries NDACs 
Executing 
Institutions 
Policy Area 
Total 
Economy 0.83 0.56 0.56 0.65 
Finance 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.30 
Judiciary 0.33 0.11 0.25 0.23 
Media 0.83 0.69 0.56 0.69 
Military and Police 0.67 0.44 0.44 0.52 
Health Care 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Culture and Education 0.50 0.56 0.28 0.44 
Foreign Service 0.33 0.22 0.44 0.33 
Regional and Local 
Administration 0.67 0.44 0.44 0.52 
Country Total 0.57 0.46 0.42 0.48 
Source: expert interviews conducted by the author between December 2012 and February 
2013 
Variation does exist amongst different public policy sectors, with the 
finance and judiciary being perceived as the least influenced by the political 
sphere. Conversely, the economic, media and health care sectors are 
regarded as the most heavily politicized. Overall, political patronage is 
relativeley widespread in Romania, both in terms of scope, and in term of 
depth. 
The judiciary records the lowest values of the Romanian patronage 
index. Firstly, because over the past years, a very public anti-corruption 
campaign has been fought against representatives of all political parties, thus 
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acquiring a general impression of integrity64. Secondly, it has undergone an 
intensive institutional and procedural reform, under the EU accession and 
post-accession mechanisms, such as the Mechanism for Control and 
Verification (MCV). But, the reality is slightly more complex and confusing 
than the simple success story.  
In effect, following persistent and pervasive political pressures, the 
judiciary protected itself by becoming more and more insulated. This resulted 
in apparent weaker politicization, but also in consolidating a poor 
accountability to any outside forces. Thus, the judiciary—like the police, 
intelligence services, the army, or foreign affairs office, acts under a ‘caste’-
like system of staffing65. This means that it is extremely hermetic—recruits 
and promotes only from within its structures, and there are no effective checks 
and balances. Consequently, the judiciary may be the public sector most 
resistant to patronage and political pressures, partly because ‘it has started to 
act like a party itself—magistrates’ party’66 
An interesting pattern emerges from the experts’ evaluation of 
patronage in executive institutions, in such areas as culture and education. 
According to their assessments, the institutions in this policy field are not often 
vitiated by political patronage. But, when they do fall prey to patronage, 
politicization touches most or all echelons. Also, while the ministries, and 
subordinated agencies and commissions (NDACs) are subjected to patronage 
appointments driven by party interests, executing institutions, such as 
universities, are better insulated from political appointments, given their 
autonomous status.  
The relatively narrow field of public policy concerning the media is 
perceived as being successfully sought after by political parties. This study’s 
findings are consistent with Roper’s assessment: ‘media patronage is a 
special case because of the importance of the media during and between 
																																																								
64 Cristian Ghinea, Minister of European Funding and former director of the Romanian Center 
for European Policies (CRPE) think tank, interview with the author, 08.12.2012 
65 based on expert’s interviews, 2012-2013 
66 idem 19 
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electoral cycles (…), involves the appointment of individuals to the body that 
oversees the broadcast media, as well as appointments to state run media 
outlets’ (2006:376). In terms of appointments in the cultural and media 
sectors, these serve mostly electoral goals, through various events and 
publications that support the patron party or its leaders67.  
For organizational purposes, patronage is deployed mainly in the field 
of regional and local administration. Although this policy area does not stand 
out in particular, in terms of its patronage scores, the values are nevertheless 
relatively high—0.52. The politicization of these structures is obviously 
effective in terms of allocating public funds to party strongholds, but also for 
providing a favourable regulation and implementation, during and in-between 
elections. 
If the objective of patronage is narrowly confined to the value of 
controlled resources, the political appointments in the economic institutions of 
the state have a much more pronounced exploitative motivation. For example, 
with the restructuring of the Government in 2007, the National Liberal 
Transport Minister Ludovic Orban replaced the democratic liberal one, Radu 
Berceanu. As a result of this leadership change, in only 1 month, all the 
managers of the main companies in which the volume of investment is 
substantial were replaced, 11 in total (Andrei et al 2009). In all state-owned-
enterprises in Romania, the discretionary appointments seem to be the norm, 
as the institutional restrictions remain weak: 
“selection procedures for managers and board members often 
adhere to the letter but not to the spirit of the law. One such example is 
the dismissal of management and board members upon the arrival of a 
new minister, only to appoint interim managers and board members 
while a new lengthy selection procedure is started. The monitoring unit 
																																																								
67 Raluca Grosescu, former coordinator of the Public Policy and Partnerships Department, 
Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, 
interview with the author 23.01.2013 
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within the Ministry of Public Finance lacks proper enforcement tools as 
line ministers do not feel accountable to this unit.” (Marrez 2015:7)68 
This shows how certain Ministries have a much more strategic value 
than the mere number of available positions within their structure. State 
Owned Companies (SOEs) under the control of certain Ministries are equally 
important in party patronage for both capitalization and number of employees 
(Ennser-Jedenastik 2014:402). Based on this aspect, the following chapter 
will explore in depth the patronage dynamics at the level of certain key 
Ministries.   
With every political rotation in Romania, the winning party proceeds to 
fill the array of political appointments with party members, or supporters. Even 
when some positions are filled with technocrats (i.e. politically uncommitted 
persons), they still fulfill the promise of agreeable cooperation. This extensive 
appointment process is commonly referred to, in the sphere of public 
employees, as “cleaning up”69. The problem with the process of cleaning up is 
that it surpasses the already wide range of political appointments, and 
transgresses into the realm of public sector employments. The various levels 
of civil servants are not political functions, and as such should not be directly 
constrained by the electoral cycles because it weakens the institutional 
capacity.  
The use of the expression “cleaning up” (sa facem curățenie) is 
intentionally ironic of the frequent use of it in the anti-corruption discourse. 
Thus suggesting how the system is not yet inclined to self-regulate, and sees 
such efforts as ridiculous distractions from the constant pursuit of expanding 
political influence in all spheres of the public sector, and beyond. The 
evidence of the present study shows not only how and why the politicization of 
public office has gradually expanded, but also, how the general perception of 
it is has. Thus, it is not the incidence of patronage and clientelism that is 
																																																								
68 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/country_focus/2015/pdf/cf_vol12_issue1_
en.pdf, last accessed 23.08.2016 
69 An often used Romanian expression describing personnel turnover: “to clean up” (să facem 
curățenie) 
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erroding Romanian institutions, but also, how such practices are perceived to 
be the norm, and even in the absence of political pressures, they continue to 
multiply and regenerate with ever growing financial stakes.  
Many experts point out how in recent years, the political cycles create a 
rotation of personnel, down to the „cleaning lady level”. While „changing 
everyone, down to the cleaning lady” may be just an expression, actual 
examples start to turn up. One of the interviewees pointed out, that in one 
highschool in Timișoara, the candidates for the cleaning service job were in 
fact asked with what party they sympathise70.  
One of the main functions of placing people in key positions is to 
influence decisions and implementation procedures at every level. 
Consequentially, influence peddling has become a widespread practice. In 
this case, most of the benefits of such exchanges take the form of favors or 
preferential treatment, and not immediate material gains (i.e. payments). With 
formal channels of interaction poorly institutionalized in Romania, much of the 
inter-institutional interactions take the informal road of personal connection. 
Thus, a key element of influence peddling is the personnel network, usually 
constructed through patronage.  
In exchange for appointments clients are also sometimes willing to pay 
sums that exceed by far their position’s legal revenues. According to 
interviewed experts this is because clients expect to be able to gain indirect 
material gains as well through appointment in key positions of the state 
structures, or through an elective position (e.g. County Councilmen, MP, 
Mayor). An investigation of the National Agency for Integrity (ANI) into local 
and county councils, for the period 2008-2012, revealed that 78 councilmen 
have a conflict of interests, participating in incompatible economic activities 
that brought them profits totaling 37,952,350 RON (approx. 8,510,000 €). 
Romanian MPs also have profits from business interactions with institutions of 
the state: a survey of the 2008-2012 MPs revealed that 48 out of the total 334 
																																																								
70 Răzvan Orășanu, former State Secretary and Head of the Agency of State Assets (AVAS), 
interview with the author 27.12.2012 
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deputies, and 24 out of the total 137 senators have contracts, with various 
public institutions, of over 250 mil. €71. 
Party patronage seems to achieve a greater depth in the local 
institutional setting than in the central state apparatus. This is especially true 
for those ruling parties that have a strong regional base, or focus on 
developing one. Over the past decade, the channeling of public funds to local 
public administrations has also been more pronounced in these two cases 
(Volintiru 2013). Thus, regional bases remain effectively controlled by local 
bosses, empowered by the discriminant resource distribution. The party 
patronage plays an important role in this situation, as it is through the 
politically controlled positions in the administrative apparatus that substantial 
flows of resources can be diverted to the party bases. The flows of resources 
are equally essential in electoral periods. The distribution pattern towards the 
electorate is heavily dependent on the level of control of the political patron 
over the regional party organizations. 
Changing institutional leadership, based on political connections, 
generally involves deeper turnovers as well. Sometimes these are based 
more on personal, just as much as political connections—“Would you want to 
work with someone that gives you a dirty look every time you tell them to do 
something?!”72 . According to expert interviews, the political and personal 
connections both play a key role in ensuring a job in the Romanian public 
institutions. This suggests that while the political umbrella is a necessary 
factor in making discretionary use of public jobs, it is ultimately the various 
ranks of party officials, and not just the party organizations, that actually 
establish the networks, populating them with personal contacts, which in turn 
do the same towards their subordinates, and so on, and so forth. Thus, the 
political strategy factor gets diluted the further down the institutional hierarchy 
you get. 
																																																								
71 Cât câștigă deputații noștrii din contracte cu statul, CursDeGuvernar.ro, Emilia Șercan, 
20.01.2012  
72 N.C., Ministerial official, interview with the author, 18.01.2013 
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The pivotal element for channeling state resources in the public 
administration hierarchy is usually embedded in the middle management of 
the state apparatus. Political agents direct the patronage networks, but it is 
with the cooperation and contribution of these high ranking bureaucrats that 
the extractive system takes form. While the title of ‘local baron’73 has long 
been used in the Romanian public discourse, a newer entry is ‘administration 
barons’ 74 - persons who occupy leadership positions in the public 
administration, and who act as gatekeepers to the institution’s prerogatives 
and resources. While initially political appointments, the “administrative 
barons” have become useful to successive parties in office, and are currently 
in a position to both give and receive favors or financial rewards (e.g. well 
remunerated positions on the Managing Board of State Companies and 
Agencies). 
The strength of such ‘administrative barons’75 is that they no longer 
belong to the party patronage network, and create their own support 
structures from within the institutions they preside over. If such appointees 
survive multiple electoral cycles, it becomes harder to control the respective 
institutions without their support or approval—‘I like him [i.e. director of a 
executing institution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs], he’s young and smart, 
but he will not be able to stay long, because he was brought by the previous 
boss, from another organization, and the system will eject him—he simply 
does not have the support from below’76. 
Such gatekeepers of public resources are the product of cartelization, 
as they were initially placed in the Central Government, as the institutions 
were first constructed. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the Romanian Party 																																																								
73 term describing regional party bosses, who’s firm grip, both organizational and electoral, in 
the territory, makes them extremely important to the party center leadership; usually 
attributable to the Social Democratic Party—the larges party organization, but more recently 
mentioned in relation to the Democratic Liberals, and less often to the National Liberals, as 
these parties have expanded their territorial presence too; determinant party actors   
74 Victor Alistar, executive director of Transparency International Romania, interview with the 
author 14.02.2013 
75 Victor Alistar, executive director of Transparency International Romania, interview with the 
author 14.02.2013 
76  Ion Cuhutencu., official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, interview with the author, 
30.01.2013 
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System, the party leaders are also occupying executive positions if their party 
wins elections or joins a ruling coalition, and therefore concentrates  both 
political and administrative power. It is with the help of this direct/formal 
control that ruling political parties control the established senior officials in the 
Central Government. Given that the same parties have succeeded to power in 
the post-communist period (see low alternation electoral volatility in Romania, 
Table 1), such appointees will continue to support the political cartel that 
appointed them in the first place.  
4.2. Senior Civil Service Positions: Procedural and Legislative 
Frameworks 
The legislative framework of the Romanian civil service has steadily 
progressed from the vacuum of the communist regime, to a EU compatible 
level, at the present moment. The most important landmark has been the Law 
no. 188/1999, which has created the first coordinates for the function of civil 
servants, followed by a succession of laws and regulations consolidating the 
architecture of the civil service, and its responsibilities and attributions77.   
There are however several problems regarding the legislation that 
informs the activity of civil servants in Romania, starting with the selection and 
appointment procedures, and ending with the removal from office and other 
personnel policies. These problems emerge from three aspects of the current 
legislation: it may be too vague on certain issues, it makes omissions on 
certain aspects, and most importantly, it is not always implemented.  
The first set of problems streams from what the legislation does not 
specify, or only too vaguely covers. Being pieced together over more than a 
decade, it does not always provide an encompassing, coherent framework to 
the everyday activities of civil service. For example, in the interrelated layers 																																																								
77 Legislative highlights on state employment: Law No. 161/2003 regarding measures to 
ensure transparency of the public functions and business environment, to prevent and 
sanction corruption; Law No. 571/2004 regarding the protection of the personnel employed in 
public office; Law No. 215/2001 of the local public administration; Law No. 7.2004 regarding 
the Code of Conduct of civil servants; Law No. 447/2004 regarding the Code of Conduct of 
contractual personnel working in public institutions; Law No. 340/2004 regarding the Prefect 
function and institution; Law No. 330/2009 regarding the standardization of salaries of the 
personnel paid from public funds;  
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of the Romanian public administration, the county councils and the 
prefectures are similarly structured and have overlapping responsibilities 
(Stan and Zaharia 2011), thus creating the opportunity for each to pick and 
chose its responsibilities and attributions, according to the various interests 
they hold.  
The very attitudes of Romanian decision-makers seem to be at the 
core of this hunt for grey area in the legislation—‘Romanians are generally 
looking for what the law doesn’t specify, as opposed to what the law says’78. 
Additionally, legal interdictions do not always involve automatic sanctions, 
which is often seen as a free pass by many public officials—‘he [i.e. the 
mayor] would always ask if there are any sanctions, whenever we pointed out 
a measure was in contradiction with the law; if there weren’t, he had no 
problem moving forward with his plans’79. 
Even if the legislation sets a coherent framework for certain activities, 
within public institutions, the details of implementation are left to the 
Organizational and Functional Regulations (Regulament de Ordine și 
Funcționare—ROFs), Internal Organization Regulation (Regulament de 
Ordine Interioară), and other internally devised methodological norms. These 
are effective means of leaving considerable leeway to each institution’s 
leadership. In broad terms, leaving the specificities to be detailed at the 
institutional level is the characteristic of a flexible and efficient legislation, but 
without proper channels of control and motorization, this flexibility creates 
opportunities for abuse of power, or manipulating the attributions of public 
office to serve special interests.  
A second problematic aspect is the fact that sometimes the legislation 
and regulations are circumvented. Politicization of public office persists in 
Romania through a simple, yet effective measure: changing the institutional 
architecture. Each time a new political decision-maker—be it mayor, or 
minister, wants to make political appointments within the civil service, he or 
she proceed in creating a new institutional structure. Thus, not only they are 																																																								
78 A.D., former Dignitary in Local Government, interview with the author, 14.02.2013 
79 M.F., local councilmen, interview with the author, 16.01.2013 
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able to exercise extensive patronage with the new appointments, but also by 
constantly changing personnel and procedures, creating an immense 
instability within public institutions.  
One of the measures taken to constrain the discretionary nature of 
appointments and revocations to public office was the Law No. 161/2003 
regarding measures meant to ensure the transparency of public office. In 
effect, certain protective provisions were created. For example, civil servants 
who won their position through a public contest, act according to a mandate, 
and cannot be removed from office, without solid grounds, until the specified 
period expires. But, as mentioned before, in order to circumvent these 
protection provisions, some ministers have chosen to demolish the existing 
structures, and then re-create the institutions with a whole set of new 
positions to be appointed (Andrei et al 2009).  
At the local and regional level, mayors, county council presidents, or 
prefects proceed by changing the institution’s organization’s chart, and thus 
creating new jobs, to be filled with new people. Ionita et al (2011) observe a 
‘way recently identified to shortcut legislation is seen in the proliferation of 
short-term contract appointments in senior government positions (directors of 
ministries, heads of agencies, prefects), as such contracts do not require 
open competition to fill in the office’. In fact, public officials sometimes 
candidly admit: ‘if I open up a job for contest, anyone from the outside can 
come and apply. I do not open up the job, lest someone I do not like should 
occupy the position’80.   
Even though the legislation has attempted to restrain politicization, it 
has had to allow sufficient flexibility for changing governments to exercise 
their executive will. Thus, we cannot talk about legislative failures in 
constraining patronage and politicization of public office, but of an adamant 
inclination to make political appointments on the part of all post-communist 
governments. Institutions and departments are rearranged, with the purpose 
of eluding the legal protections of existing staff.  																																																								
80 Mihai Dima, human resource director of an executing institution of the Romanian local 
public administration, interview with the author 07.02.2013 
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Ministries themselves are subjected to cyclical changes. In 2000, after 
the enforcement of the Civil Servants Law (188/1999), 14 out of 22 Ministries 
have been changed, leaving more than 6.000 positions to be refilled (Ghinea 
2001). This practice persisted, with every new government since changing at 
least a quarter of its Ministries, by renaming, recreating, or restructuring 
them—‘I fully expect the new Ministries to be filled with members of the ruling 
coalition, because that’s just the way it is’81. 
The third, and most important problem of the Romanian legislation 
regarding civil service is that it is not always implemented. ‘From the 
legislative point of view we [i.e. Romanians] have all the major security nets! 
Why aren’t they enforced? Because, under the political pressure, they [i.e. 
public officials] protect their interests and their position’82. ‘We have all the 
rules and regulations, but no one applies it’ 83 . One of the most telling 
examples is the legislation regarding the standardized remuneration (Law no. 
330/2009, abrogated by Law no. 284/2010). It is in effect since 1st of January 
2011, yet not currently, or in the foreseeable future, applicable—‘it will never 
be applied because those who have obtained higher salaries, will not want to 
lose them’84.  
The legislative framework should be upheld by enforcement agencies, 
and this is where the vulnerability of the system lies. Such institutions, as the 
National Agency of Civil Servants (ANFP) or the National Integrity Agency 
(ANI), have been one of most important elements of progress in Romania, but 
they have not been more successfully insulated from politicization than the 
institutions they are meant to guard. Thus, once there is political will to 
politicize certain institutions, the monitoring and enforcement agencies 
																																																								
81 Victor Adîr, policy advisor, interview with the author, 18.01.2013  
82 Victor Alistar, executive director of Transparency International Romania, interview with the 
author 14.02.2013 
83 dignitary, interview with the author, 14.02.2013 
84 Alisa Roman, civil servant in the Ministry of Economy, interview with the author 18.01.2013 
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themselves fall pray to this practice, ‘and no longer serve their purpose as 
barriers of political discretion’85.    
Certain senior management replacement in public institutions are taken 
at any cost to the state budget, as disgruntled civil servants who have been 
unlawfully replaced, usually win their case in courts. This leads to paradoxical 
situations where several persons occupy the same office, at the same time. 
Such cases have been reported by interviewees at all institutional levels, from 
the ministries—Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Economy, to NDACs—Agency 
for Payments and Intervention for the Agriculture (APIA), down to executing 
institutions of local governments (LGs), thus denoting the extent of unlawful 
replacements. As one interviewee put it, ‘one signs, one decides, and the 
other is happy to be paid for not doing anything—one for each party’86.  
Civil Servants have been dismissed, with vague motivations such as 
disciplinary offences (abateri diciplinare), when the institution could not be 
restructured and/or renamed, or the organizational chart changed. This 
occurred usually in the case of decentralized agencies, or executing 
institutions87. When they have been reinstated, extremely tense and inefficient 
work relations emerged88. Other situations include substantial compensations 
being paid for leaving certain positions available to the party clientele, as in 
the case of Proprietatea Fund, when former manager received almost half a 
million euros when leaving the office before term. 
According to the current official legislation, there are three categories of 
senior civil servants: (1) General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries, 
(2) Prefects and Underprefects, and (3) Governmental Inspectors.  These are 
not very well institutionalized positions, as they have been created or adapted 
to the current form as a result of the reform pressures from the EU during the 
accession talks. One of the conditions for the integration of Romania in the 																																																								
85 Victor Alistar, executive director of Transparency International Romania, interview with the 
author 14.02.2013 
86 Nicolae Zlotea, president of a regional branch of the state agricultural agency APIA, 
interview with the author, 18.03.2012 
87 M.A., senior official in the Ministry of Public Administration, interview with the author, 
16.02.2013 
88 Mariana Popa, former school inspector, interview with the author, 30.01.2013 
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EU was the depoliticization of the Romanian civil service and the creation of 
an elite group of civil servants. As such, the category of senior civil servants 
was introduced in the law.  
General secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries in Ministries and 
Governmental Agencies were already professional civil service positions since 
2005. Governmental inspectors became a senior civil service position in 2007, 
when this position was created. Prefects and Underprefects were previously 
political representatives of the ruling party—‘loyal party elites were often 
rewarded with prefectures by the centralized leadership of the Nastase 
Cabinet’89. Since 2007, these too became the third category of senior civil 
servants.  
Senior civil servants are the layer that comes immediately after the 
political functions of the Romanian Public Administration. Efforts have been 
made to insulate these functions from political control. One of the methods 
through which the recruitment process should forgo party patronage is the 
publicly advertised competition for the appointment. The National Agency of 
Civil Servants (ANFP) advertises on its website the openings for different 
positions of General Secretaries or Deputy General Secretaries within the 
Ministries or Governmental Agencies. These announcements also contain the 
background requirements to be eligible for these positions. In the case of 
general secretaries and deputy general secretaries this requirement, 
according to legal provisions of the Civil Servants Law (188/1999) is usually a 
5 years previous activity within the public administration.  
In contrast with the implicit aim of such conditions—to ensure a 
selection of candidates with a professional background, most of these 
documents90 mention the acceptance of an alternative to the experience in the 
public administration: a full term served as a member of parliament. This is an 
obvious overlap with the political sphere. A member of parliament, having 
served a term in office with the support of a certain political party, will remain 
loyal to that party’s interests even after he or she enters a ‘professional’ 																																																								
89 I.M, former prefect, interview with the author, 20.08.2013 
90 consulted by the author on www.anafp.ro  
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career path as General Secretary of Deputy General Secretary. Thus, even in 
the recruitment phase, governing political parties can evade the intended 
meaning of the legislative reforms of depoliticization.  
While there have been general revisions of the legislation and functions 
of civil servants—especially as a result of the integration process, these have 
failed to create a coherent framework that would effectively constrain 
politicization. Rather, the functions of senior civil servants have been formally 
designed outside the political control, while they remain very much imbued 
with party patronage and party loyalties. Existing studies confirm this 
tendency, as although ‘the legislations created an appropriate framework for 
ensuring stability regardless of political related changes (…), after each major 
political shift after parliamentary or local elections we can witness massive 
change of civil servants in managerial positions’ (Andrei et al 2010).   
Attempts have been made at various stages to reverse even the 
legislative reform, as in 2009 a proposition for a new law was forwarded to the 
Parliament, envisaging the possibility of political appointments at the head of 
state agencies. The Boc (I) Cabinet argued that the heads of the 
decentralized institutions should be included in the civil service, and as such 
could be temporarily appointed through prime-ministerial decision. It was 
passed by the Parliament in early 2010, but later annulled through a decision 
of the Romanian Constitutional Court (CCR). One of the problematic aspects 
was the provision to hold the exam for permanent appointment after the 
prime-ministerial appointment decision, and not before as the Civil Servants 
Law (188/1999) prescribes. Such a setting would have empowered even 
further the prime-ministerial decisions on appointments. In the current 
framework, general secretaries and deputy general secretaries have to pass 
an appointment exam before they are validated through prime-ministerial 
decision.  
As showed in Figure 11, the appointment system in the Romanian 
Central Public Administration aims at separating the openly politicized 
personnel from the civil service layers of employees. In terms of the 
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management of the central apparatus, the political personnel are either 
represented by political functions in the Cabinet—Ministries or Prime Minister, 
or by contractual personnel supporting the Governmental institutions—
Ministries and General Secretary. The latter are a form of junior ministers, 
which are called state secretaries or deputy state secretaries. These 
secretaries are seen as the team of each Minister and it is not infrequent that 
they change simultaneously.  
Figure 11. Appointment System in the Central Government (CG) 
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This administrative elite is only partly composed of the senior civil 
servants—General Secretaries or Deputy General Secretaries. It may also 
include managing civil servants like General Directors or Executive Directors. 
In contrast to their procedural powers, they have increasingly adopted a 
compliant attitude towards the political interests, as a strategy of survival. With 
a multitude of procedural routes for discretionary appointment, the General 
Secretary of a Ministry has a much bigger chance to survive if the political 
leader perceives him as being compliant to political orders91.  
Because of their career pathway—usually within the ministerial 
bureaucracy, the General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries are the 
most likely to be co-opted, rather than supported by the party elite. In this 
sense, many of the interviewed persons in this category refer to a well-known 
Romanian proverb: ‘the sword will not cut a head that bows’92.   
The General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries have to pass 
a public exam to be appointed to a vacant position. Afterwards they are 
validated through prime-ministerial decision. The political discretion in this 
case is based on various procedures to circumvent the examination phase 
(e.g.: temporary appointments), but also on the manipulation of exam 
conditions (e.g.: not publicly disclosing the date of the examination).  
Prefects and Underprefects are an interesting category of senior civil 
servants, as they were not long ago exclusively politically appointed positions. 
Legislation on the professionalization of these functions has been drafted at 
the end of 2004—The Law on the Prefect Institutions (Law No. 340/2004), but 
it was not until late 2005 that provisions were made for its application.  
Since 2007 de jure, these functions have been „depoliticized” and the 
appointees are expected to be professionals who are part of the senior civil 
servants body. In practice, most of the Prefects and Underprefects are former 
party members. Their appointment procedures tend to show that the 																																																								
91 opinion expressed by multiple interviewees from the Central Public Administrative structure 
in Romania 
92 ‘Capul plecat sabia nu-l taie, dar cu umilință lanțul înconjoară’—part of a Romanian poem 
by Dimitrie Bolintineanu, reffering to the Romanians troubled relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire 
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professionalization reform has failed in creating an actual detachment 
between the bureaucracy and party networks.  
Prefects and Underprefects are the governmental representatives at 
the local level. Every county has ‘an elected council led by a president and a 
government appointed prefecture led by a prefect’ (Stan and Zaharia 2011). 
The administrative problem is that the council and the prefecture ‘are similarly 
structured and have overlapping responsabilities’ (Stan 2003). It is debatable 
to what degree these senior civil servants are administrative agents, as 
opposed to politically motivated, ruling party agents. For example, they have 
the power to contest in Court any decision by an elected representative, which 
automatically leads to that act being suspended. Recent revision efforts of the 
Constitution attempt to limit this veto power of the prefects towards local 
representatives, transferring it to the subsequent judicial decisions.  
The appointment procedures of the Prefects and Underprefects differ 
from the other senior civil servants categories. While the General Secretaries, 
the Deputy General Secretaries and the Governmental Inspectors are 
appointed through Prime-ministerial Decision, the Prefects and Underprefects 
have to be appointed through Governmental Decisions93. This procedure 
should ensure a lower level of discretionary behaviour, because the entire 
Cabinet has to agree on the appointments. Through ‘political algorithms’ ruling 
coalitions divide these positions amongst themselves, based on each party’s 
economic or electoral interests94. We can frequently observe that ‘changing 
political structure of the government caused a massive change in the prefects 
of the counties’ (Andrei et al 2010:18). 
The final category of senior civil servants in Romania is that of 
Governmental Inspectors. As opposed to the other categories that existed 
even before they were formally labeled as ‘senior civil servants’, the 
governmental inspector is a position created within the Governmental 
apparatus.  																																																								
93 for Underprefects it is also required the recommendation of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
94 Dan Baranga, former underprefect of Bucharest and former prefect of Ilfov, interview with 
the author, 10.08.2013 
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According to the legislation, its functions and attributions are to be 
settled by the Prime-Minister at the time of the appointment, or afterwards. In 
many cases, the task attribution does not happen at all. The Governmental 
Inspectors are appointed through Prime-Ministerial Decision, and they should 
have been previously validated as Senior Civil Servants thorough the 
competence evaluation exam. According to interviewees, the Governmental 
Inspector position is a sort of ‘purgatory’95 for the career pathway of Senior 
Civil Servants, or even politicians. It has the least formal power within the 
senior civil servants categories.  
Usually, the bigger the organization under the command of a Senior 
Civil Servant, the more coveted that position is. For Governmental Inspectors 
this is not the case, as they conduct their activities within the administrative 
apparatus of the Government. Most of the Governmental Inspectors from the 
reference period of this study are former Prefects or Underprefects redrawn 
from office, or former political appointees (e.g. Ministers, State Secretaries).  
More importantly, by appointing someone to a position of 
Governmental Inspector may facilitate the transfer of a Senior Civil Servant, 
from a regional position—Prefect or Underprefect, to a national position—
General Secretary or Deputy General Secretary, and vice versa. This rotation 
of senior civil service appointments tends to go the way of the coalition 
dynamics, as where the party leaders go, so do their networks.  
4.3. Mechanisms of Politicization of Senior Civil Servants 
This study is generally concerned with the patterns of politicization in 
the Romanian public administration, and specifically focused on the category 
of senior civil servants.  The first step in analyzing the personnel dynamics of 
this category is to look at the decisions regarding the three categories of 
senior civil servants in Romania. As previously explained, the General 
Secretaries, the Deputy General Secretaries, and the Governmental 
Inspectors are normally appointed through Prime-Ministerial decision, while 
the Prefects and Underprefects are normally appointed through Government 																																																								
95 Andrei Popescu, governmental inspector, interview with the author 7.10.2013 
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Decisions. These decisions can refer to the: appointment, dismissal, transfer, 
or suspension96.  
Figure 12. Number of Decisions on Senior Civil Servants in Ministries, 
Governmental Agencies and Prefectures (2005-2012) 
 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial and 
governmental decisions in the period 2005-2012 
Analyzing the dynamic of the decisions on senior civil service positions 
shows the level of change or instability in a certain period. As it is shown in 
Figure 12, the increasingly high number of decisions for every category of civil 
servants is telling of at least a discretionary behavior in appointments, if not 
necessarily politicization. This study asserts that in the absence of a 
discernable pattern of appointments that would benefit the ruling party 
organization, or the party leaders, we can only discuss the discretionary 
behavior of the government and not the politicization of the entire system.  
Still, such patterns become obvious when we compare the dynamics of 
changes in these positions with the electoral timeline. One can easily see the 
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96 In the case of Governmental Inspectors, the Prime-Ministerial Decisions on this topic can 
also refer to the task allocation of the appointee. 
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completely. The appointment patterns of each cabinet will be discussed in 
greater depth in the following section, but we can already deduce that the 
senior civil service in Romania is going through the most drastic changes in 
the year following the change of the governing coalition. These tendencies 
support the hypothesis that the central administration is heavily politicized in 
this country.   
The highest number of decisions regards the senior civil service 
positions of Prefects and Underprefects. The high volatility of these positions 
is explainable through the perspective of their previous political regime. 
Although these have become senior civil service appointments, the 
appointees continue to be de facto political agents. In many cases the 
Prefects and Underprefects are former party members, even local party 
leaders, who renounced their membership. This procedural requirement is no 
substitute for an actual disentanglement between the political and 
administrative spheres.  
The available number of appointments is comparable between the 
Prefects, and Underprefects, on one hand, and General Secretaries, and 
Deputy General Secretaries, on the other hand. There are 42 Prefectures in 
Romania, ruled by one Prefect and two Underprefects. The appointments of 
General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries can be for Ministries, 
and State Agencies. The available number of Governmental Inspector would 
normally be lower, but is has soared to 69 in 2012, according to official 
records.  
As showed in Table 13, in 2009, an average of 8.7 changes were made 
in every Prefecture in Romania. Another spike is recorded in 2012, when 5.6 
changes occurred in each Prefecture. Official records show that between 
2007-2010, 140 persons were appointed as Prefect, which means an average 
replacement rate of 3.3 persons per position, or an average survival in office 
of only 18 months (Munteanu 2010). In the case of Underprefects we see a 
similar pattern of instability, as 200 persons were appointed in these positions, 
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meaning an average survival in office of 2 years, which shows a slightly more 
stable situation than for Prefects (Munteanu 2010). 
Table 13. Average Yearly Changes in Romanian Prefectures (2007-2012) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1.6 3.2 8.7 2.6 0.5 5.6 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of governmental decisions in the 
period 2007-2012 
One of the main indicators of politicization is whether the appointment 
of a senior civil servant is a permanent one, or a temporary one. A permanent 
appointment would require the candidates to pass through all legal 
procedures of evaluation and competition, whereas the temporary 
appointments are made by political executive decisions.  In 2005, the Deputy 
General Secretaries were permanently appointed in most cases—71% of total 
decisions on Deputy General Secretaries. This shows that there is a much 
greater inclination towards continuity and stability at the level of Deputy 
General Secretaries, than in the case of General Secretaries (see Table 14). 
Such a pattern can be seen for Prefects and Underprefects too, as was 
previously mentioned. The appointment procedures suggest a focus on 
ensuring compliance at the senior level (i.e. Prefects or General Secretaries), 
leaving the administrative structures beneath to function with continuity. 
One of the reasons temporary appointments have become more and 
more numerous throughout recent years is that they help patronage networks 
elude the increasingly difficult and transparent requirements to occupy a civil 
service position: public announcement of the vacancy, competence test, 
public competition etc. Senior civil servants are required to pass a general 
exam to be certified as such. When a person is temporarily appointed to a 
senior civil service position, it is not required to pass the exam. They just have 
to fulfill the job requirements in terms of experience in civil service or studies. 
In other words, in such situations, somebody who is not necessarily a senior 
civil servant himself occupies a senior civil service position. Thus, the 
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candidate pool is effectively opened up to most of the patronage network of a 
political party, with work experience in the field of public administration.  
Table 14. Permanent Appointments of General Secretaries and Deputy 
General Secretaries (2005-2012) 
 
General 
secretaries 
Percentage of 
total decisions 
on general 
secretaries 
Deputy 
general 
secretaries 
Percentage of 
total decisions 
on deputy 
general 
secretaries 
2005 4 36% 5 71% 
2006 10 45% 1 17% 
2007 8 36% 5 31% 
2008 5 20% 5 42% 
2009 17 27% 8 19% 
2010 9 26% 0 0% 
2011 0 0% 0 0% 
2012 1 1% 1 2% 
 Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial in the 
period 2005-2012 
The temporary appointments also ensure the loyalty of the appointees, 
in an increasingly more volatile political and administrative environment—‘you 
never know what might happen; change of Minister, change of Government, 
restructuring of the institution, fusion with another department—all have 
happened in recent years every few months and those making long term 
career plans have been mostly left for a fool’97. The extension of temporary 
appointments has to be made every 6 months, and as such the appointee is 
highly motivated to accommodate any requirements from his patron.  
With the increasing frequency of sanctions applied by the National 
Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) or the National Audit Court (CCR) make 
many wary of assuming positions of high responsibility. From the senior civil 
service categories, the General Secretaries are the positions with the most 
complex set of tasks. As such, appointees are often reluctant to assume office 
for longer periods of time—‘with difficult positions like this, it’s usually a 																																																								
97 chief of department, Ministry of Development, interview with the author, 7.10.2013 
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temporary appointment, as you’re not willing to assume full responsibility for 
all that is going on’98. 
Table 15. Temporary Appointments of General Secretaries and Deputy 
General Secretaries (2005-2012) 
 
Number of temporary 
appointments 
Percentage of total 
appointments 
Percentage of total 
decisions 
2005 4 29% 22% 
2006 11 48% 39% 
2007 10 38% 26% 
2008 15 54% 41% 
2009 25 49% 24% 
2010 11 35% 19% 
2011 20 100% 54% 
2012 54 92% 48% 
 Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial decisions in 
the period 2005-2012 
As showed in Table 15, the temporary appointments for General 
Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries have risen sharply in 2011 and 
2012. The contextual explanation for this is the freeze on employment in the 
public sector implemented by the Boc (II) cabinet, in late 2010. This meant 
that no new appointments could be made. This did not however exclude 
transfers, temporary appointments, or application of professional mobility. The 
figures for 2011 show the complete absence of permanent appointments in 
that year. The public sector gradually opened up, especially in the second half 
of 2012, after the change of government. This explains the slightly lower 
figure of 92% temporary appointments in this category of senior civil servants, 
for the following year. 
The use of temporary appointments in the case of Prefects and 
Underprefects follows a similar trend, as in the studied period we witness an 
increase of temporary appointments over permanent ones. The temporary 
appointment of a Prefect or Underprefect has more to do with the desire to 
control the appointee, than with procedural restrictions, as no open 																																																								
98  Radu Chiurtu, temporary appointed general secretary of the Ministry of Economics, 
interview with the author 6.12.2012 
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competition is necessary for these nominations. Temporary appointments also 
allow for persons who are not civil servants to occupy these positions, which 
might prove useful for political appointments. 
The mobility of civil servants is another legislative provision used to 
construct and reinforce a patronage network within the Romanian civil service. 
The premise for the creation of the category of civil servants was to construct 
a category of specialized personnel, whose career pathways will be bound to 
the available civil service position. Only such accredited professionals would 
normally fill senior civil service positions. In this sense, the mobility provision 
allows for transfers from one hierarchically similar position to another, 
considering them all to be administrative functions, and as such largely inter-
changeable.  
From the human resource perspective, a moderate mobility of 
personnel would add to the professional competence of the individual, through 
diverse work experiences, and would also prevent the institutionalization of a 
patronage system within public institutions. In contrast, when the level of this 
mobility becomes too high, the risk is of institutional instability and procedural 
inefficiency.  
Table 16 shows the average survival period in office, based on a 
survey of more than 460 public administration employees. What the data 
obtained from this survey demonstrates is that there is a higher instability at 
the level of Local Governments than at the level of the Central Government. 
Moreover, with a civil service in which almost 40% of the employees are over 
5099, the average years of continuity are relatively low. 
When turning to the specific situation of senior civil servants we can 
discern a growing pattern of mobility in these appointments, over the studied 
period. In table we show an analysis of the number of appointments through 
mobility, compared to the total decisions on the function. We look solely at the 
senior civil service position of Governmental Inspectors because through legal 																																																								
99 according to an internal memo of the National Agency for Civil Servants (ANAF)—Analiză a 
riscurilor privind administrația publică din România, 2012 
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provisions, it is only to and from this function that a senior civil servant can be 
transferred to another senior civil service position100. This is the reason why 
we see a sudden increase from no transfers at all in 2007, to 40% 
appointment through the mobility provision. The gradual yearly increase of the 
transfer culminates with more than 61% such appointments out of the total in 
2012. This is a situation where politicization is not based on personnel 
policies, but rather of excessive use of prerogatives. 
Table 16. Mobility of the Romanian Civil Servants 
 Average years 
worked in Public 
Administration 
Average 
years 
worked in 
the same 
institution 
Average 
years 
worked in 
the current 
job 
Average years 
worked under 
the same 
supervisor 
Central 
Government  
9.4 8.1 6.1 4.4 
Local 
Government  
8.6 7.1 4.2 2.8 
Sources: adapted by the author from the data collected in Andrei et al 2010 
The mobility of senior civil servants is closely intertwined with the 
position of Governmental Inspector. The reason for this is that the legislation 
only permits the application of the provision on professional mobility (aplicarea 
mobilității profesionale) only from or to this senior service position. In other 
words, it is used to circumvent the fact that a government can not 
permanently appoint a person from the central administration to the regional 
administrations directly—‘you cannot appoint a secretary general as prefect in 
Dolj, unless you pass him through the governmental inspector position first’101. 
																																																								
100 Governmental Decision on the Organization and Career Development of Civil Servants (No 
611/2008). 
101 Radu Chiurtu, former general secretary of the Ministry of Economics, interview with the 
author, 5.11.2013 
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Inversely, the same applies to the appointment of regional senior civil 
servants (Prefects or Underprefects), who sometimes follow local leaders 
appointed as Ministers, to the central administrative apparatus.  
Table 17. Mobility of Senior Civil Servants (to and from the position 
of Governmental Inspector) 
 
Mobility or transfer 
appointments 
Percentage of 
total Decisions Total decisions 
2007 0 0% 11 
2008 23 40% 57 
2009 92 45% 203 
2010 20 38% 52 
2011 13 50% 26 
2012 38 61% 62 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial in the period 
2007-2012 
While the mobility of senior civil servants, as much as that of civil 
servants in general, is designed to further the development of these 
professionals, it is also used to vacate coveted positions. The transfer from a 
position of Prefect or Underprefect, of General Secretary or Deputy General 
Secretary, to a position as Governmental Inspector is widely seen as a step 
down in terms of power and privilege. Because senior civil servants can not 
be fired without proper cause—the Court ruled in their favour every time, and 
imposes reinstatement (e.g. General Secretary Gheorghe Pleșa, 2007)102, a 
transfer is the only way to vacate their position. Thus, ‘from a vehicle of 
modernization and efficiency, mobility is currently an elegant means to 
remove civil servants from their appointments’ (Munteanu 2010: 183). The 
alternative is a transfer to a position that the acting Prefects or Underprefect 																																																								
102 When the appointment decision references „reintegration” it means the appointment is 
forced through a legal decision of the national High Court of Cassation and Justice (Înalta 
Curte de Casație și Justiție). Senior civil servants who feel they have been unlawfully 
dismissed starting using this leverage since 2007, when the first general secretary—
Gheorghe Plesa, was restored due to a court ruling of the Section for Contentious 
Administrative and Fiscal Business, within the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Still, 
given the politicized environment, their comeback is usually temporary, mostly used as a 
leverage to negotiate a better position than was given to them in the first place.   
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refuses—‘they transfer you from Bucharest to a position in Rădăuți103 which 
you willingly forgo, and you remain on the senior civil servants list, but you no 
longer have a position’104. 
Based on the available evidence, the employment dynamics in public 
administration seem to be characterized by an unpredictable and 
discretionary personnel policy, as well as a lack of transparency in all 
procedural aspects, such as entry examinations. This has led to a generally 
negative perception of public institutions, on the part of the population. 
Augmented by the anecdotal media coverage of various corruption cases, the 
trust in the civil service system is very low in Romania, despite relatively large 
efforts to reforms the system105. 
It is within the functions of patronage systems that we find elucidating 
variance. Social Democrats (PSD) are more concerned with increasing the 
number of available public administration positions within Local Governments 
while in power. In contrast, Liberal Democrats (PDL), tend to focus on the 
Central Government structures. They thus achieve two goals: reward loyal 
supporters, close to the party leadership, and achieve discretionary control 
over public resources. In this sense, we see that the cartelization process has 
allowed for a diversification of the utility of employing political patronage. The 
following chapter will disentangle further inter-party variations in Central 
Government and the utility of patronage networks as gatekeepers of state 
resources. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked into the occurrence in Romania of such 
informal linkages as party patronage and politicization of civil service. I argue 
that it is the appointment of political clients or coopting the existing appointees 
that ensures the continuous access to public resources. Through the process 
of cartelization, ruling political parties have had the opportunity to design the 
institutional architecture, as well as the regulatory framework to best suit their 																																																								
103 Remote city in north-eastern Romania 
104 former secretary general of a Ministry, interview with the author, 8.10.2013  
105 according to a study regarding corruption in local public administration, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MAI) 
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organizational interest. This chapter addresses these aspects by showing the 
empirical evidence of such instances in the case study of Romania. Given the 
lack of regulatory barriers to politicization (i.e. permissive or ambiguous 
legislation) and the extent of the public sector in Romania, party patronage is 
a widespread phenomena (second highest value in the IPP for European 
democracies) and a linchpin of the clientelistic provision of goods, services or 
regulatory favours. 
 Through the expert survey assessment, this chapter engages with the 
range of the party patronage phenomenon in Romania: its scope (i.e. how 
many policy sectors are targeted), and depth (i.e. to what level of the 
institutional hierarchy is the phenomenon spread). As we can see from a 
triangulation of data sources (e.g. interviews, appointment decisions, official 
reports), party patronage is employed throughout various policy sectors (with 
the heaviest emphasis on economy, health care and media), and is targeting 
both managing and executive positions in the state apparatus. 
 Beyond the occurrence of party patronage in the public sector 
employment, I argue that it is through the specific case of Central Government 
bureaucratic positions—Senior Civil Servants, that state capture is achieved. 
If in the case of the broad category of public sector jobs, we could have 
confounded the reward and control motivations for appointments, in the case 
of Senior Civil Servants the control motivation is much clearer. Such positions 
are powerful, as they are the gatekeepers of a vast array of public resources, 
with the possibility to navigate the legislative provisions in favour of 
clientelistic distribution. Therefore, in the last section of this chapter, I provide 
an in-depth investigation into the mechanisms of Senior Civil Service 
politicization in Romania (i.e. mobility, temporary appointments, transfer of 
prerogatives).  
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Chapter 5. Going Down the Rabbit Hole: Appointment 
Procedures in Selected Ministerial Case Studies 
This chapter uses a Rotation Index as a proxy measure of politicization, 
based on the number of personnel decisions. As a replaced General 
Secretary or Deputy General Secretary would normally require two decisions: 
one for appointment, and one for removal, the number of decisions should be 
double the number of individual appointments. In fact, for some Ministries, the 
number of decisions is much higher.  
I look at the patterns of appointment and dismissal in Senior Civil 
Service as these are the linchpin of discretionary control over public 
resources. While cartelization offers ruling political parties the option of 
politicization, it is the control of such positions that offers in turn the possibility 
to deploy large-scale, systematic clientelistic exchanges. Assessing the 
context of such personnel turnover hikes helps us understand the utility of 
clientelistic networks, as well as the agency of the different political patrons. 
Between 2005 and 2013, the largest number of changes of Senior Civil 
Servants occurred in the following Ministries: Internal Affairs and 
Administration—57 decisions, Environment—47 decisions, and Economy—41 
decisions. The explanation for the high turnover levels comes from two 
practices: cyclical appointments of the same persons, or consecutive 
sequences of temporary appointments.  
This chapter is concerned with two important dynamics: the turnover 
levels of each Minister (for those Ministries with the highest turnover levels), 
and the turnover levels of each Cabinet. The empirical data suggests that 
Ministries with a wide spectrum of resources and regulatory proceedings 
under their jurisdiction have much higher politicization of appointments (see 
Table 18). Similarly, Cabinets of wide coalitions tend to accommodate higher 
turnover levels than narrow ones (see Table 26). 
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Table 18. Total Number of Senior Civil Service Changes (2005-2013) 
Ministry 
Nb. of Senior Civil 
Service Changes  
No. of Senior Civil 
Servants (2013) 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration 
57 3 
Ministry of Environment 47 2 
Ministry of Economy 41 3 
Ministry of Education and 
Research 
33 3 
Ministry of Regional 
Development and Tourism 
30 3 
Ministry of External Affairs 23 2 
Ministry of Justice 22 2 
Ministry of Transportation 21 2 
Ministry of Public Health 16 2 
Ministry of Culture 15 2 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 
15 2 
Ministry of Public Finance 13 2 
Ministry of SMEs, Commerce 
and Business  
11 2 
Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Social Protection 
11 2 
Ministry of National Defense 11 2 
Ministry of Youth and Sport 11 2 
Ministry of Communications and 
Information 
8 2 
Ministry of European Affairs 7 1 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial and 
governmental decisions in the period 2005-2013 
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As showed in Table 18, the total number of appointments per Ministry 
suggest frequent changes of Senior Civil Servants. Within the Ministry of 
Economy, for 7 Ministers in the reference period, 22 General Secretaries and 
Deputy General Secretaries were appointed. Out of these, more than half—
13, were temporary appointments, and 9 permanent. Given that a Ministry can 
have one general secretary, and two Deputy General Secretaries, the 
numbers suggest that on average, every Minister changed the entire senior 
civil service leadership of the Ministry. Within the Ministry of Environment, for 
5 Ministers in the reference period, 30 Senior Civil Servants were appointed, 
out of which the majority were temporary—27. Similarly, in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Administration, for 10 different Ministers in the reference 
period, 32 General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries were 
appointed, out of which the majority were temporary appointments—23.   
Table 19. Appointments of Senior Civil Servants in Ministries (2005-
2013) 
Ministry 
Total Number of 
Appointments 
Temporary 
Appointments 
Permanent 
Appointments 
Ministry of Economy 22 13 9 
Ministry of Environment 30 27 3 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Administration 
34 25 9 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial and 
governmental decisions in the period 2005-2013 
 Most official representatives of the Romanian public institutions explain 
the frequent use of temporary appointments and rotation of senior civil service 
personnel through contextual limitations: restrictions on public employments, 
budgetary constraints, or legislative provisions on enhancing the personnel 
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mobility and efficiency.106 In reality, the mobility provisions ‘pass the control 
over Senior Civil Servants from the prime-minister to the minister’ through an 
evasive provision: ‘Mobility of the Senior Civil Servant will be deployed 
through prime-ministerial decision, at the solicitation of the manager of the 
public institution under whose command the Senior Civil Servant acts’—in 
most cases the Minister107.  
 For the Ministries with the highest rates of Senior Civil Service 
personnel turnover, the predominance of temporary appointments is first and 
foremost explained by the relatively frequent governmental changes. When 
Ministers do not expect their term to last too long they are inclined to avoid the 
normal appointment procedure—consisting of an relatively time-consuming 
open competition, because the personnel changes must occur rapidly. 
Permanent appointments are ‘made’ as they go along, and competitions tend 
to ‘be usually won by the temporary appointees…’108. Additionally, the same 
person is often the subject of multiple appointments, with the first one or two 
being temporary, and the final one indefinite or permanent.  
The motivation of political leaders to condition as much as they can the 
activity of senior civil service appointees is congruent with the prescriptions of 
the political patronage theory. Whether it is in the interest of the party, or their 
personal interest, Ministers tend to deploy as many control tactics as they 
can. This level of control surpasses the normal, functional, administrative 
activity of a civil servant—which is already hierarchically controlled by the 
Minister, but rather aims at ensuring unquestioning obedience.  
A former General Secretary whose career in senior civil service covers 
the entire democratic period of Romania is convinced of Ministers’ predilection 
for such appointments: ‘of course you temporarily appoint them because they 
remain loyal—your man 100%, he is personally obligated to you—he will 																																																								
106 From interviews with the author, current Minister of the Environment Rovana Plumb, 
former Ministrer of Internal Affairs Ioan Rus, former Minister of Internal Affairs Dan Nica, and 
former Minister of Internal Affairs Cristian David 
107 Former General Secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with the author, 
29.01.2014 
108 Nicolae Nemirschi, former Minister of the Environment, interview with the author 
06.02.2014 
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answer to your orders no question asked, and he doesn’t have to pass an 
appointment contest’109.   
Still, even when these appointments are permanent, given the mobility 
provision of the legislation, they are just as replaceable as the temporary 
ones—only the procedures differ. Furthermore, some Senior Civil Servants 
claim they themselves do not want to be permanently appointed quoting 
multiple interconnected reasons. One former General Secretary of the Ministry 
of Economy explains that ‘these jobs have just become too risky, here (i.e. the 
Ministry of Economy) it’s not a linear task distribution, like in other Ministries, 
here you have to walk on thin ice—it’s just not worth it’110.  
Other Senior Civil Servants point to the fact that Ministers have 
increasingly tended to delegate the key attributions, such as that of main 
credit release authority, to whomever they want—‘normally it was the General 
Secretary that held all administrative powers in the Ministry, now you can very 
well be left with all the responsibilities, and no attributions. At one point we 
didn’t even know who was the ‘main credit release authority’ in the 
Ministry…someone he brought with him (i.e. the acting Minister)’111.  
5.1. Different Patterns of Personnel Change 
The changes in senior civil service personnel have different patterns 
throughout the institutions studied here. On one hand, the Ministry of 
Environment presents a somewhat steady distribution of appointments, as 
can be seen in Figure 13. In this case, the hikes appear in the electoral years 
2009, and 2012, when more ministers were changed than in-between 
elections. This suggests party patronage in senior civil service appointments 
in the Ministry of Environment. The number of yearly changes taking place in 
this institution suggests the stability of General Secretaries and Deputy 
General Secretaries is quite low.  																																																								
109 Adrian Radu, former General Secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with the 
author, 06.02.2014 
110 Radu Chiurtu, former General Secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with the 
author, 19.01.2014 
111 former General Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, interview with the author, 
06.02.1014 
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In contrast, for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, as 
well as in the case of the Ministry of Economy, we see pronounced hikes in 
certain years, and relatively few changes in the rest of the reference period. 
The most dramatic hike for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration 
is recorded in 2009. It was not only an electoral year, but also one of 
numerous changes in the structure of the governing coalition. Within a total 
number of 23 prime-ministerial decisions on this ministry’s senior civil service 
positions, 16 were appointments (9 temporary appointments, 6 permanent 
appointments). 
Figure 13. Decisions on General Secretaries and Deputy General in 
Selected Ministries (2005-2013) 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial and 
governmental decisions in the period 2005-2013 
 The discrepant personnel policy of this institution over the years is 
especially striking, as in 2013, it comprised two distinct Ministries—one for 
Internal Affairs, and another one for Administration. Although this situation 
creates a double number of positions, the decisional pattern is not significantly 
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changed. The most powerful factor of influence in this case remains the 
national electoral struggle.  
Finally, in the case of the Ministry of Economy, most senior civil service 
rotations have been recorded in 2012 and 2013. For the rest of the reference 
period, the Ministry of Economy seems have had much lower turnover levels. 
In the electoral year 2009, we see in this institution too a surge in personnel 
decisions, but it is much smaller than in the case of the other ministries.   
 These different patterns of personnel appointments are a telling 
demonstration of the small effect general contextual factors play in the 
politicization of the senior civil service in Romania. If contextual elements (e.g. 
general elections, budgetary cuts) were at play, as many claim they are, we 
would have seen a similar trend of appointments throughout various 
Ministries. Rather, each case is different, with different periods of hikes in 
rotations, and different predilection for changes over the reference period. 
This sooner points to the idea that it is the specificities of every Ministry, the 
internal stakes and processes that contribute to the occasional senior civil 
service instability. Thus, the analysis will further proceed with an in-depth 
analysis of each of the three Ministries under discussion.  
5.2. The Stakes in Controlling each Ministry 
Probably the single most important Ministry, both from the political, and 
administrative point of view, is the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration. As the institution that presides over law enforcement, 
elections, local public administrations, and a part of the national intelligence 
services, it has powerful and stable internal hierarchies. It is only partially 
controlled politically, and most of its personnel is not covered by the Civil 
Service legislation, but by the Police Status Law, as they are police officers. 
Based on interview data, it is described as a “caste-like system”. 
Nevertheless, while it is not as easily politicized as other institutions, the 
opaque nature of its internal organization provides administrative patrons (i.e. 
Minister, Prime-Minister) with considerable leeway of appointments from 
within the existing personnel base (i.e. few outside appointments occur).  
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This heavy inclination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration towards the specificities of the Internal Affairs system has led 
to the recent split of the institutions. In the beginning of 2013, two distinct 
Ministries emerged: the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI), and the Ministry of 
Administration and Regional Development (MDRAP). This move has created 
a much more homogenous area of activity, and institutional procedures.  
The newly established Ministry of Administration and Regional 
Development (MDRAP) creates a new platform of powerful representation of 
the interests of the local governments (LGs). The Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) that initiated this institutional split is the party with the largest territorial 
network, and powerful local leaders. In this sense, it is easy to see the lineage 
between internal party organizational strategies, and institutional reforms 
conducted while in power.  
For the entire post-communist period, the portfolio of Internal Affairs 
has seen most changes in its executive: 18 ministers for the total 14 cabinets, 
and an average term of a little over one year. In the reference period of 2005-
2013, the highest turnover of Ministers was recorded, as 10 different persons 
occupied this position. Furthermore, for the reference period, the average 
term in office of an Internal Affairs Minister was only 9 months.  
Two different typologies of ministers emerge in this case. On one hand 
we can see the ‘fixtures’—political actors generally associated with this 
portfolio, occupying it for several times, when their party was in power (e.g. 
Vasile Blaga (PDL), Ioan Rus (PSD)). On the other hand, there are 
‘incidentals’—political actors of limited notoriety, or with limited political 
support in this field, occupying the minister chair for not more than a few 
months, or even days (e.g. Dan Nica (PSD), Gabriel Berca (PDL), or Mircea 
Dușa (PSD)). For this latter category it was however an important stepping-
stone in their subsequent political carriers.  
The Rotation Index is based on the compilation of all personnel 
decisions made by every Minister, holding the Internal Affairs portfolio in the 
reference period. This index is further developed as the ratio of the number of 
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personnel decisions of the Minister while in office, and the number of months 
he or she spent in office. Thus the result is an index of monthly average 
personnel stability. It is important to mention that it is an overall index of 
personnel turnover, accounting for both political appointments—State 
Secretaries and Deputy State Secretaries, as well as Senior Civil Service 
appointments—General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries.     
Based on the data in Table 20, we can see that personnel policies vary 
in wide extent from Minister to Minister. The 2009 peak of rotations, 
mentioned in the previous section, is equally reflected in this detailed 
coverage, as we see in the case of Minister Liviu Dragnea a rotation index of 
21. This is the highest value ever recorded, in the reference period, for any 
Minister. It is telling of the high determination to ensure control over the 
different echelons of this Ministry in the eve of elections. While in Romania 
elections are generally perceived to be free and fair (according to opinion 
polls), the organization of the elections is important mostly because of the 
territorial presence of party agents.  
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Table 20. Decisional Patterns in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration (2005-2013) 
Minister Vasile Blaga* 
12.04 – 
04.07 
Cristian 
David 
04.07 – 
12.08 
Liviu 
Dragnea 
01.09 – 
02.09 
Dan 
Nica 
02.09-
09.09 
Vasile 
Blaga 
12.09 – 
09.10 
Traian 
Igaș 
09.10 – 
02.12 
Gabriel 
Berca 
02.12 – 
05.12 
Ioan 
Rus 
05.12 
– 
08.12 
Mircea 
Dușa 
08.12 – 
12.12 
Radu 
Stroe 
12.12 – 
04.14 
Nb. of Months 
in Office 27 21 1 8 12 16 2 3 4 13 
Rotation Index 
(Personnel 
Decisions per 
Nb. of Months 
in Office) 
0.15 0.67 21.00 2.00 2.17 0.94 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.92 
Total 
Personnel 
Decisions 
4 14 21 16 26 15 6 9 4 25 
Percentage of 
Decisions taken 
in the first 
three months 
of the term 
n.a. 42% n.a. 81% 80% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 52% 
Decisions on 
General 
Secretaries and 
Deputy General 
Secretaries 
(Senior Civil 
Servants) 
0 5 8 7 9 13 4 2 1 4 
Percentage of 
decisions on 
Senior Civil 
Servants 
0% 36% 38% 44% 35% 87% 67% 22% 25% 16% 
Decisions on 
State 
Secretaries 
(Political 
Appointments) 
3 7 10 4 15 2 0 5 1 16 
Decisions on 
key** 
Departments in 
the Ministry 
1 2 3 4 3 0 2 2 2 5 
Percentage of 
decisions on 
political 
appointments 
100% 64% 62% 50% 69% 13% 33% 78% 75% 84% 
Source: compiled by the author based on public records 
 *partial data analysed, as her term began one year earlier than the start of our reference period 
** key Departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are considered to be: (1) Department of Intelligence and 
Internal Protection, and (2) Department of Order and Public Safety 
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Liviu Dragnea who is now the leader of the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) was a key player in the internal organization of the party, as a General 
Secretary. A former County Council President in Teleorman, who migrated 
from the Democratic Party (PD) in 2000, made a reputation as the leader of 
local bosses. He was later indicted for electoral fraud, in 2015, as he 
coordinated a “complex digital system through which he was sending 
messages, orders and recommendations” to local intermediaries on order to 
“illegally increase the turnout by impersonations, or fictitious votes”. 112 
Prosecutors also claimed for the purpose of increasing local turnout in the 
2009 presidential referendum he used a local network of 74 persons who 
chaired voting sections.  
The effective monitorization of the electoral procedures is important 
because: it can prevent any fraudulent attempts from other political agents, 
and it can exert a certain amount of influence on rural areas—where there is a 
much more compliant mentality. If the governing party is able to deploy 
resources and support logistically local bosses in prefectures, or local 
governments (LGs), it has a greater chance to rally rural voters. All these 
political survival mechanisms have been deployed for the past decade, 
through the institutional procedures under the control of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Administration. Respondents tentatively confirm these findings—
‘You have Internal Affairs (i.e. the portfolio of Internal Affairs and 
Administration), you have the keys to the kingdom’113.  
Another important pattern presented in Table 20 is the high 
predominance of personnel changes in the first three months of office. While 
most Ministers did not survive in office for more than three months, those that 
did had much longer terms. Still, in their case too, over 80% of personnel 
changes are effected in the first three months of term. This suggests, once 
again, that it is not the contextual factors, or cyclical events that contribute to 																																																								
112 Excerpts from the National Anticorruption Agency (DNA) 
Statements,http://www.agerpres.ro/justitie/2016/04/22/alerta-iccj-liviu-dragnea-condamnat-
definitiv-la-doi-ani-de-inchisoare-cu-suspendare-in-dosarul-referendumul--14-41-45, last 
accessed on 20.06.2016 
113 former Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, 
interview with the author, 08.02.2013 
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the personnel rotations, but rather the widespread practice of politicization 
and discretionary appointments in central administrative institutions in 
Romania.  
Most personnel changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration were effected on political appointments—State Secretaries, 
and Deputy State Secretaries. The changes on Senior Civil Servants, while 
significant, remain smaller than the political changes. The one telling 
exception is the term of Traian Igaș who concentrated on Senior Civil Service 
personnel, with 87% of his decisions targeting this category. Firstly, he 
followed a Minister from his own party, so there was little incentive to change 
political appointments, as they belonged to the same governing coalition. 
Secondly, he was a relative outsider, having only served as a local 
councilmen before.  
Expert opinions also suggest differences in appointment decisions 
based on previous experience with the institution: ‚powerful, politically backed 
Ministers, do not feel the need to change everyone, it is usually the weak ones 
that do it like this’114.This seems to reinforce the prescriptions of the cartel 
party model that penetrates the state. It is usually the case of Ministers who 
have been previously in professional contact with the Ministry or some of its 
Senior Civil Servants, and have a means to control them without extensive 
personnel changes. If Ministers are powerful within the political organization, 
than they are also in a better position to control the administrative networks 
developed through party-state interpenetration over succesive electoral 
cycles—„it’s all about how much political backing you’ve got”115. 
Finally, another important function of this portfolio the control of part of 
the national intelligence services. This is the Department of Information and 
Internal Protection (DGIPI), nicknamed ‘a quarter past two’ (doi și un sfert) 
after it’s name during communist times—UM215. The appointments here are 
heavily political, and more so, they are normally agreed upon within the 																																																								
114 former Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, 
interview with the author, 09.01.2013 
115 N.C., Ministerial official, interview with the author, 16.02.2013 
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governing party leadership. In 2009, when a proposed Minister wanted to 
appoint a certain person, he felt was suitable, on this position, against the 
party leadership desires, his political support was redrawn. In this general 
setting, the rotation patterns in such key departments of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Administration do not coincide with the Ministerial 
changes, but rather with the broader, political changes. As such, these 
appointments are some of the few, directly linked to the political party’s 
support, and not just the political leader himself. 
The stakes in controlling the Ministry of Economy are less 
organizational, and more closely linked to regulatory proceedings and public 
contracts. It is here that the pervasive interest nexus between politicians, 
politicized civil servants, and private agents meets. Generally speaking, in the 
political negotiations jargon, the Ministry of Economy is  “the wealthiest” or the 
“piggy-bank”. It is not necessarily because of a big budget, but rather because 
of the control over the privatization process and State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). Thus, the key political interests in the Ministry of the Economy are 
‘public procurement contracts, concessions, investments, privatizations, 
information regarding capital increases’116.  
The Ministry of Economy is probably the single most scandal-ridden 
Ministry in Romania. In the reference period—2005-2013, out of 7 occupants 
of the Ministerial appointment, 4 have pending investigations on their activity. 
Most investigations deal with preferential treatment of economic agents, 
resulting in massive losses of public funds (e.g. Codruț Sereș, Varujan 
Vosganian, Adriean Videanu). In this sense, the cartel party model, of 
intertwinement between political parties and the state, is taken one step 
further, including the interest groups of economic agents.   
It should be noted that many of the State Owned Companies (SOEs) 
are also massive employers, which in turn means that there can also be an 
electorally oriented clientelistic strategy. Some of the linkage mechanisms 
deployed within a cartel system for state capture are also using their leverage 																																																								
116 Radu Chiurtu, former General Secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with the 
author, 19.01.2014 
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over such large scale employers to mobilize votes. Given the predominant 
profile of low-skilled workers, and the lack of employment alternatives, it is 
often much easier to mobilize votes in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) rather 
than any other public institution. 
The first investigation that took place in this period was labeled the 
‘Strategic Privatizations’ Enquiry – a transnational interest group developing 
its economic activities on the basis of inside information from ministerial 
institutions in Romania. Between 2004-2007, the Ministry of Economy, and 
the Ministry of Communications were involved in the process of privatizing 
such high value state enterprises as Electrica Muntenia Sud, Petrom, 
Romaero, Avioane Craiova, Poșta Română, and Romtelecom. Besides the 
Ministers of the two institutions at that time, there were several Senior Civil 
Servants indicted by the Court. 
When looking at the personnel decisional patterns, the analysis is 
constricted by the ministerial rotation itself. More stable than the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Administration, but less stable than the Ministry of 
Environment, the Economy portfolio was occupied by 7 different persons in 
the 9 years of the reference timeframe. This means that the average term was 
of 1 year and a half. Still, in attempting to establish a Minister’s discretionary 
powers and political support it is not entirely relevant the duration of a term. 
For example, at the helm of this institutions we find pillars of political parties, 
benefiting from great political backing, as well as somewhat peripheral 
political agents.  
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Table 21. Decisional Patterns in the Ministry of Economy (2005-2013) 
Minister 
Ioan 
Codruț 
Sereș 
12.04 – 
12.06 
Varujan 
Vosganian 
12.06 – 
12.08 
Adriean 
Videanu 
12.08 – 
09.10 
Ion 
Ariton 
09.10 – 
02.12 
Lucian 
Nicolae 
Bode 
02.12 – 
04.12 
Daniel 
Chițoiu 
05.12 – 
12.12 
Varujan 
Vosganian 
12.12 – 
10.13 
Andrei 
Gerea 
10.13 – 
03.14 
Nb. of Months in 
Office 23 24 20 24 2 7 7 14 
Rotation Index 
(Personnel 
Decisions per 
Nb. of Months in 
Office)  
0.74 0.75 0.90 0.17 0.50 2.00 3.29 0.43 
Total 
Personnel 
Decisions 
17 18 18 4 1 14 23 6 
Percentage of 
Decisions taken 
in the first three 
months of the 
term 
n.a. 22% 6% 50% n.a. 79% 30% n.a 
Decisions on 
General 
Secretaries and 
Deputy General 
Secretaries 
(Senior Civil 
Servants) 
2 5 5 3 1 7 13 2 
Percentage of 
decisions on 
Senior Civil 
Servants 
12% 28% 28% 75% 100% 50% 57% 33% 
Decisions on 
State 
Secretaries 
(Political 
Appointments) 
15 13 13 1 0 7 9 3 
Percentage of 
decisions on 
political 
appointments 
88% 72% 72% 25% 0% 50% 39% 50% 
Source: compiled by the author based on public records 
*partial data analysed, as her term began one year earlier than the start of our reference period 
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It is in this Ministry that we find a rare situation for the Romanian 
executives of the last decade: the same person—Varujan Vosganian, 
occupying this position in three different terms. This might suggest a 
distinctive support from his political party—National Liberal Party (PNL), in 
nominating him when they were ascribed this portfolio in ruling coalitions. 
Thus, a revealing analysis can be conducted on whether the return of the 
same Minister, at the same portfolio, in a fairly narrow difference of years, 
brings back the same people on the positions of General Secretaries, and 
more so state secretaries—purely political appointment. This comparison 
presents surprising results in terms of politicization, as not a single 
appointment, political or administrative, coincides between the two times in 
office.  
While at first this would denounce the political patronage thesis—as it 
is reliant on an existing network of clients, the situation is much more 
complex. A compelling explanation is that the Minister, whoever he is, does 
not have as much control on who to appoint, as the legal framework allows it. 
In fact, it is the political party, or other supporting groups, that have the de 
facto power of nomination. From what this situation in the Ministry of Economy 
tells us, it is not as much a question of ‘all the kings men’—minister’s political 
patronage, as it is one of party patronage, directly influenced by internal party 
strategies.  
Most interviews with General Secretaries and State Secretaries reveal 
the issue of ‘political algorithm’ of distributing various positions in the central 
apparatus—political appointments, but also administrative ones, to clients of 
local party bosses. This is supported by the findings of a recent study on the 
appointments on the Board of State Owned Companies (SOE) in Austria. 
Ennser-Jedenastik (2014) showed how coalition algorithms of appointment 
play a statistically significant role in the nomination process, but also in their 
survival in office. 
The limited role played by the Minister’s preferences is equally 
supported by a substantial increase in the number of senior civil service 
	 197	
personnel over the last two years of the reference period. As such, it seems it 
is much less a question of paradigm, as it is one of context. One explanation 
for this is that this two-year period of increased changes coincides with the 
government of a large coalition. As such, based on expert interviews, it seems 
there were difficult negotiations between the ruling parties, on the control of 
various political and administrative appointments. And while in smaller 
portfolios, the negotiations might stop at the ministerial level, with a highly 
strategic portfolio as this one, it is obvious that any position is desirable. Thus, 
the political allocation of functions runs over the administrative strata of the 
institution.  
 In this setting, it is again telling to compare the two terms in office of 
the same minister. In the first round, with a ruling coalition of smaller parties, 
Varujan Vosganian was less concerned with changes of Senior Civil Servants, 
72% of his decisions targeting the political appointments of state secretaries, 
and only 28% concerning the administrative level (see Table 21).  
Reversely, with the second term in office, in a context of much greater 
political struggles for power, the same person devoted much more of his 
attention to the changes of Senior Civil Servants—57%, as opposed to those 
of state secretaries—only 39%. Furthermore, while his first term records one 
of the lowest values for the rotation index—0.75, the second term records the 
highest—3.29. On a basic level, such quantitative evaluations show in this last 
example an average of more than three personnel decisions per month in 
office, concerning the management of this institution. This itself is a troubling 
pattern in terms of institutional stability, coherence and efficiency. But it also 
suggests, as mentioned before, that there is little evidence of a traceable 
effect of the Minister’s preferences or attitude towards the personnel policies 
in his attribution.   
 Another revealing assessment is that on the number of decisions taken 
in the first three months in office. The politicization patterns are generally 
more pronounced at the beginning of a term. If changes occur in this time 
frame it is much more likely to assume they occur on the basis of personal, or 
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political preferences. In contrast, for the changes occurring later on during the 
term, it is harder to distinguish between a multitude of factors that can include 
poor performance on the part of the Senior Civil Servants, more attractive 
employment opportunities and so on.  
In this sense, it is in the case of Minister Daniel Chițoiu that we find 
almost 80% of all of his management level personnel decisions taken in the 
first three months in office (see Table 19). He ruled this Ministry during an 
extremely tense political period leading up to general elections, and within the 
institution the perception was that he was well in charge—‘it was obvious that 
he knew what he was doing’117. As a result of his efforts, he subsequently 
gained the Finance portfolio, and Deputy Prime-Minister position. The 
methodical approach of this Minister towards personnel rotations is reflected 
in the fact that his decisions were equally split between the senior civil service 
positions, and the political appointments of state secretaries.  
 Since 1996, the Ministry of Economy has gone through 8 major 
reorganizations as a whole, and numerous other internal reshuffles. In this 
situation, it is hard to evaluate the institutional processes and connections 
between the Ministry and its subordinate agencies and departments. If at one 
point the most significant agencies were the ones related to the industry, this 
might not necessarily be the situation at this moment118. Key subordinated 
institutions connected to the Ministry of Economy have been the National 
Authority for Energy Regulation (ANRE) or the Office for State Participation 
and Privatization (OPSPI). As opposed to more prosaic clientelistic provisions 
of public goods or services, such Agencies are primarily a source of 
regulatory favours. Unmistakably, such favours would be highly valued by 
private sector agents, as I show with selected examples in the final section of 
this chapter. The favours targeting such private beneficiaries are still 
connected to clientelistic electoral goals, as they usually provide in return 
material assistance to the patron party in campaigns. 																																																								
117 Radu Nicolae Chiurtu, former general secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with 
the author, 19.01.2014 
118 State Secretary, interview with the author 
	 199	
The Ministry of Environment has seen a steadier string of Ministers. 
Since its creation, in 2000, it has been only been governed by 6 ministers, two 
of which have had a full 4 year term. In the reference period of 2005-2013, the 
average term has been smaller—1 year and 10 months, mainly due to the 
short life of two cabinets—Boc I, in 2009, and Ungureanu, in 2012. Thus, in 
general terms, we can say this Ministry is one of the most stable portfolios 
from the point of view of the political leadership. Nevertheless, not the same 
can be said about the intra-institutional personnel dynamics.  
 In contrast to the other two Ministries, this portfolio is less desirable for 
itself, as for the subordinate agencies—‘effective arms in controlling and 
influencing economic activities throughout the country’ 119 . Target 
governmental agencies controlled by the Ministry of Environment: National 
Agency for the Protection of the Environment (Agenția Națională pentru 
Protecția Mediului) (ANPM), National Environment Guard (Garda Națională de 
Mediu), and the Environmental Fund Administration (Administrația Fondului 
de Mediu) (AFM). 
As can be seen in Table 20, in the case of most Ministers of the 
Environment, the personnel decisions were focused on the political 
appointments. In other words, their personnel policy was not aimed at 
politicising the civil service, but rather using the political prerogatives of 
appointments. Furthermore, the shortest terms—the one month of Attila 
Korodi, and one year of Nicolae Nemirschi, are linked to lower rates of 
decisions regarding Senior Civil Servants—0%, and respectively, 18%. 
Conversely, the longer terms can be associated to higher rotations of Senior 
Civil Servants. As hypothesissed by this study, the rotation patterns are taken 
to be a proxy for governmental leaders’ inclination to politicization. 
Only in the case of László Borbély has the rate of decisions on Senior 
Civil Servants been greater than the rate of decisions on political 
appointments. There are two possible explanations for the 52% decisions on 
Senior Civil Servants in the case of Minister Borbély. On one hand, being a 																																																								
119 Anne Jugănaru, State Secretary of the Ministry of the Evironment, interview with the author, 
12.02.2014 
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representative of a minority coalition partner—the Hungarian Union (UDMR), 
this Minister’s of the Environment political clout was limited. As such, he could 
not impose his, or his party’s people, well beyond the direct jurisdiction of his 
instiution.  
In fact, most of the positions of state secretaries and Governmental 
Agencies presidents and vice-presidents are attributable according to a 
political algorithm, with the most powerful political parties in power gaining the 
most numerous positions. In this perspective, the political power and position 
of a Minister within his own party/coalition may be seen as a determining 
factor in its level of discretionary appointments.  
On the other hand, still connected to the degree of political influence, 
the predominant focus on senior civil service positions might suggest a 
struggle to control the institution. As appointments within Governmental 
Agencies are sooner driven by reward motivations—placing loyal people in 
highly profitable positions, the Senior Civil Servants are the gateway to 
procedurally controlling the Ministry iteself. As such, their manipulation is 
much more significant from the administrative point of view, than the political 
one. 
Currently, almost 20% of the Romanian territory is classified as natural 
protected area, within the European wide network Natura 2000120. According 
to experts, this massive inclusion of territories in protected jurisdiction is 
based on the fact that within those areas various European funding lines can 
be requested121. The National Agency for the Protection of the Environment 
(ANPM) is one of the main institutional pillars responsible with the 
management and funding for these territories. As such, it plays a determinant 
role in relation to local governments (LG) responsible for protected areas, but 
also towards economic parties interested in developing and managing these 
territories (see discussion on the decentralization strategy in Romania, 
Chaper 2).  																																																								
120 according to http://biodiversitate.mmediu.ro/romanian-biodiversity/despre-arii-protejate  
121 based especially on the accounts of a State Secretary from the Ministry of Environment, 
interview with the author, 3.02.2014 
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Table 22. Decisional Patterns in the Ministry of Environment (2005-2013) 
Minister Sulfina 
Barbu* 
12.04 – 
04.07 
Nicolae 
Nemirschi 
12.08- 
12.09 
László 
Borbély 
12.09 – 
04.12 
Attila 
Korodi 
04.12- 
05.12 
Rovana 
Plumb 
05.12- 
03.14 
Nb. of Months in Office 48 12 27 1 20 
Rotation Index (Personnel Decisions per Nb. 
of Months in Office)  
0.31 1.42 1.00 2.00 2.95 
Total Personnel Decisions 15 17 27 2 59 
Percentage of Decisions taken in the first 
three months of the term 
n.a. 100% 52% 100% 34% 
Decisions on General Secretaries and Deputy 
General Secretaries (Senior Civil Servants) 
4 3 14 0 17 
Percentage of decisions on Senior Civil 
Servants 
27% 18% 52% 0% 29% 
Decisions on State Secretaries (Political 
Appointments) 
3 4 5 2 14 
Decisions on the National Agency for the 
Protection of the Environment (ANPM) 
(political appointments) 
6 4 5 0 7 
Decisions on the National Environment Guard 
(political appointments) 
2 2 0 0 10 
Decisions on the Environmental Fund 
Administration (AFM) (political 
appointments) 
0 4 3 0 11 
Percentage of decisions on political 
appointments 
73% 82% 48% 100% 71% 
Source: compiled by the author based on public records 
*partial data analysed, as her term began one year earlier than the start of our reference period 
ANPM also has an important role in regulating and implementing 
environmental protection actions. The significance of this institution in the 
Environment portfolio is reflected in the high level of changes in its leadership, 
surpassed only by the rotations of state secretaries (see Table 20). According 
to the signed testimony of an employee of this institution, there are various 
incidents of procedural misconduct, meant to serve a process of politicization 
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and proprietary use of institutional powers. Adriana Georgian aims to 
demonstrate that within this institution there is ‘discretionary promotion of 
personnel, through rigged contests through discriminatory conditions, serving 
previously selected persons, willing to execute illegal orders, and thus 
becoming simple instruments in realizing his (a.n. the director’s of ANPM) 
goals’122.   
5.3. Career Pathways Analysis and Clientelistic Networks 
Beyond the decision-making patterns of Ministers, it is relevant to assess who 
the appointees are, and where they come from. The career-pathway analysis 
is an effective way to discern to what degree personnel changes are only 
linked to institutional instability, and to what degree these changes are in fact 
representing effective politicization practices. So far in the analysis, I have 
considered the turnover levels themselves to be a proxy indicator of the level 
of politicization, but it is important to have additional support for my 
arguments.  
There are significant background specificities between the three 
Ministries. In the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, 
most Senior Civil Servants appointed in the past decade have a police, and 
not an administrative career behind, while in the case on the Ministry of 
Environment, some have private sector experience, or in local agencies. The 
Ministry of Economy is probably the most coherent in terms of the 
predominance of career-pathways, with most of the appointees coming from 
the specific category of Senior Civil Servants. In the case of this Ministry, it is 
not only that various people occupy, through different appointment procedures 
(e.g. temporary appointments, mobility) the senior civil service positions, but 
that they are themselves Senior Civil Servants—a distinctive, professional 
category in which you enter through exam.  
																																																								
122 Adriana Georgian, letter to the Fapt Divers publication, 30.10.2013, accessible at 
http://www.faptdivers.ro/social/7518-concursuri-trucate-si-controale-ilegale-la-agentia-pentru-
protectia-mediului.html  
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I look at two categories of senior civil service appointees: insiders and 
outsiders. Insiders are considered to be all those appointees that have 
previously held a position within the institution, at the time of their 
appointment. Outsiders are all those who did not hold for more than three 
months a position within the institution, at the time of their appointment. This 
analysis is significant because it shows the extent to which there is a limited 
politicization—promoting people from within the system, or unlimited 
politicization—promoting whomever the Minister wishes. This distinction has 
been dealt with in the public administration literature, as ‘bounded’ vs. ‘open’ 
politicization (Meyer-Sahling 2008)123.   
The findings of our career-pathway analysis in the case of the three 
selected Romanian Ministries shows confirms that the Ministry of Economy is 
an example of what can be called ‘bounded’ politicization. In this sense, we 
see frequent changes on the positions of General Secretary, or those of 
Deputy General Secretaries, but most of these persons come from within the 
institution, the ministerial apparatus. An in-depth look into their background 
suggests that it is mostly from the Human Resources or Judicial Departments 
that they get promoted. This pattern holds true also for the much fewer 
insiders in the Ministry of Environment, where only 37% of persons occupying 
senior civil service positions in the reference period come from within the 
system. In the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the proportion again is in 
favour of outsiders—58%, but it must be noted that these are not completely 
from outside the internal affairs system, but rather from local agencies and 
departments. Like in the case of many outsiders, the Minister or another 
regional political leader probably brings them to the central apparatus.   
While there are two discernable categories—insiders vs. outsiders, the 
latter category requires more nuancing. Outsiders can be promoted on the 
basis of political patronage or personal patronage. Political patronage is 																																																								
123 According to Meyer-Sahling (2008), ‘bounded politicization’ assumes that new 
governments replace inherited senior officials and fill these vacancies by promoting lower-
ranking officials into senior ranks; ‘open politicization’ assumes that new governments replace 
inherited officials and fill these vacancies by appointing officials who are recruited from 
settings other than the ministerial bureaucracy. 
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obviously based on the party support, but personal patronage seems to be 
even more pervasive. General Secretaries, or Deputy General Secretaries, 
with no discernable professional background in central, or regional 
administrative appointments, are found to be directly, or indirectly connected 
to the Ministers. As such, they form a limited, but most problematic category 
of appointments, because of the lack of qualifications for the position, and 
their unquestioning subordination to the political will.  
Table 23. Career-pathway Analysis of Senior Civil Servants 
Ministry 
  
Insider Pathway (held 
previous positions in the 
Ministry) 
Outsider Pathway (no 
previous position in the 
Ministry) 
Nb. of 
Appointees 
Percentage of 
Total nb. of 
Appointees 
Nb. of 
Appointees 
Percentage of 
Total nb. of 
Appointees 
Ministry of Economy 10 59% 7 41% 
Ministry of 
Environment 6 37% 10 63% 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Administration 
8 42% 11 58% 
Source: Personnel record from the Ministries' Human Resources Departments, and from 
the National Agency of Civil Servants (ANAF) 
Another distinctive category of outsiders is that of ‘professional’ 
General Secretaries. These persons represent a limited category of people 
who have had previous senior civil service positions in other Ministries—
“there is a certain class forming, with people (i.e. Senior Civil Servants) being 
moved around (i.e. different Ministries)”124 –while this is the very purpose of 
creating a professional class of Senior Civil Servants, it is hard to assess the 
basis of their transfer. Some of them are usually following a Minister that 
receives different portfolios (e.g. Vasile Blaga moved all the Senior Civil 
																																																								
124 Radu Chiurtu, former General Secretary in the Ministry of Economy, interview with the 
author 19.01.2014 
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Servants from one Ministry to another, as he was changing portfolios, in 
2009).  
Others, are indeed ‘people of the system’, sought because of their 
experience with various parties, and know how to navigate both the political 
and the administrative seas, but they are less than a ‘handful of people’, and 
are not widely held in high regard—‘there are generally preferred people who 
apply any order they receive, and for this you need them to be either 
unknowledgeable, either extremely loyal’125. 
Beyond the simple dichotomy between people from within the 
administrative system, and people from outside, there is also a common 
denominator for successful careers in senior civil service appointments: 
intelligence service background126. A successful tenure does not necessarily 
mean a long one, but rather one that is followed by an appointment that is at 
least as prestigious—proof of the continuous political support for that person.  
For example, one Senior Civil Servant in the Ministry of Environment, 
rumored to have earned his position by personal connections to the Minister’s 
family, also graduated the Information College, suggesting an overlapping 
network of support. Another Senior Civil Servant in the same Ministry has a 
professional background that suggests a similar career-pathway. This is the 
type of multilevel background—political or personal patronage, coupled with 
administrative or intelligence support, that is most emblematic for the senior 
civil service positions in Romania. Thus, for any coding purposes, it becomes 
effectively impossible to ascribe clear background categories to most of the 
occupiers of Senior Civil Service positions. Most of them have been initially 
appointed in the Central Government via party patronage, but they are not 
necessarily clients of a single patron party, as they have survived over 
multiple electoral cycles.  
																																																								
125 Adrian Radu, former General Secretary in the Ministry of Economy, interview with the 
author, 06.02.2014 
126 based on multiple conversations with general secretaries and State Secretaries form the 
studied Ministries 
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As I mentioned in the previous chapter, I find the traits of the 
administrative networks to be a reflection of the cartelization process, and the 
party-state interpenetration of all major parties. For the present analysis this 
means that it is more elucidating to assess whether appointees come from 
within the institutions or form outside it. In terms of their ability to channel 
public resources for clientelistic purposes, if they have an insider background, 
it will be easier for them to do so (i.e. use legislative and institutional 
loopholes), than from outsider backgrounds.  
Over the entire period of reference, insiders are much more likely to 
survive or return in multiple rounds to the senior civil service positions. The 
outsiders on the other hand, are much more likely to be political appointments, 
than in the case of hierarchical promotions from within the institutions. 
Outsiders come from such positions as Prefects, or Underprefects, and are 
generally imposed by the territorial party organizations—‘the current general 
secretary is from Giurgiu (i.e. supported by the party leaders of the county of 
Giurgiu territorial organization)’127 . As mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, one of the most striking and significant findings of the present 
research is the existence of a ‘political algorithm’ of distributing positions in 
the central administration. This effectively means that at least some of the 
outside appointees are benefiting from the patronage of local party bosses. 
The latters’ interest in placing these people in the central administration 
revolves around ‘protecting their local policy interests, or their personal 
economic ones’128.  
The control of the institution, both in terms of functions, as well as in 
terms of personnel, has to be subordinated to the political interests of the 
party that holds the respective ministerial portfolio. It is only through this deep 
penetration of the various institutional departments, amongst which the legal 
and economic departments appear to be most notable, that the exploitative 
clientelistic machine is able to circulate vast amounts of public funds. Both at 																																																								
127 Radu Nicolae Chiurtu, former general secretary of the Ministry of Economy, interview with 
the author 19.01.2014 
128 Anne-Rose-Marie Jugănaru, State Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, interview with 
the author, 14.02.2014 
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the central, and at the local level, the criminal cases brought against party 
leaders, either Ministers or Mayors, included in the batch of defendants, the 
respective Senior Civil Servant—General Secretaries, of either central level, 
or local level institutions of public administration. 
While the Rotation Index analysis presented before revealed in a proxy 
manner the high level of politicization of Senior Civil Servants in the Ministry of 
Economy, our anecdotal evidence on clientelistic networks also reveal a great 
interest devoted to this institution. On one hand, the clientelistic political 
leaders are focused on it as a means of ensuring the distribution of various 
favourable decisions, and resources, within informal linkages. On the other 
hand, we find party donors, like Ioan Niculaie that agreed to support 
financially the PSD, in exchange for favourable appointments at the head of 
state companies, which are subordinated to the Ministry of Economics. As the 
president of the biggest private company in the Agricultural sector in 
Romania—Interagro, Ioan Niculae paid high value, under the table party 
donations in order to maintain favaourable appointees, of his own choosing in 
the Ministry of Economics, to be able to fix prices and subsidies in his 
industry. Furthermore, he sought to informally select appoitments to the 
leadership of two state companies—SNTGN Transgaz and SNGN Romgaz 
SA, with whom he had business dealings.129 
Another cabinet portfolio that seems to be reserved to party elites 
devoted to ensuring financial stability to party supporters, as well as to the 
electoral campaigns is the Ministry of public works. It has gone through 
various changes of name and organization: Ministry of Transportation and 
Public Works (2000-2004), Ministry of Transportation (2004-2008), or Ministry 
of Regional Development and Tourism (2009-2012). Still, the genealogy of 
this portfolio can be established based on certain lucrative contractual 
prerogatives, especially in the case of the National Company for Motorways 
and Roads (CNADNR).  
																																																								
129 http://www.hotnews.ro/ancheta-14560859-dosarul-mita-psd-gheorghe-bunea-stancu-ioan-
niculae.htm, last accessed on 21.06.2015 
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 While for the recent period we find politicians negotiating with private 
contractors as stand-alone entities each, the line between the two categories 
was much more permeable throughout the first three post-communist electoral 
cycles. As such, before big fortunes were made, and strong clientelistic 
pyramids were built, electoral support from agents of the private sector often 
lead to patronage for a political career. Such an example is that of Florian 
Walter, formerly known as Florian Bucșe, who after supporting financially the 
electoral campaign of former Transport Minister, and Trade Union leader, 
Miron Mitrea, received in exchange a sinecure as a city councilmen in 
Bucharest. His private interests, in the SC Romprest SRL—a garbage 
disposal company receiving public contracts from the capital’s administrative 
institutions, and other companies, continued to expand throughout a variety of 
public contracts, in the field of garbage disposal, all watched over from his 
public dignitary position.130 This would only be a case of conflict of interests, 
and influence peddling if it were not part of a transversal clientelistic network. 
During the cabinet of Adrian Năstase (2000-2004), the former Minister 
of Transportation Miron Mitrea, former trade union leader and one of the 
political agents in the Social Democratic Party (PSD) appointed Mihai 
Necolaiciuc as president of the National Railways Company (CFR). This is 
one of the biggest national companies in Romania, and is currently in a dire 
situation, with the international donors (i.e. IMF and World Bank) pressing for 
the privatization of the Freight division (CFR Marfă) to make up for some of 
the losses the company has incurred throughout the years. In this context, 
Mihai Necolaiciuc was found guilty of producing damages of over 18 mil. EUR 
to the company by inflating the price of the public procurement contracts the 
company was granting.131 He is currently in jail, under a previous sentence for 
mismanagement of 4 years. Before he was arrested, another member of the 
patronage network of Miron Mitrea helped him escape the country—the 
																																																								
130  http://www.amosnews.ro/pionii-din-spatele-politicienilor-2015-06-10 , last accessed on 
21.06.2015 
131 http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ancheta-8493405-dosarul-achizitii-lux-1-mihai-
necolaiciuc.htm, last accessed on 21.06.2015 
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aforementioned Florian Bucșe.132 While Miron Mitrea is currently serving a 2 
year sentence in jail, for kickbacks received in the form of a renovation to his 
mother’s house, it is easy to see that his patronage networks touched upon all 
the different exchange mechanisms I here consider under the umbrella of the 
clientelistic phenomenon.  
The National Liberal Party (PNL) never had the territorial presence or 
the mass mobilization capacity of the other two major parties. It has been 
traditionally positioned as a party of elites for the elites and members of the 
private sector. As such, it neither extended large clientelistic schemes, 
especially not the ones that put down roots in society, nor did it support 
extended patronage schemes. In compensation, it managed to secure a 
position in most of the post-communist cabinets, through coalitions and 
alliances, and as such many of the party leaders accessed important positions 
as ministers, or state agency presidents. From these positions, it was their 
own responsibility to fund and support the party. An example of this situation 
would be former Minister of Transportation Relu Fenechiu. Together with his 
brother, he engaged in various privatization schemes before becoming 
Minister, and for the case of the state owned company Electrica Moldova 
(SISSE) to which he sold used transformers, 99% of which were never used, 
for 7.5 mil. RON he was tried and sentenced to 5 years in jail since 28th of 
June 2012.133 Relu Fenechiu was one of the major donors of the National 
Liberal Party, giving individually over 70,000 RON each year to his 
organization, and financing through his companies with over 1 mil. € the 2009 
presidential campaign of the former PNL president—Crin Antonescu.134  
 As in previous examples, the PDL shows clear evidence of clientelism 
both at the local, and at the central level. The way mayors were involved in 
this party’s exchange system was seen above in the case study of Elena 
Udrea pyramidal patronage system. As such, we can see that in comparison 																																																								
132http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Actualitate/Politica/Marirea+si+decaderea+finantatorilor+de
+partide, last accessed on 21.06.2015 
133 http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ancheta-14554882-dosarul-transformatorul-relu-fenechiu.htm, 
last accessed on 21.06.2015 
134http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Actualitate/Politica/Marirea+si+decaderea+finantatorilor+de
+partide, last accessed on 21.06.2015 
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to PSD and PNL, the local party bosses of PDL were heavily dependent on 
central patronage, and as such they were sooner brokers to the party’s overall 
clientelistic system, than patrons in their own right. In contrast, next to the 
PNL, the PDL shows the strongest appetite for party patronage in 
appointments to the management of state owned companies (SOE). 
Furthermore, they use these appointments not only to extract material 
resources, but also to satisfy the electoral mobilization that some of their 
territorial organizations are to weak to do.  
Constantin Roibu, long lasting CEO of the state owned company 
Oltchim, is an illustrative example of how political appointments in such 
positions accomplish the double function of mobilizing votes from employees, 
as well as funneling public funds for private interests. On one hand the judicial 
investigations reveal the extent of damages created by the management of 
Constantin Roibu—over 20 off-shore companies set up with the explicit 
purpose of discretionary channeling approximately 700 mil. € in between 
2009 and 2012. Throughout the same period, the company recorded annual 
losses of 100 mil. €, currently lingering on in state of insolvency, after a 
privatization attempt failed last year.  
On the other hand, the same politically appointed management was 
supposed to politically control the vast workforce of the company—over 3,000 
dependent employees, so that the electoral outcomes in local, and national 
elections, in the city, and county of Râmnicu Vâlcea would be favourable to 
the party leadership, under whose patronage he remained in office135. Mr. 
Roibu patrons in this case were the Minister of Economy, and leading figure of 
the party leadership, Adriean Videanu (PDL), and a former MP from the 
region, Cristian Boureanu (PDL). The latter is currently investigated for 
several incidences of influence peddling in state owned companies, amongst 
others in the case of the public procurement contracts that he signed, as a 
member of the Board in the National Lottery Company, bringing a total 
																																																								
135 http://www.realitatea.net/roibu-asigura-pdl-ului-peste-3-000-de-voturi_1057245.html, last 
accessed on 21.06.2015 
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damage of 126 mil.€136. He is also investigated for electoral clientelism, as he 
unsuccessfully attempted in 2012 to gain an MP seat in one of the poorest 
counties in Romania—Vaslui, which is a traditional stronghold of the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). 
Overall, the rotation index values do not suggest a clear influence of 
electoral periods on all Ministries’ personnel policy. Rather, it is the stability of 
the ruling coalition that seems to play a bigger role in certain Ministries’ level 
of personnel turnovers. Different patterns emerge. In the case of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, a discernable hike in the number of decisions on Senior 
Civil Servants is recorded in the electoral year of 2009. This is again traceable 
to the instability of the governing coalition in this period, with the presidential 
elections at the end of the year. In the case of the Ministry of Economy, and 
the Ministry of Environment it is only in the last two years of the reference 
period that we see a spike in personnel turnover. While political leaders 
attempted to explain these patterns on the basis of ‘budget allocations for 
salaries’, or ‘variations in the intensity of the task allocation, given processes 
of structural funds absorption137’138, there is no particular evidence to suggest 
such claims.   
5.4. Different Parties, Different Methods: Maximizing Political 
Discretion and Appointments in Relation to Parties’ Interests 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, without connecting the specific 
discretionary appointment procedures to the political strategies and 
fluctuations, it is hard to demonstrate the actual politicization intent on the part 
of the ruling parties. As such, this section is concerned with the differences 
between parties, as represented through the perspective of the various 
Cabinets. Although we do not have figures on Senior Civil Servants during the 																																																								
136 http://www.gandul.info/stiri/deputatul-boureanu-anchetat-pentru-informatizarea-cu-ghinion-
a-lui-6-49-2584363, last accessed on 21.06.2015  
137 Structural funds are given from the European Union for various projects, such as 
infrastructure expansion, or rural development, which are mostly managed by the national 
authorities (i.e. Ministries) 
138 From interviews with the author, former Minister of the Environment Rovana Plumb, former 
Ministrer of Internal Affairs Ioan Rus, former Minister of Internal Affairs Dan Nica, and former 
Minister of Internal Affairs Cristian David 
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Năstase cabinet, as this function was not legally defined then, it is included in 
the tables, because it is included in the general research framework of this 
project.  
In terms of appointments, I present a turnover index, calculated as the 
number of decisions concerning a certain senior civil service position divided 
by the number of days spent in office by that government. This helps us 
construct a realistic image of the inclination towards politicization, or at least 
the degree of discretionary appointments realized by every cabinet. 
Furthermore, looking at each senior civil service position at a time, we can 
see the different patterns of politicization—higher in the case of Prefects and 
Underprefects, and lower for General Secretaries and Deputy General 
Secretaries.  
Some of the lowest turnover scores are recorded in the Boc (II) cabinet. 
It can be explainable in different ways. On one hand, it is a consecutive 
cabinet of the same ruling coalition, and in this sense, we can safely assume, 
it had no interest of fundamentally changing the previous appointments. On 
the other hand, as an austerity measure, it implemented a freeze on 
employment in the public sector. This freeze was previously discussed, as it is 
a direct cause for the sharp increase in temporary appointments, as opposed 
to permanent ones.  
One of the highest turnover ratio is in the first year of the Boc (I) 
Cabinet, when a new ruling coalition took power. In accordance with the 
previous assessment of the higher stability of Deputy General Secretaries 
compared to general secretary positions, this cabinet often preffered to 
promote the lower ranks of personnel, rather than completely replace the 
leadership. This might suggest that its patronage network was not as massive 
as other parties, aiming more at efficiently controlling the governmental 
institutions, than rewarding numerous party supporters. On the other hand, it 
was part of the previous ruling coalition for a while—Popescu-Tăriceanu (I), 
and the promoted Deputy General Secretaries, might well have been survivals 
of the previous wave of political appointmemts exerted by this party.  
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Table 24. Changes of General Secretaries and Deputy General 
Secretaries (per Cabinet) 
Cabinet Leader Period 
Decisions on General 
Secretaries and Deputy 
General Secretaries 
Days 
in 
Office 
Rotation 
Index  
Adrian Năstase 
2000 (28, 
December) – 2004 
(29, December) 
(elections) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Călin Popescu-
Tăriceanu (I) 
2004 (29, 
December) - 2007 
(5, April) 
51 827 0.06 
Călin Popescu-
Tăriceanu (II) 
2007 (5, April) – 
2008 (28, 
December) 
(elections) 
70 633 0.11 
Emil Boc (I) 
2008 (22, 
December) – 2009 
(23, December) 
106 366 0.29 
Emil Boc (II) 
2009 (23, 
December) – 2012 
(9, February) 
100 1096 0.09 
Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu 
2012 (9, February) – 
2012 (27, April) 
19 78 0.24 
Victor Ponta (I) 
2012 (27, April) - 
2012 (9, December) 
(elections) 
88 226 0.39 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial decisions in 
the period 2005-2012 
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This would imply a pattern of survival for appointed personnel, when a 
political party does not spend too much time in the opposition. Thus, one 
would expect, the longer the period spent in opposition, the greater turnover 
will be necessary when returning to power. In the case of the Ponta (I) 
coalition cabinet this hypothesis seems to hold, as it records the highest 
turnover ratios in General Secretaries and Deputy General Secretaries. As it 
regained control of the government after 8 years, notwithstanting a less than a 
year coalition with the Boc (I) cabinet, the patronage exercise of this cabinet 
demonstrates a virulent pattern of politicization.  
For General Secretaries, and Deputy General Secretaries we can see 
in the appointment or dismissal decisions the interest in specific Ministries. It 
is within the Ministries that have to be very tightly controlled that we see most 
changes. For example, in 2009, most of the appointments—permanent or 
temporary, or dismissals occurred in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is 
connected to the ministerial changes in this portfolio. After successive 
nominations and resignations, the Minister for Regional Development, Vasile 
Blaga, returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, bringing most of the 
managing administrative staff with him, which he transferred the first time he 
left for the Ministry of Regional Development.  
In the case of Prefects and Underprefects (see Table 25), we cannot 
really deduce a preference for certain counties of each Cabinet, as usually a 
massive turnover of most Prefects and Underprefects in every county takes 
place when the government changes.  This is a strategic action to control the 
territories. In terms of Prefectures, they are of equal importance from the 
governmental point of view. This is not to say that all local public 
administrations have the same value, as the importance of town halls or 
county councils is the same. In contrast to the Prefectures, which are similarly 
designed in terms of resources, organization, and functions, the institutions of 
elected representatives have proportional budgets, sizes and significance to 
their districts. Thus, while political parties have differentiating strategies 
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towards elective local public administrations, the Prefectures are seen as 
being a single prize—a means to control the entire local networkt139.  
In contrast, the central administrative apparatus—Ministries and state 
agencies, are also differentiated in size, resources and importance. Frequent 
changes occur in such portfolios as Economy and Commerce, Internal Affairs, 
Transportation, Environment, Development, or Justice. The general secretary 
or Deputy General Secretaries positions in these Ministries are highly coveted 
by political parties for different strategic purposes. In the case of such 
portfolios as Economy, Transportation or Regional Development, we can find 
some of the highest budgetary allocations, which are to be deployed in public 
projects. The greater the public procurement capacity of a institution, the 
greater potential for preferential resource allocation to the ruling party 
clientele.  
In the case of Internal Affairs or Justice, there is a powerful motivation 
to control the functions and organization power these institutions possess. For 
example, the Internal Affairs Ministry has been throughout the studied period 
in charge of nor only the police system, but also local public administrations. 
In this capacity it is in charge of the organization of elections and all the 
current institutional processes of the territorial public administration (including 
Prefectures). The Justice Ministry is of obvious importance for the control and 
potential interference with the more and more visible and disconcerting 
activities of the anticorruption agencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
139 from an interview with a former general secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
interview with the author 5.10.2013 
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Table 25. Changes of Prefects and Underprefects (per Cabinet)  
Cabinet Leader Period 
Decisions on 
Prefects and 
Underprefects 
Days in Office 
Rotation 
Index  
Adrian 
Năstase 
2000 (28, December) 
– 2004 (29, 
December) 
(elections) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Călin 
Popescu-
Tăriceanu (I) 
2004 (29, December) 
- 2007 (5, April) 
15 (since 2007) 94 0.16 
Călin 
Popescu-
Tăriceanu (II) 
2007 (5, April) – 2008 
(28, December) 
(elections) 
190 633 0.30 
Emil Boc (I) 
2008 (22, December) 
– 2009 (23, 
December) 
366 366 1 
Emil Boc (II) 2009 (23, December) 
– 2012 (9, February) 
142 1096 0.12 
Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu 
2012 (9, February) – 
2012 (27, April) 
49 78 0.63 
Victor Ponta 
(I) 
2012 (27, April) 
=2012 (9, December) 
(elections) 
180 226 0.80 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of governmental decisions in the 
period 2007-2012 
The highest levels of turnover in all senior civil service positions are 
found in the case of Prefects and Underprefects. For many reasons, 
previously exposed in this chapter, these are probably the most politicized 
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function in the Romanian senior civil service. The highest turnover is found in 
the case of the new coalition government Boc (1), when an average of one 
decision per day was taken with regards to Prefects and Underprefects in the 
Romanian counties. Ponta (I) coalition Government scores the second highest 
turnover, where a decision on Prefects and Underprefects was taken every 
working day of the week on average. This latter cabinet has publicly assumed 
what all the other coalition governments have done: an algorithm of 
distribution amongst the coalition partners of the Prefect and Underprefect 
positions in the territory140. While legally these are not political appointments, 
‘they are constantly included in the appointments algorithm of governing 
political parties, the institutional politicization descending even further down 
the hierarchical level than the leadership of Prefecture’141.  
The nature of some of the political parties process of survival and 
organization in the transitional context has generated ‘local bosses’—highly 
influential and powerful leaders of the local party organizations. The best 
example of such a situation is the Social Democratic Party (PSD) that has a 
well-established territorial presence, but a centrifugal tendency of the power 
distribution. When such parties win elections, the local party leaders often 
become elected representatives—Mayors, County Council Presidents. As 
such they are sometimes harder to condition by the central government, given 
a decentralized structure of the public administration in Romania. Thus, 
Prefects and Underprefects are a means to regain control over elected 
leaders of Local Governments. Nevertheless, as I show in the following 
chapter, the most effective control over local leaders is that of resource 
conditioning, as their budgets rely heavily on central budgetary transfers.  
Under the national-liberal cabinet of Popescu-Tăriceanu (I), the 
government has passed a decision142 to specify the particular prerogatives 
Prefects and Underprefects should have. Incidentally, the ruling party of the 																																																								
140 press article, Gândul, 08.05.2012 (http://www.gandul.info/politica/algoritmul-impartirii-
prefecturilor-psd-a-luat-23-de-judete-pnl-va-pune-prefectul-in-bucuresti-9598646 ), last 
accessed on 20.06.2016 
141 Codrin Dumitru Munteanu, former Prefect and Underprefect of Covasna, as well as 
General Secretary of the Defense Ministry, public statement, 2010 
142 Government Decision No. 460/2006. 
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coalition government—the National Liberal Party (PNL), had a weak territorial 
presence, and the strengthening of these governmental representatives’ role 
gave a better territorial control to the government. The provisions of this 
decision included the ability of Prefects to monitor and verify how 
decentralized institutions 143  allocate public funds, to assist in the 
implementation of various reforms of the administrative system, to represent 
in Court the Government when the decentralized institutions could not, and 
more significantly, to manage public procurements for the Prefecture, as well 
as for common projects of the decentralized institutional. The attributions of 
the Underprefect are very similar to those of the Prefect, but depend to an 
extensive degree on the willingness of the Prefect to delegate responsibility to 
each of the two Underprefects—‘if the Prefect wants to keep all the power, 
this function is mostly concerned with the administration of the Prefecture, 
rather than actual power of consequence in the region’144.  
The turnover of governmental inspectors has little to do with the 
intention to fulfill the actual governmental inspector positions. Rather, these 
are intermediary appointments in the transfer chain, or refuges for 
‘retrograded’ Prefects or Underprefects. An appointment as governmental 
inspectors of a loyal supporter is solely designed to offer a refuge in a 
privileged position, but not actual power in the ruling party’s exploitation 
scheme. As such, I would sooner refer to the reward motivation of patronage, 
rather than the control one (Kopecky et al 2012).  
In this sense, governmental inspectors can at most be liable of 
influence peddling rather than direct involvement in clientelistic transactions, 
as they do not have power over resources. The lack of powers is sourced in 
the lack of responsibilities. Most of these positions have vague and 
inconsequential attributions—‘my job responsibilities consist of inspecting the 
roads for black spots and checking the rodent damage on the dams’145 																																																								
143 Institutions that provide public services in the territory, on behalf of the Ministries, the 
Governmental Office (Secretariatul General al Guvernului) and other institutions of the Central 
Public Administration  
144 Paul Dodea, former Underprefect, interview with the author 7.10.2013 
145 public interview, 17.07.2013 
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explains a governmental inspector Ion Ghica, who previously served as a 
Underprefect of the Neamț county. In a long tradition of façade bureaucratic 
work, the governmental inspectors often become the epitome of an oversized 
apparatus, rather than of an efficient professional elite: ‘we often questioned 
ourselves what was the use of the reports we forwarded to the Ministry of 
Transportation every month’146. 
After analyzing the prime-ministerial decisions on the attribution of 
tasks to governmental inspectors, we can assess that most of these deal with 
monitoring the maintenance status of the infrastructure and governmental 
assets. These are not seriously consequential tasks, as they overlap with 
specialized institutions on one hand, and have no enforcement power, on the 
other hand. Few governmental inspectors, do receive some significant tasks 
in terms of governmental representation, delegated cooperation with different 
Ministries, or even project management. Task allocation is the main vehicle of 
discretionary power. Appointing loyal supporters to different high ranking 
positions within the state apparatus is both reward and control driven, but it is 
not until the tasks are allocated that an agent can become truly empowered to 
take advantage of his or her position and to be able to act beyond the 
specifications of the patron. 
The turnover index values for the appointments of governmental 
inspectors are generally low. This is mostly based on the fact that this is the 
least coveted function of the senior civil service. Still, there are once again 
sharp increases in the terms of the Boc (I) cabinet and the Ponta (I) cabinet. 
As the qualitative analysis of the decisions shows, most of these were 
applications of the career mobility provision to and from the position of 
governmental inspector. Most of the transfers to this position were the result 
of the new Governments desire to vacate the Prefect and Underprefect 
positions. The highest turnover ratio, during the Boc (I) Government, is 0.55, 
or 1 decision on governmental inspectors every other day. The score is mostly 
based on the removal of local Prefects and Underprefects appointed by the 																																																								
146 Lucian Simion, former governmental inspector, public interview 17.07.2013 
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Popescu-Tăriceanu (II) cabinet. Most of these individuals remained 
governmental inspectors until 2012, when the national liberal party retuned to 
power in the coalition cabinet Ponta (I). At this point, some have been 
reinstated, while other were dismissed. To understand the underpinnings of 
these decisions I account for additional contextual evidence. 
Table 26. Changes of Governmental Inspectors (per Cabinet)  
Cabinet 
Leader 
Period 
Decisions on 
Governmental 
Inspectors 
Days in 
Office 
Rotation 
Index  
Adrian 
Năstase 
2000 (28, December) – 
2004 (29, December) 
(elections) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Călin 
Popescu-
Tăriceanu (I) 
2004 (29, December) - 
2007 (5, April) 
0 827 0 
Călin 
Popescu-
Tăriceanu (II) 
2007 (5, April) – 2008 
(28, December) 
(elections) 
68 633 0.11 
Emil Boc (I) 2008 (22, December) – 
2009 (23, December) 
203 366 0.55 
Emil Boc (II) 2009 (23, December) – 
2012 (9, February) 
80 1096 0.07 
Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu 
2012 (9, February) – 
2012 (27, April) 
7 78 0.08 
Victor Ponta 
(I) 
2012 (27, April) =2012 
(9, December) 
(elections) 
53 226 0.23 
Source: compiled by the author based on the public records of prime-ministerial decisions in 
the period 2007-2012 
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The career pathway of the Popescu-Tăricenu (II) Prefects and 
Underprefects is telling of the general appointment dynamics in the Romanian 
senior civil service, as it is not only inter-party politics that plays a role, but 
also intra-party or intra-coalition struggles for power. For example in Ponta (I) 
government, the consensus was that where there are County Council 
Presidents from one party, there should be a Prefect from the other147. This 
arrangement aroused some suspicion, as the county council president is an 
elected function, while the Prefect is a nominated position, but was mostly 
reflected in the nominations. In this context, it is highly surprising that most of 
the governmental inspectors, who were Prefects and Underprefects of the 
liberal cabinet of Popescu-Tăriceanu up until 2009, have been dismissed, 
instead of being reinstated. Through the governmental decisions 278-337 
from 2013, no less than 59 governmental inspectors have been dismissed, 
through the dissolution of their positions. At this point, these persons remain 
Senior Civil Servants, but lack an appointment to a senior civil service 
position. While the Government justified this action with an austerity driven 
governmental emergency ordinance 148 , the inspectors claimed it was a 
political maneuver, which infringed their constitutional rights. 
The political underpinnings are multiple. On one side there is a tacit 
struggle for party networks of appointments between the coalition parties, and 
it could be seen as an assault by the Social Democrats on liberal protégées. 
On the other hand, within the liberal party, there is a power struggle between 
the ‘old guard’ of the Popescu-Tăriceanu patronage networks and the new 
leadership’s patronage networks of the new leader—Crin Antonescu. From 
this perspective it may very well be that the liberals themselves supported the 
mass dismissals as a way to destabilize the party members’ support for the 
previous party leadership.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has accounted for appointment procedures of Senior Civil 
Servants in Central Government institutions (i.e. Ministries). I argue that the 																																																								
147 Bogdan Pintileasa, party official, interview with the author, 7.10.2013 
148 Emergency Government Ordinance No. 77/2013 
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main motivation of politicization in Central Government position is not that of 
rewards (i.e. clientelistic provision of public jobs) (as is the case for party 
patronage in the public sector in general), but that of controlling the institutions 
(i.e. ensuring further distribution of clientelistic provisions). As such, Senior 
Civil Servants are linchpins of the clientelistic distribution of public resources, 
services or regulatory favours. 
For the civil service Rotation Index, I analyzed all the Ministerial 
decisions of appointment, dismissal or transfer of senior civil servants for the 
period 2003 to 2014. I then triangulated this data with various official 
documents and legislation, as well as in-depth interviews with civil servants, 
and party officials. I also did a systematic coverage of press outlets’ news on 
the Ministers, and appointees, to be able to reassemble their background, and 
political or personal connections. For career pathways analysis I also 
analyzed each Minister’s and Senior Civil Servant’s CV, and other sources of 
personal information (e.g. personal webpages, blogs, profile pieces).  
 As we can see variations in terms of the proxy index of politicization—
the Rotation Index, I explore with an in-depth enquiry the reasons, specificities 
and implications for each of the most heavily politicized Ministries in Romania 
(i.e. Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of 
Environment). This chapter deals with both the opportunities to appoint “your 
people” (e.g. loose legislative provisions), and with the incentives to do so 
(e.g. overseeing the organization of elections, key regulatory Agencies). 
 Several findings emerge as particularly relevant to the present analysis 
of cartelization and clientelistic exchanges in Romania. Firstly, there is a clear 
tendency to (re)place Senior Civil Service personnel, especially in Ministries 
with wide prerogatives. This confirms the party-state interpenetration, and the 
ability of ruling parties to impose their appointees even in administrative 
functions.  
Secondly, we can see that insiders (i.e. people with previous 
experience in the institution or similar institution) are preferred to outsiders 
(i.e. people with no similar institutional experience). This suggests that while 
there is a certain amount of favoritism or personal patronage, party patronage 
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is a key element of selection. As the same political parties have succeeded to 
power (sometimes even the same Ministers), insiders are much more likely 
appointments along cartel party lines and/or ruling coalition algorithms of 
appointment.  
Finally, we find a dual utility of politicization. On one hand there is the 
incentive to control the Ministries and their prerogatives. This political control 
can ensure the policy-making goals of the ruling political party, as well as the 
clientelistic distribution of public goods and services. On the other hand, I 
present here evidence of regulatory favors through appointees in State 
Owned Companies or Regulatory Agencies. These favors include private 
sector beneficiaries that either are or subsequently become party donors and 
supporters. Both of these means to use political appointees will be further 
explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6. Clientelism and State Capture in Romania 
This thesis shows how the cartel party is reinforced by clientelistic linkages 
fuel territorial organizations, and constituencies. This achieves a political 
stability that the political parties would not otherwise be able to do in the 
context of weak mass mobilization. In the new democracy setting there are 
often much more complex clientelistic schemes of state largesse deployment, 
given the opportunities of state capture provided by the party-state 
interpenetration.  
This chapter looks at one of the most important linkage instruments of 
a clientelistic system: resource distribution channels. The distribution of power 
within ruling political parties is influences the destination and extent of public 
resource flows, streaming from the Central Government (CG) to Local 
Governments (LGs). As such, these are cases of state largesse, or pork-
barrel politics, that do not only target electoral mobilization, but also 
acquiescence of local party leaders and consolidation of local party 
organizations. Thus, it is not only important to channel resources to their 
constituencies, but also to dimension these political allocations in a manner 
that ensures their continuous allegiance.   
The first type of distribution channel is that of the proprietary lump sum 
allocations to Local Governments (LGs). The analysis focuses on 
Discretionary Governmental funds—the Reserve Fund, and the Intervention 
Fund. The nature of these funds makes them less constrained by institutional, 
or procedural limitations. Furthermore, in the absence of monitoring from the 
opposition parties it is highly likely that the allocations will be predominantly 
designed to serve the political interests of the ruling parties.  
The second type of distribution channel is that of regional development 
projects funding. These are projects that have a big electoral impact—based 
of how fast their effects would be registered by the citizens, and based on 
how important they are for the population. Selected programmes include: 
thermic rehabilitation, public housing, and infrastructure. In each case there is 
evidence of politicization.  
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Finally, the public procurement contracts involved in implementing such 
projects are themselves a topic of interest in this chapter, as many private 
contractors working with central or local governments fuel the clientelistic 
system. As the process of cartelization leads parties increasingly dependent 
on public resources, we look at the clientelistic channels of informal resource 
allocation. Thus, the evidence presented in this chapter links back private 
contractors benefiting from preferential access to government contracts and 
procurement to formal, or under the table, party donations.  
For the budgetary data of Local Governments, I have covered the 
entire post-communist period, based on official records (formally solicited to 
the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration, and to the 
Ministry of Finances). For the analysis of the Government Discretionary Fund 
allocations, I have compiled data from the Ministry of Public Finances with 
provisions from Governmental Decisions on funding from these budgetary 
sources. For these evaluations I covered the period raging from 1999 to 2012. 
I triangulated all the financial allocations from these funds, with the political 
background of the local dignitaries (i.e. Mayors, or County Council 
Presidents), based on the electoral records of 2008, and press coverage of 
subsequent formation or dissolution of political alliances.  
For party donations, I have systematically covered every party’s annual 
declaration of donations, which is published in the Official Gazette in 
Romania. I have then compiled these lists, as some parties would publish 
county-level data on donations. This analysis covers the period 2009 to 2015, 
as it was not until 2009 that the national legislation required parties to disclose 
their donations. I then triangulated the donors from the party lists with the 
public procurement contracts in the public online database—SEAP. 
Furthermore, I analyzed official records of various public agencies specialized 
in this field (e.g. National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public 
Procurement, National Council for Solving Complaints, Unit for Coordination 
and Verification of Public Procurement). I analyzed the financial records of 
various categories of donors and public contractors through the online registry 
of private companies in Romania. Finally, I triangulated the data on donations 
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and public contracts with criminal cases on campaign financing, based on the 
National Anticorruption Agency’s (DNA) records, which were then 
contextualized through press coverage 
6.1. Political Allocations and the Linkages with Local Party 
Leaders 
In order to apply a clientelistic logic of action to political allocation these 
need to be specifically designed to benefit a local party leader. Looking simply 
at the amounts transferred to the each County, we find a relatively balanced 
distribution of funds, and the clientelistic channels remain obscured. In 
contrast, if we look at each Local Governments (LGs) —at the city, and 
commune level, as the present analysis has done, we find a much clearer 
picture of politicization of financial allocations. This supports the assumption 
that the clientelistic exchanges have the highest electoral efficiency in local 
settings, or in direct exchanges.   
Furthermore, the present analysis traces the flow of discretionary 
funding from the Central budget to various LGs, but this is also contextualised 
within the broader political and administrative power relations. As mentioned 
in the previous chapters of this thesis, we consider clientelistic linkages to 
have a heavy influence on the relationship between the Central Government 
(CG) and Local Governments (LGs).  
From the point of view of the inner-linkages, preferential allocations 
reinforce each level of the clientelistic party organization. On one hand the 
incumbent local party leaders, in their position of intermediaries, or public 
resource distributors, remain effective electoral agents. On the other hand, the 
elected local officials (e.g. Mayors, County Council President) gain more 
power, in their position of patrons towards their territorial base.  
This latter aspect is problematic from the point of view of the political 
party, or the central leadership. Allocating public resources in a preferential 
manner to a local public official might hold him satisfied and loyal, but it might 
also fuel a dominant position over the central party leadership. As previously 
discussed in this thesis, the stronger the local party leader is, the more 
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influence she or he can exert over central decision-making. This influence can 
be exerted directly—within inner-party decision-making forums, or indirectly—
within the governing coalition. Thus, political allocations from the centre can 
be seen as both a means of reinforcing political loyalty, on the part of local 
officials, as much as they can be a means of emancipation, for this latter 
category. Because of this risk, and because of reasons external to the party 
organization (e.g. procedural constraints, or opposition monitorization), the 
majority of political allocations remain limited in terms of absolute value. Thus, 
this section follows incidences of disproportional allocation, and attempts to 
correlate political strategies with discretionary spending patterns.   
Many of the discretionary transfers explored here require different 
layers of cooperating clientelistic agents—from within Ministries, State 
Agencies, and Local Governments. At each institutional level, it is the party 
state interpenetration, and inter-party collusion that makes public resources 
available to political patrons. Nevertheless, civil servants willing to convert 
such transfers into political capital are the linchpins of the informal distribution 
system. Not only in the case study of Romania, but also in other post 
communist settings, such as Bulgaria, we find evidence of the connection 
between a ruling political party’s central allocations, and local officials of the 
same political affiliation (Marinov and Nikolova 2015). As such, we find the 
direct link between party patronage networks and politicization within multiple 
layers of the public administration, and the preferential allocation of central 
funding to certain party bases.  
6.1.1. Local Governments (LGs) Budgetary Dependency 
In Romania, local budgets are constituted only partly on their own 
revenues. A substantial part of their budgets (usually averaging to more than 
50%) is received from the Central Government. Given this reliance of local 
budgets on the central allocations, a continuous ‘lobby’ activity has to be 
made by Mayors and County Council Presidents. If we look at Local 
Governments’ (LGs) financial situation for the entire post-communist period 
(see Table 27), we can discern an enormous reliance of these institutions on 
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central allocations. In terms of national average, we can see the lowest level 
of autonomy in income, in 2004, when only 19.21% of LGs budget was 
constituted from own tax collection.   
Table 27. Local Governments’ (LGs) Financial Situation (1999-2012) 
Year Total Income (in 
national currency) 
Autonomous Income 
(in national currency) 
Percentage Autonomous Income 
1999 22.242.526,20 9.888.248,60 44,46% 
2000 6.212.395,49 2.278.434,53 36,68% 
2001 71.185.235,39 15.477.440,83 21,74% 
2002 93.227.720,43 20.534.228,39 22,03% 
2003 130.780.745,57 27.291.786,78 20,87% 
2004 159.562.852,67 30.759.622,70 19,28% 
2005 19.480.864.263,35 8.697.491.665,00 44,65% 
2006 27.708.584.983,43 12.152.103.660,05 43,86% 
2007 36.805.163.013,40 17.317.436.303,12 47,05% 
2008 43.629.115.432,00 20.587.707.747,00 47,19% 
2009 43.526.070.486,00 21.117.607.538,00 48,52% 
2010 43.922.200.747,00 21.251.403.599,00 48,38% 
2011 44.803.868.892,00 21.968.906.756,00 49,03% 
2012 45.419.275.145,00 21.622.553.877,00 47,61% 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from the Ministry of Regional Development and 
Public Administration (MDRAP) 
Beyond the reliance on central transfers, we also see a decrease of the 
available financial resources for investments, as non-earmarked revenues 
(NER) on capital expenses of the Romanian LGs have remained generally low 
after 2008 (see Figure 14). The NER are important to LG because they can be 
used for various bottom-up needs (e.g. infrastructure damages), and problems 
can be more swiftly resolved than through centrally planned programmes. The 
little room to manoeuvre with budgetary allocations, on the part of local 
officials, makes them even more reliant on central transfers than before. 
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Figure 14. Non-Earmarked Revenues (NER) for Capital Expenses in 
Romanian LGs 
 
Source: World Bank dataset 
As this chapter will further detail, it is often the smaller administrative 
units that are most dependent on political favouritism, as their autonomous 
budgets can be as low as 5%. The budgetary empirical evidence shows in 
contrast the much better positioning of larger, and richer LGs, such as the 
subdivisions of the capital city of Bucharest, and other cities in Romania, 
whose own income is generally the same as the transfers from the centre. 
Thus, the relative power of the local party leaders in these constituencies is 
much higher. In such cases we see fewer lump sum transfer, like those from 
Governmental Discretionary Funds, as much as we see infrastructure, or 
housing developments. 
The high reliance of LGs on Central allocations, especially in a EU 
driven tendency of prioritising national, integrated projects, makes them reliant 
on informal linkages with the ruling coalition at the national level. The local 
officials are highly determinant elements in the clientelistic system, as it is 
them that are the main drivers of electoral mobilization. As such, it is much 
easier for the central party leadership via central government, to capacitate 
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instability of the Romanian political scene, which sees high levels of party 
switching, and coalition changes.  
As we can see in Figure 15, if we compare the budgetary situation of 
Local Governments in Romania, we do not find significant variation. It is clear 
that the capital city of Bucharest, and few of the main municipalities (i.e. 
Constanța, Cluj, Brașov, Sibiu) have much more discretionary revenues at 
their disposal. Still, most of the 42 counties in Romania remain largely 
dependent on Central Budgetary transfers, and as presented in Table 27, 
have a very small fraction of their budgets derived from own revenues. 
The clientelistic system in Romania is systematically deployed at the 
level of local governments because: (1) it is here that it is most effective in 
developing roots in society and thus anchoring a cartel party in society, and 
(2) it is the level at which it is easiest to deploy the direct/traceable transfer of 
goods and services to political clients. As mentioned before in chapter 2 and 
3, the local governments in Romania enjoy more extended prerogatives than 
local governments in other CEE countries, given the public administration 
architecture. Nevertheless, they remain reliant on central budgetary transfers 
to exert all of these prerogatives. 
“Local governments in Romania are important. They are the 
primary providers of a range of infrastructure services, including 
local road construction and maintenance, solid waste 
management, and, in larger cities, urban transport and district 
heating. Through their shared ownership of regional utility 
companies, they provide water supply and sanitation. They also 
play a major role in the social sectors. They are the paymasters 
for teachers’ salaries and are responsible for the maintenance of 
primary and secondary school buildings, the administration of 
certain social assistance programs, and the operation of regional 
hospitals and residential facilities for the disabled. All in all, they 
account for roughly one-quarter of total government expenditure.” 
(World Bank Romania, Romania Decentralization Process Final 
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Report on Romania’s Local Government, February 5, 2016:7, 
emphasis in original) 
Figure 15. Discretionary Revenues in Local Governments (per capita) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Romania, Romania Decentralization Process Final Report on Romania’s 
Local Government, February 5, 2016 
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have been designed to cover “urgent or unexpected events” such as natural 
calamities (Law no. 500/2002). In practice, they have been increasingly used 
to supplement the budget of electoral strongholds of the governing parties, or 
those local party leaders that need be motivated to remain loyal to the central 
government (e.g. local officials from minority partners in the ruling coalition). 
These funds are discretionary tools that through their nature serve well 
in supplementing the different public institutions’ budget over the year. From 
the point of view of the proprietary use of public funds and clientelistic 
linkages, it is interesting to evaluate the connection between governmental 
allocations and the political affiliation of the recipient LGs. In this regard, two 
problematic patterns emerge in the management of these special funds: an 
obvious politicization of the allocations, and an exponential increase of their 
value over consecutive years.  
The analysis of the distribution patterns of the Reserve Fund shows 
that there is a clear bias in favour of the ruling party’s mayors. Approximately 
45% of these special allocations went to National Liberal Party’s (PNL) 
mayors in 2008, when this party was in power. Between 60-70% of the 
Reserve Fund were then annually channelled to the Democratic Liberal 
Party’s (PDL) mayors, after 2009, when this was the main ruling party. If we 
account for the fact that PDL had only achieved a 28.55% electoral score in 
the 2008 local elections, we can see that the politicization of these allocations 
surpasses by over two-folds what would have been the expected pattern of 
distribution.  
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Table 28. Evolution of Sums Allocated through Government Resolutions 
(H.G.) from the Reserve Fund and the Intervention Fund 
Year 
Total supplementary funds 
(RON) Total supplementary funds (€) 
1999 13,543,000 8,310,848 
2000 164,626,000 82,495,521 
2001 79,158,000 30,413,930 
2002 263,482,000 84,300,078 
2003 1,338,972,000 356,528,021 
2004 2,665,112,000 657,531,029 
2005 3,631,797,000 1,002,317,437 
2006 6,229,067,000 1,767,361,895 
2007 3,306,693,000 990,828,814 
2008 3,892,618,000 1,057,001,113 
2009 4,841,953,000 1,142,697,708 
2010 2,812,369,000 668,037,008 
2011 1,889,167,000 445,779,042 
Source: compiled by the author based on official data from the Ministry of 
Public Finances (MFP) and average annual exchange rates established by 
the National Bank of Romania (NBR), available at: http://www.bnr.ro/Cursul-
de-schimb-3544.aspx  
 
Some of the many issues related to the constitution and allocation of 
these funds, have been mentioned in the Romanian Court of Accounts’ Audit 
Report (2009b). According to it, between 2007 and 2008, over 3.5 mil. RON of 
the allocations from the special governmental funds, were illegally spent by 
local administrations. Some of the illegal utilisations mentioned in the Report 
were: changing the destination of the funds, deducting payments for public 
works that were never made, employee bonuses. Thus, ‘no actual 
monitorization or control of how these allocations are used exists at the 
central level’ (2009:35). Additionally, many of the beneficiary public 
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administrations did not make any formal requests for the allocation of 
supplementary funds, and most of the recipients of funds for ‘current capital 
expenses’ or non-earmarked revenues (NER) actually had surplus budgets. 
These findings, together with the absence of any official ranking or inventory 
of needs, strengthen the inference that transfer from these funds to local 
administrations were based on political affiliation. 
Another problem with the supplementations of the special 
governmental funds is the timing when big sums are allocated—at the end of 
the year, when little else than bonuses, or other such current expenses can 
be made. An analysis of overall budgetary rectifications called this the 
‘December effect’ (SAR 2009b). According to it, spikes correspond yearly to 
the month of December, when funds that were not used are redistributed to 
any fast spending purposes (e.g. direct acquisitions of goods and services, 
salary bonuses) so that the budget for the next year will not be diminished. In 
2010, with only three days left until the end of the year, 177 mil. RON (approx. 
42.1 mil. €) was sent to selected Local Governments (LGs) for “current capital 
expenses”, based on the Government Decision No. 1379/2010, passed on the 
28th of December.  
The Reserve Fund allocations have also been a stepping-stone in 
toppling Mihai Razvan Ungureanu’s short-lived government, on the 27th of 
April 2012. The subject of the debate was represented by allocations made to 
local administrations, shortly after assuming office, through a Government 
Decision No. 255/2012. Then opposition leader, Victor Ponta, argued they had 
commited abuse in office and grave damages to the intrests of the citizens of 
the county Gorj (his Member of Parliament base since in 2008), where from 
70 localities, only the 19 with mayors from the ruling coalitions received 
supplementary allocations from the central government.   
That allocation Decision was thus one of the three arguments made for 
the impeachment of the Government in the joint motion titled „Opriți guvernul 
șantajabil. Așa nu, niciodată!” (Stop the blackmailing government. Never like 
this!). This was the second impeachment motion ever to pass in the 
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Romanian Parliament. It argued that the government decision was illegal, 
because in one round, it distributed 648.2 mil. RON (approx 150 mil. €) to 
LGs, even if the budgeted value of the Reserve Fund for the entire year was 
only 224. mil RON (approx. 52 mil. €).  
The preferential distribution of funds is clear when comparing the list of 
allocations with the political affiliation of the leaders of the beneficiary LGs. 
These are in proportion of 95.15%  granted to mayors or county council 
presidents affiliated to the ruling coalition, comprising PDL, UDMR, UNPR and 
the parliamentary group representing ethnic minorities (see Table 29). The top 
beneficiary, the Dâmbovița County Council—a PDL stronghold, receives 10 
mil. RON (approx 2.20 mil. €)—more than all LGs controlled by opposition 
leaders, which received in total only 8 mil. RON. 
Table 29. Political Distribution Reserve Fund before Local Elections in 2012 
(allocations of over 1,000,000 lei) 
  
Funds 
Allocated 
(thousand lei) 
Electoral Share 
(2008 General 
Election) 
Funds 
Allocated 
(percentage) 
Ruling Coalition 
Parties (PDL, 
UDMR, UNPR, 
ethnic minorities) 
158,442 42.88%* 95.15% 
Opposition Parties 
(PSD, PNL, PC) 8,070 57.12% 4.85% 
Total 166,512 100% 100.00% 
Source: compiled by the author based on official data from the Government Decision (H.G.) 
255/2012, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), Centralizator Rezultate Finale Alegeri Locale 
2008  
* The electoral share results do not account for the UNPR share of the votes, as this party only 
split from PSD in 2010, and as such its electoral share was subsumed to that of the PSD.  
More than 25 mil. RON (or over 15% of the allocations on the top 
values list), were given to recently converted local political leaders to the 
ruling parties149. With local elections two months away, these transfers seem 																																																								
149 Călărași, Voluntari, Craiova, Deva, Bănești, Bihor County Council, Tibănești, Dolhasca, 
Calafat, Iași County Council, Huși 
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to have served as incentives for party switching. The infusion of additional 
funds into selected local budgets is an efficient way to strengthen the linkages 
between the party leadership, controlling central executive positions, and the 
party’s territorial network. In turn, the mayors and county council presidents 
receiving such funds have a better resource base to attract voters through 
clientelistic exchange channels, thus improving theirs and the party’s electoral 
chances.   
Some of the most generous allocations of the Government Decision 
No. 255/2012 went to localities or counties ruled by ethnic minorities—55 mil. 
RON (approx. 13 mil. €). The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR) represented the Hungarian minority in the Parliament, and 
Government. The other beneficiaries of allocations, such as the UBBR 
(Bulgarian Union from Banat Romania), the FEDGR (Democratic Forum of 
Germans in Romania), or the ZHR (Croatians Union in Romania), can be 
linked to the parliamentary group of ethnic minorities, also part of the ruling 
coalition at that time. Still, at the impeachment motion, the ethnic minorities 
group rallied with the opposition parliamentarians in voting against the 
Ungureanu Government. 
 Finally, while the allocations from the discretionary governmental funds 
are relatively small, compared to the total value of most local budgets, the lack 
of transparency and favoritism makes them highly contestable. Also, given 
their constitution as instruments in case of emergency, we can find stringent 
examples where such allocations were needed but not granted—Brad locality 
was left without heating in winter, after the prices tripled, and the local budget 
was unable to subsidize them anymore 150 . In contrast, a recent penal 
investigation conducted by the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) on 
the former mayor of Cluj, Sorin Apostu, revealed that in exchange for 
kickbacks of minimum 10% of the allocated sum, any project could obtain 
financing from the Reserve Fund.   
																																																								
150 Neagoe, L., 2011. Primarul din Brad a intrat în greva foamei, România Liberă, 22nd of 
November 
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Certain estimates suggest that in 2008, when the clientelistic 
allocations were highest due given the local and national elections taking 
place that year, that the sum of the aforementioned discretionary allocations 
represented over 70% of all the investments done through local budgets151. In 
other words, in a cartelized system, in which the parties in office could 
discretionary control the public resources, the local party branches of those 
parties benefited in a substantial manner from material resources distributed 
through the inner clientelistic linkages of the party organizations.  
Apart from the Government Reserve and Intervention Funds, over the 
period 2004 and 2011 there were other funds available for politicized 
allocations, but these were smaller in size, and fell under the control of various 
Ministries. For example, in between 2008 and 2011, there was an 
Environmental Fund managed by the Ministry of Environment to develop 
sewage infrastructure, and green spaces in LGs. Similarly, in between 2007 
and 2011 the Ministry of Education managed a school fund that permitted 
ministerial allocations for investments, as well as maintenance or capital 
investments to LGs. Other special funds like the one set up on the occasion of 
massive floods in 2006, continued to exist until 2012, permitting opaque 
transfers to LGs directly from the Prime Minister. These funds were 
reorganized by subsequent governing coalition, and since 2013, all local 
development investments (e.g. sewage infrastructure, roads, bridges, school 
maintenance, public building construction and maintenance) are financed 
through the National Local Development Programme (PNDL)152.  
6.1.3. Centrally Controlled Development Projects Serving 
Electoral Purposes  
As previously mentioned, in the case of larger, more developed 
constituencies, where the discretionary fund allocation is harder to justify, or 
would make only a marginal impact, the clientelistic linkages employ other 
public policy instruments. This section will address some of the regional 
																																																								
151 Clientelistic Index, Expert Forum Study http://expertforum.ro/en/clientelism-map/, last 
accessed on 22.11.2015 
152 Emergency Government Decision No 28/2013 
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development projects that could have been subjected to the most 
discretionary concentration of resources, and also served very well for 
electoral mobilization purposes: thermic rehabilitation, public housing, and 
infrastructure.  
The first references to an insulation and recladding programme for 
apartment buildings dates back to the social-democratic government of Prime 
Minister Adrian Năstase, being mentioned in the Government Decision No. 
29/2000, and later the Law No. 325/2002. Little evidence exists on who were 
the beneficiaries and on what basis funds were being allocated. This is mostly 
because only marginal sums were channeled through this programme. A first 
tentative surge in the programme is recorded under the center right coalition 
government of Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, when a first list of only 11 beneficary 
buildings emerges153.  Still, it is not until the consecutive Cabinets of Prime 
Minister Emil Boc, that this programme achieves a size worthy of 
consideration, both in terms of funds—85.7 mil. € in 2009, and in terms of 
spread—79 localities in 2009.  
The insulation and recladding programme is intended for the numerous 
apartment buildings in the municipalities and cities of Romania. Most of these 
have been built under the extensive urbanisation projects of the communist 
regime. The financing algorithm of the programme instructs that 20% of the 
total cost of the renovation works will be paid by the owners’ associtations, 
and the remaining 80% will be divided between the local authorities (30%) 
and the MDRT (50%). Nevertheless, many local administrations opted to pay 
from the local budget the remaining half of the costs, that the Ministry is not 
paying for, thus creating a completely free scheme of thermic rehabilitation to 
their electorate.  
The official explanation for the implementation of the fully-funded 
scheme was that the owners’ associations gathered with great difficulty their 
share of the costs, as these apartment buildings usually have very 
heterogenic socio-economic profiles of owners. Still, unofficially the electoral 																																																								
153 Government Decision No. 805/2005 
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motivation inevitably surfaces, as local administrations that had previously 
applied the initial partially-funded scheme, have opted for the fully-funded 
scheme in 2012, when local elections are taking place. Additionally, with the 
fully-funded scheme there is far lesser public scrutiny of the costs and the 
tender procedures, thus allowing for greater space of maneuver for 
preferential allocation of public contracts.   
There are different aspects regarding the way in which the thermic 
insulation and recladding scheme that are problematic. On one hand, the 
evidence suggests preferential treatment in the public procurement 
procedures.  One of the arguments supporting this inference is that there are 
significant variations in terms of prices per unit. In Bucharest, the same 
company—SC Tehnologica Radion SRL, charges public authorities in the 6th 
sector on average 78€ per square meter, in the 1st sector, it charges on 
average 93€ per square meter, and in the 3rd sector it charges 126€ per 
meter154. This constitutes a variation of 48€ between different local authorities 
of the capital city that is not explained by variations in the works—all 
apartment buildings included in the program have very similar specifications 
(e.g. construction date, size).  
Tehnologica Radion is not only the biggest receiver of public contracts 
in the period 2009-2010, but also subject to several investigations on fixed 
tenders led by the Competition Council. The same company is at the center of 
a formal notification of the European Commission regarding improper 
awarding proceedings. Furthermore, by looking at the market prices of such 
thermic rehabilitation works, we see considerable differences from the public 
authorities bills. PVC window profiles for example cost between 35€ and 75€ 
per square meter, while in the 3rd sector of Bucharest, the authorities pay 
126€ per square meter.  
While the preferential treatment in awarding procedures implies certain 
clientelistic connections between private contractors and local authorities, it 
does not however demonstrate a direct impact on electoral outcomes. The 																																																								
154 Lăcătuș, G., 2010. O afacere secretă pe bani publici, România liberă, 4th of June, available 
at: http://romanialibera.ro/special/investigatii/o-afacere-secreta-pe-bani-publici-190026  
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electoral motivation, which is central to the clientelistic apparatus, is much 
more directly served by the selective allocation of funds to LGs. Thus, the 
recipients of supplementary central funding have a better chance to satisfy 
their electorate with more public works.   
As was mentioned above, the thermic insulation and recladding 
programme has become a significant platform of public funds distribution only 
recently. For this reason this analysis is focused on the years 2009, 2010, and 
2011. Thus, the official data on funds allocation from the Ministry of Regional 
Development (MDRT) is compiled with the political affiliation of each recipient 
local authority representative, as derived from the Permanent Electoral 
Authority’s records, and press articles regarding electoral officials switching 
their political affiliation during their term in office. If the political affiliation had 
only been determined based on the electoral results from the last local 
elections in 2008, a distorted image would have resulted. This is because 
many mayors, elected from the opposition parties, had subsequently become 
important recipients of public funds after they switched to parties from the 
ruling coalition. Many times, this was not an official party membership change, 
as this would have conduced to the invalidation of their mandate, but rather 
public declarations of affiliation and engagement to run for office at the next 
elections from another party. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 30. We can see a 
clear politicization of the allocation of thermic rehabilitation funds, as 82.1% of 
these went to the ruling coalitions’ mayors in 2009, 68.5% in 2010, and 
82.79% in 2011. Throughout this period, the main ruling party was the PDL, 
but the composition of the ruling coalition changed after the presidential 
elections at the end of 2009. At that point, PSD and PC joined the ranks of the 
opposition, while UDMR and UNPR gained representation in the Boc II 
cabinet. These changes might explain why in 2010 there is a smaller 
indication of the influence of political criteria in funds allocation. Thus, it is also 
interesting to see that when the cabinet structure is clearly and swiftly divided 
between political parties, as in the case of cabinet Boc I (2009), there is 
greater inclination for pork-
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uncertainty at the executive level. Also, the total value of the programme was 
greater in 2009, which was an electoral year, suggesting again the electoral 
calculus behind the implementation of such programmes.  
Table 30. Thermic Rehabilitation Allocations (2009-2011) 
  
Political Affiliation Total Funds Allocated (Lei) 
Electoral 
Share (2008 
General 
Election) 
Total Funds 
Allocated (%) 
2009 Ruling Parties (PDL, 
PSD, PC) 295,552,218 42.88%* 82.10% 
Opposition Parties 64,447,782 57.12% 17.90% 
Total 360,000,000 100% 100.00% 
2010 Ruling Parties (PDL, 
UDMR, UNPR) 102,885,884.45 42.88%* 68.59% 
Opposition Parties 47,114,115.55 57.12% 31.41% 
Total 150,000,000.00 100% 100.00% 
2011 Ruling Parties (PDL, 
UDMR, UNPR) 124,182,963.70 42.88%* 82.79% 
Opposition Parties 25,817,036.30 57.12% 17.21% 
Total 150,000,000.00 100% 100.00% 
Source: compiled by the author based on official data from the Ministry for Regional Development and 
Turism (MDRT)—Centralizatorul fondurilor alocate pe unitati administrativ-teritoriale in anul 2010, the 
Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP)—Centralizator Rezultate Finale Alegeri Locale 2008, and press 
articles regarding elected officials switching their political affiliation during their term in office  
* The electoral share results do not account for the UNPR share of the votes, as this party only split 
from PSD in 2010, and as such its electoral share was subsumed to that of the PSD. 
In 2011—82.79% of funds went to the ruling coalition, which is 
indicative of a consolidation of the new cabinet structure. What is interesting 
to observe is that preferentialism was not only exerted towards the main 
party—PDL that counts amongst its leaders the Minister of MDRT, Elena 
Udrea. Judging by the allocation pattern, there was a strong preoccupation to 
fuel the territorial network of parties with a weak territorial presence—UNPR 
and UDMR. This supported their declarations of standing together at the next 
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local elections in 2012. The subsequent disintegration of this coalition is 
indicative of the low efficiency of such clientelistic strategies for governing 
purposes (i.e. holding coalitions together). In contrast, the survival in office of 
the most of the smaller parties’ local leaders, in the 2012 local elections, 
suggests a much larger impact in the territory, even if it is mostly constrained 
to local efficiency.  
The organizational challenges of the coalitions partners were different. 
The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) is only a strong 
presence in the counties of Covasna and Harghita, where the Hungarian 
ethnic minority is numerous. It has some electoral strongholds in the Mureș 
county too, but it is much more important to prove administrative capacity 
here, than the simple ethnic identification, as the electorate is more 
heterogenic. Thus, either to consolidate or to extend its position, the thermic 
rehabilitation programme served as a good platform.  
The National Union for Romania’s Progress (UNPR) on the other hand, 
is a newly established political party, formed in 2010 with deputies and 
senators that left the Social Democratic Party (PSD). It achieved 
parliamentary representation under the PSD electoral sign, and needed to 
build a new organizational network by the 2012 elections. For both of these 
parties’ organizational challenges, the allocations from the thermic 
rehabilitation programme, like the ones from the discretionary funds, are an 
important instrument in supporting their local officials. This in turn, preserves 
the latters’ loyalty towards the party leadership.     
The different housing programmes developed by the National Housing 
Agency (ANL) respond to a heightened need for affordable housing in a 
country where very little public housing has been built after the collapse of the 
communist regime. Further more, exploiting this tension between the demand 
and the supply, the real estate market in major cities in Romania has known a 
bubble similar to that of the rest of the world. Thus, in the face of a meager 
market supply, and very poor price per quality ratio, any public housing 
programme is a powerful electoral magnet. The most widespread in recent 
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years have been youth and social housing projects. Another interesting 
category has been represented by schemes dedicated to professional, such 
as resident doctors 155 , or army personnel 156 . The general housing 
developments appear to address the entire electorate, attracting support for 
any party that implements them. Meanwhile, the professionally targeted 
schemes are much more likely to be, at least partially, a reward system for 
different parties’ specific electorate. 
The evidence suggests that there is a very high degree of politicization 
in youth housing programmes allocations. Judging by the official records, we 
can see that both in 2009, and in 2010, allocations made from the Ministry of 
Regional Development and Tourism under this programme, were directed 
mainly at localities were the mayor belonged to one of the ruling parties. Out 
of the top ten recipients of funds for this housing programme, in 2009 eight 
belonged to the ruling parties PDL or PSD, and in 2010, seven belonged only 
to the main ruling party PDL.  
Again private contractors play a role in the clientelistic system, as there 
are unjustifiably big variations between the prices to built one apartment in 
Maramureș County for example—on average 170,777 RON (approx. 40,000 
€), and Gorj County—on average 7,755 RON (approx. 1,800 €). Furthermore, 
based on the lack of transparency of how the final beneficiaries lists are 
compiled, numerous scandals emerge of political clients receiving apartments 
through these housing schemes157.  
The National Infrastructure Development Programme (PNDI) is a 
programme of public investment in infrastructure established in 2010, as part 
of the wider Programme of Investments from Public Funds. Although it was 
established for developments in public infrastructure, especially roads, the 
PNDI quickly became the center of political debates and contradictions. The 																																																								
155 Agerpress, 2008. PDL acuză PNL că folosește locuințele ANL pentru capital electoral, 
28th of May 
156 NewsIn, 2011. Oprea: 2500 de locuințe ANL din Ghencea vor reveni personalului MapN, 
18th of March 
157 Gândul, 2009, Locuințele ANL, o superofertă guvernamentală pentru „tinerii” descurcăreți, 
5th of May   
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most pertinent questions about this programme were raised by Jeffrey Franks, 
the IMF representative in Romania, who claimed that ‘PNDI is not captured in 
the yearly budget’, which leads to the risks of funds being spent without 
proper oversight and a total lack of investment prioritization158159.  
The opposition representatives, claim that PNDI’s ‘sole purpose is to 
distribute electoral bribes’160. These allocations were sizeable, with 2.25 bil. 
RON (approx. 527 mil. €) in 2012161. The politicization of this programme’s 
allocations is suggested by the fact that 250 mayors from the ruling party—
PDL, received financing in 2012, but only 85 mayors from the opposition—
PSD and PNL.  
A recent corruption sentence against former MP Alin Trășculescu 
revealed how the clientelistic networks feeding from such projects involved 
various strata of the parties and the administration. According to prosecutors, 
in between 2010-2012, he used his position at the national level for influence 
civil servants from the Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism to 
certify allocations from PNDI to Vrancea county, where he was the leader of 
the local party organization of the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) 162 . 
Subsequently he would pursuade the contracted companies to subcontracted 
parts of the project to companies from whom he would solicit kickbacks. As 
such the programme itself was not furthering public works, but fueling a local 
party network.  
Additionally, the program’s objective to rehabilitate 10,000 km of public 
roads is overshadowed by the significant discrepancies, recorded in official 
documentation, in the costs involved by these projects: the Teleorman County 
Council manages road rehabilitation works for approx. 21.4 mil. €, the Mureș 
County Council conducts the same works for approx. 771,600 €, and Timiș 
County Council rehabilitates and modernizes its public roads for only 234,000 																																																								
158 Jeffrey Franks, IMF Mission Chief for Romania, interview in Hotnews, 7.02.2012 
159 Cristian Petrescu, minister of MDRT (2012), interview in Mediafax, 2.03.2012 
160 Rovana Plumb, MEP PSD, interview RTV, 16.03.2012, 20:47 
161 Andreea Vass, economic councilor of Prime Minister Emil Boc, Ziarul Financiar, 
14.12.2011  
162 Evenimentul Zilei, http://www.evz.ro/magistratii-cab-i-au-redus-drastic-pedepsele-fostului-
deputet-pdl-alin-trasculescu.html, last accessed on 25.06.2016 
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€. Although these discrepancies may be partly explained by the variation in 
the specificities of each rehabilitation project, the price variation tends to be 
related to the strength of local party leaders with regards to private 
contractors. The stronger the incumbent party leader (i.e. Mayor, County 
Council President) is, the bigger the prices are, as the rationale of clientelistic 
party elites is not to drive public costs down, but up. As a Romanian civil 
servant puts it: ‘the higher the prices, the higher the share for the politician or 
his party’163.   
The PNDI programme was dismantled through the International 
Monetary Fund partnership agreement because of the lack of transparency in 
allocations. It was however transformed into the National Regional 
Development Programme (PNDL) under the mandate of the Social Democrat, 
Liviu Dragnea, at the reorganized Ministry of Administration and Regional 
Development (MDRAP)164 . The central allocations to LGs through PNDL 
programme were substantial, starting with approximately 85 mil. € in 2013, to 
171 mil. € in 2014, and an estimate of more than 3 bil. € for 2015-2018.  
Furthermore, while the PNDI allocations were Governmental Decisions, the 
PNDL allocations have been solely ministerial decisions. The transfers 
consolidate the dependency relationship between the center and the 
periphery within the Social Democratic Party: “the allocations are too small to 
be able to finish a project in due time, and as such you remain dependent on 
the central leader for the annual transfers... you’re never sure you’ll be 
covered”165. 
6.2. Clientelistic Nexus: Public Procurement and Party Financing 
The clientelistic linkages are intrinsically dependent on the availability 
of resources. Through cartelization, these channels use predominantly public 
resources. Still, there is an underexplored link on how public funds reach the 
party organizations. As we find empirical support for political allocations in 
Romania, we also need to see the mechanisms through which they become 																																																								
163 M.D., interview with the author 14.05.2015 
164 Emergency Government Ordinance No. 96/2012 
165 Marcel Prună, Mayor of small LG (Pipirig) in Neamț county, interview with the author 
07.05.2015 
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more than pork-barrel politics. Public procurement becomes an important 
clientelistic tool as both at the national, and local level, political leaders 
holding office use it to fuel their electoral campaigns. Furthermore, local party 
bosses who manage to ensure through intra-party power dynamics, 
preferential allocations from the central government, are able to fuel their own 
patronage networks.  
Still, the legislation on party financing, and electoral expenses in 
Romania166 is one of the most detailed in the Central and East European 
setting (Casal-Bertoa and Van Biezen 2014). Although there is significant 
leeway in the possible sources of collection (e.g. private donors, anonym 
donations, membership fees), political organizations, whether local, or 
national, have to have declare all sources of income.  
In this context, we find the link between public procurement contracts, 
with national or local public institutions (e.g. road infrastructure development, 
cleaning services) and donations to the patron political parties. The evidence 
presented in this chapter establishes the direct link of registered party 
donations from companies that benefitted from public contracts engaged by 
the same party’s representatives. Still, we should consider this to be only a 
proxy measure of the overall transfers of resources from public procurement 
contracts, to party benefactors. The majority of such transfers are however 
done in an informal manner, and lest of corruption investigations, we cannot 
systematically investigate their value, or usage.  
The preferential interaction of public officials with private economic 
agents is generally explored by the research concerned with the corruption 
phenomenon. The research shows why this is frequently a conceptual error, 
as most of these instances are not merely examples of corruption, but rather 
phases of the clientelistic linkage system.  
In this setting, private companies that benefit from preferentially 
allocated public contracts become intermediaries or brokers, helping ruling 
parties and politicians to transfer public resources into party funds (Gherghina 																																																								
166 Law no 14/2003 regarding the functioning and organization of political parties 
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and Volintiru 2015). This sort of transfer becomes significant only in the 
context of elections, when clientelistic distribution of resources is important to 
mobilize the voters. This is not to say that public officials do not engage in this 
sort of linkages for personal gains. But, within the clientelistic model, it is 
important to go beyond wasteful public expenditure. In the Romanian case 
study, we can trace back party donations to preferential access to government 
contracts or procurement.  
From the internal organizational point of view, the literature on party 
politics has made comprehensive assessments of why party financing is 
plagued by multiple issues in the context of decreasing party membership in 
most democracies (Hopkin 2004). This problem is significantly augmented in 
the post-communist new democratic setting, where political parties are even 
worse organizationally equipped to support their logistical necessities 
(Gheghina et al 2011). Thus, clientelistic strategies of fuelling political parties 
appear to be an effective compensation for such deficiencies. Still, the existing 
research on party finances failed to completely unveil the specific 
mechanisms through which ruling political parties manage to fund their 
organizations.   
6.2.1. Public Procurement as a Facilitator of Clientelistic 
Transfers 
The empirical evidence presented here looks at private contractors that 
receive payments through public procurement contracts, and can also be 
found on the top donors list of the major Romanian political parties. The size 
and problems of public procurement make it easy to transform public funds 
into private funds. The European Commission estimates the average value of 
public procurements in the EU Member States at 18% of the country’s GDP, 
while Romania allocates approximately 10% of its GDP167. The procurement 
budget is not included in the annual national budget as a stand-alone 
																																																								
167Public procurement in Europe Cost and effectiveness, A study on procurement regulation. 
Prepared for the European Commission, March 2011, London Economics, Ecorys, and PWC, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/cost-
effectiveness_en.pdf, last accessed on the 26.06.2016 
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category, but as part of each public authority’s budget making it extremely 
difficult to investigate it rigorously.  
There are two major categories of problems regarding public 
procurement procedures in Romania. First, there is the issue of proper control 
mechanisms. Although the Electronic System for Public Procurement (SEAP) 
is active since 2006, over the past years, only an annual average of 16% of 
Romanian enterprises opted to access tender documents and specifications 
in the electronic procurement system, compared to the EU average of 21%168. 
It is common practice for the open advertisements on SEAP to be discussed, 
or negotiated in person between a representative of the contracting authority 
and the winning economic operator: 
‘it’s been over 3 years since I’ve posted my offers on SEAP, and 
I have dozens of contracts with local authorities annually (…) but 
I’ve only been contracted once without having “discussed” in 
advance, face to face with the person responsible. And that one 
wasn’t even a profitable (i.e. the contract)’169.  
While official standards have been set to establish the framework for 
each contracting authority throughout the year, there are large difference 
between these principles and what happens in practice. Most of these refer to 
the allocated budget for different procedures, and to the disregard for the 
initial inventory of necessities (Ministry of Public Finance 2010/2011, 
Romanian Court of Accounts 2008/2009/2010/2011). Second, there are 
preferential criteria set in the tender book with the purpose of favouring certain 
contractors, in contradiction to legal provisions 170 . Another way to exert 
positive discrimination for certain economic operators is to change the 
selection criteria during the procedure, leaving ‘unwanted’ applicants with 
insufficient time to comply. 
There are a number of institutions charged with the continuous 
verification and, if necessary, the sanctioning of the assignment procedures—																																																								
168 Eurostat, last accessed on 26.06.2016 
169 private contractor G.V., interview with the author 03.03.2012 
170 Government Decision No. 34/2006 
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National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement 
(ANRMAP), National Council for Solving Complaints (CNSC), or the Unit for 
Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement (UCVAP) within the 
Ministry of Public Finances (MFP), but these are mostly understaffed: 350 
employees in total in 2010. Given the volume of annual public procurement 
proceedings—approximately 80,000 per year, the number of contracting 
authorities (ministries, county councils, town halls, public institutions etc.)—
approximately 11,000, and the value of such contracts—approximately 22 bil. 
€ per year, it remains a vastly undersized monitoring apparatus.  
Due to the limitations of the control system, multiple problems arise. 
One of which would be the instrumental use of complaints. According to a 
former ANRMAP’s director, Cristina Trailă, ‘In Romania, complaints have 
become a national sport, given that they are cost-free, (…) there are 
companies established with the sole purpose of contesting public 
procurement procedures’171. Indeed, the number of decisions on complaints 
managed by the responsible authority—CNSC, has risen from only 338 in 
2006, to 6000 in 2011. This trend may well be interpreted as a maturing 
system that evolves in establishing its checks and balances. But, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the growing number of complaints, intentionally or not, 
only leads to blockages in the open tender procedures, opening the way to 
direct awarding procedures while the investigations take place.  
According to CNSC, the economic operators’ complaints amounted to 
39.92 bil. RON (approx. 9.4 bil. €) in 2010, which led to rectifications for 
contracts of 28.4 bil. RON (approx. 6.8 bil. €) and the annulment of tenders of 
11.48 bil. RON (approx. 2.7 bil. €)172. Despite the fact that fewer decisions 
were passed by CNSC on complaints in 2011, compared to 2010, the value of 
the procedures under question rose to 57.61 bil. RON (approx. 13.6 bil. €)173. 
																																																								
171 quoted in Anghel, I, 2010. Romania la raport—Piața achizițiilor publice, 12 mld. € pe an. 
Contracte cu dedicație și o factură umflată de cel puțin 20%, Ziarul Financiar, 5th of May 
172 data made available to the author by CNSC, in response to formal requests based on the 
law no. 544/2001 regarding free access to public information  
173 data made available to the author by CNSC, in response to formal requests based on the 
law no. 544/2001 regarding free access to public information 
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One of the main functions of contesting an awarding procedure is to stall the 
open tender procedures and to prolong direct or interim appointments.  
For example, in 2009, a private contractor, PA&CO International SRL 
forwarded complaints on two open tender procedures conducted by the 
National Company for Motorways and National Roads in Romania (CNADNR) 
for maintenance works on the motorways A1 and A2 174 . While these 
complaints were being analysed by the monitoring institutions, the initial 
tender was suspended, and an intermediate contract of over 1 mil. € was 
directly awarded to the very same company that forwarded the complaints in 
the first place. CNADNR is on ANRMAP’s top penalties list yearly175, and is 
also the contracting authority with the highest budget in the period 2009-
2010—over 1.3 bil. €. PA&CO International—a frequent winner of public 
works, is currently under investigation by the Romanian Competition Council 
on several allegations of fixing tenders, along with other companies that won 
the highest values of public contracts in recent years.  
Such linkages between public institutions, and private contractors 
would not be possible without party patronage, and appointments to key civil 
service positions within the public administration apparatus. That is why illegal 
or unethical conduct in public procurement procedures are not mere examples 
of corruption, but rather sequences of the contemporary clientelistic system, 
which grows highly more reliant on state capture, and because of this deploys 
multiple layers of clientelistic linkages—patronage, preferential allocations, 
discretionary public contracts etc. But, all the clientelistic layers serve the 
central purpose of reinforcing the chances of surviving in power, through 
informal exchanges.  
 The unnecessary level of bureaucracy is another issue connected to 
the control system. To a certain extent, it may be regarded as a side effect of 
the aforementioned problem of numerous complaints. In this sense, many 
public servants are tempted to cover themselves with piles of documentation: 																																																								
174 CNADNR Ongoing Public Proucrement Works, ID 91/92, documentation available at 
http://www.cnadnr.ro/proceduri_derulare.php?show=2&step=5  
175 ANRMAP, 2007/2008/2009/2010/2011. Raport Anual de Activitate 
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‘the more signatures there are, the more diluted the responsibility is’176. This 
often means that inefficient and otherwise unnecessary procedures and 
guarantees are established just in case of an investigation. While proper 
control mechanisms require a detailed documentation and specific selection 
criteria, a study analyzing the many examples of irrelevant requests asserts 
that: ‘bureaucratic obstacles (disproportionate requests for useless 
documentation) are either symptoms of professional insecurity, or means to 
manipulate tenders’ (SAR 2009). Additionally, significant disruptions occur in 
the tender scheduler due to the time consuming nature of the filing and 
checking all the documents required.  
Each contracting public institutions has to develop an Annual Public 
Procurement Plan (Planul anual de achiziții publice) (PAAP). Discrepancies 
are often signaled regarding the disregard for the initial inventory of 
necessities. The modification of the PAAP requires the consent of the 
legislative forum, which is the County or Local Council, for LGs. The 
discretionary nature of this modification procedure reveals the strength of the 
local party leader to mobilize support from members. We see over 50 
amendments to the PAAP (e.g. Dolj County Council in 2010), or surpassing 
the initial budget by over 500% (e.g. Arges County Council in 2010).  
Similar to the discrepancy between procurement plans and 
procurement activity, Romania also faces the problem of great variations in 
acquisition prices. The variations may be the result of differing circumstances, 
quantity of order and other such pricing factors, but they are significant even 
in cases when no other factors vary. For example, the same type of litterbin 
costs on average 240 RON (approx. 56.73 €) to be put on the streets of Arad, 
while in Brașov it costs on average 1,353 RON (approx. 319.32 €)177.   
Another similar practice that signals clear intentionality: the wide 
spread practice of using addenda (acte adiționale) to extend initial awarding 
conditions. By analyzing the content of such modifications to the initial 
contracts, two principal reasons for elaborating an addendum arise: to extend 																																																								
176 Cristina Trăilă, former director ANRMAP, interview in Gândul, 25.09.2011 
177 Institutul pentru Politici Publice Data Research 2012, last accessed on 11.05.2013 
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the deadline, or to increase the value of the contract. The problem with the 
addenda is that they end up creating substantially different conditions for the 
private contractor than were stipulated in the initial agreement (Romanian 
Court of Accounts 2011). This means that the tender procedures and the 
selection criteria become a showcase that can easily be ignored—‘I prefer 
settling the conditions beforehand, but if there’s “trouble” (i.e. competing 
offers), I accept whatever conditions I have to in order to secure the contract 
and we’ll modify them afterwards so that everyone is happy’178. An evocative 
example in this case is a public works contract of approx. 41.3 mil. € awarded 
by the Ilfov County Council in 2010, that was afterwards modified through 10 
addenda, through which it allocated an additional 45.8 mil. € to the private 
contractor, thus more than doubling the initial value of the contract. 
Other ways to circumvent legal constraints and deliver public contracts 
to the preferred clients include manipulations of the framework agreement. 
The framework agreement is usually signed between a contracting authority 
and several private contractors ranked according to their prices (lowest to 
highest), and the public works are offered in cascade. Thus, if the first 
company on the list declines, the offer goes to the second and so on. The 
“client company” may be positioned somewhere in the middle of the list, so 
that the ranking of prices is respected179 . As the arrangements go, the 
companies with lower prices usually turn down the offer, the “client company” 
is granted the contract at higher prices, and then outsources the actual work 
to the higher ranked companies, with lower prices, that have already officially 
declined the offer 180 . Thus, the “client company” turns profit just by 
intermediating, and the other companies are satisfied to get the contract181.  
Finally, the empirical evidence has revealed an interesting practice 
regarding the manipulation of the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) 																																																								
178 private contractor G.P., interview with the author 06.03.2012 
179 private contractor B.P., interview with the author 22.02.2012 
180 private contractor B.P., interview with the author 22.02.2012 
181 Fining decisions of the Competition Council of Romania against colluding private 
contractors for road infrastructure works, 
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/id8121/amenzi_marcaje_noiembrie_20
12.pdf, last accessed on 26.06.2016 
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codes182 too. It involves directly awarding contracts of values under the tender 
limit (less than 15,000 €) to private contractors for multiple CPV codes, thus 
raising the sum allocated to what would have well been a tender contract. 
This practice is problematic when it ends up attributing different contracts for 
the same procedures, just to raise the total value of sums awarded.  For 
example an interviewee claimed that another private contractor had been 
awarded contracts for both the main CPV category—“service and 
maintenance”, as well as the sub-categories—“service” and “maintenance”183.  
Contracting authorities help by either choosing to look away, or by 
taking part in different preferential awarding schemes. In fact, it is the political 
interventions that most Romanians see as the primary incentive for fixing 
tenders—44%, and they attribute the blame in a distant second place to the 
control mechanisms—22%184. Consequently, Romanians blame the political 
appointees that rule public institutions—79%, and a vast majority believe 
contracts to be awarded on political criteria—92%185. 
In terms of the competitiveness of the award process, Romania is 
amongst the lowest scoring EU members, with an average of only 3.8 offers 
per procurement (when the legal limit is often 3), as opposed to the top group 
countries, such as Spain, Germany, and Portugal, who receive an average of 
7 or more bids per procurement186.  Preferential selection is ensured through 
the criteria of the tender book with the purpose of favoring certain 
operators/contractors, in contradiction to legal provisions187. Another way to 
exert positive discrimination for certain economic operators is to change the 
selection criteria during the procedure, leaving ‘unwanted’ applicants with 
insufficient time to comply.  
																																																								
182 single classification system for public procurement describing the subject of the contracts 
183 private contractor A.V., interview with the author 23.04.2014  
184 Institutul pentru Politici Publice Data Research 2011, last accessed on 11.05.2013 
185 Institutul pentru Politici Publice Data Research 2011, last accessed on 11.05.2013 
186 European Commission, SEC (2011) 853, Evaluation Report 
Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation, accessible here 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2011/EN/SEC-2011-853-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-
1.PDF, last accessed on 26.06.2016  
187 Government Decision No. 34/2006 
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The European Commission called on Romania to apply procedural 
transparency and ensure equal treatment for applicants in connection with a 
public works contract for the modernization of road infrastructure. The contract 
was worth approx. 110 mil. € and was awarded by the municipal authorities of 
Sector 3, in Bucharest. According to the Commission’s press release, ‘the 
authorities could not have performed an objective evaluation of the bids’, 
because ‘during the procedure they made changes to a number of mandatory 
conditions in the procurement notice, including the selection criteria’, and the 
contract was awarded to ‘an applicant whose bid included a large number of 
anomalies in terms of prices and deadlines tendered’188.  
6.2.2. Party Financing through Private Donations 
Given the current context of decreasing political participation and party 
membership, the fees are a marginal source of income to contemporary 
political parties. The most important source of party funding is currently 
represented by donations, as public funding in Romania is lower than in 
Western democracies. As the donations represent large sums of money, it is 
important to assess their source, and implicit purpose. It is unlikely that in a 
context of political disenchantment, contributions to political parties are driven 
by ideological values. A more plausible alternative explanation would be the 
charismatic force of political leaders that can drive up partisan support. As the 
general trend of collections, for all the major parties remain proportionally 
similar (see Figure 16), it seems that this is not the main explanation for party 
donations in Romania either. 
If we look at the overall level of party donations for the three main 
political parties in Romania, we see that for the entire period 2008-2012, the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) managed to accumulate the distinctively 
largest annual values. The Social Democrats (PSD), and National Liberals 
(PNL) have not been able to accumulate similar levels of party donations. 
Within this timeframe, the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) was both the 																																																								
188 IP/12/73, Public procurement: the Commission acts to safeguard procedural transparency 
and ensure equal treatment of applicants in connection with a public works contract for the 
modernisation of road infrastructure in Bucharest 
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governing party, and controlled a substantial number of local governments  
(LGs). As such, the evidence is consistent with this chapter’s assertion that it 
is the discretionary distribution of public resources, through public contracts, 
that will increase the value of donations from private contractors. 
Figure 16. Party Donations in Romania (2008-2012) Total Value (RON) 
 
Source: compiled by the author from the Official Gazette (2009-2013) 
The overall value of party donations is predictably correlated with 
electoral periods: all three major parties record substantially higher levels in 
election years. There is also a higher level of donations in years with local and 
parliamentary elections (i.e. 2008, and 2012) as opposed to presidential 
elections (i.e. 2009). The level of financial resources obtained through 
donations seems to have more to do with the level of mobilization of the local 
leaders, rather than that of central party leadership. In the presidential election 
year, we see a consistently higher collection rate on the party of the 
incumbent president, supported by the ruling party of that time—the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL). The local organizations/local party leaders 
need to show their utility to the party leadership by means of producing such 
formal revenues. In contrast, as I show in the final section of this chapter, 
2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	PSD	 22,756,307	 10,469,050	 3,584,859	 6,958,789	 19,282,697	PDL	 54,740,297	 41,241,293	 9,125,585	 12,878,104	 39,070,874	PNL	 27,431,821	 5,983,277	 4,330,730	 4,564,571	 6,723,852	
0	10,000,000	
20,000,000	30,000,000	
40,000,000	50,000,000	
60,000,000	
PSD	 PDL	 PNL	
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presidential campaigns frequently involve large funding off the books, in return 
for various regulatory favors or appointments. Those however are measurable 
only in as far as they constitute the subject of an investigation.  
 
Table 31. Private Donations Received by the Romanian Political Parties 
(mil. €) 
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PDL 5.35 8.35 3.30 7.00 0.05 1.10 0.02 1.30 0.21 6.70 
PNL 2.15 6.85 0.85 1.50 0.005 0.45 0.002 0.28 0.30 1.30 
PSD 4.50 5.90 2.50 2.90 0.07 1.85 0.13 0.16 1.20 4.50 
UDMR 
    
0.003 0.10 0.006 0.20 0.001 1.00 
PPDD 
         
1.10 
Note: In 2012, there is an additional 4.10 million € for the USL (PSD+PNL).  
Source: Gherghina and Volintiru 2014, based on data from the Official Gazette (2009-2013), 
for the source database see Annex 1 
Table 31 summarizes the amounts received by each party between 
2008 and 2012. It can be easily observed that the amount of both premium 
and normal donations is considerably high in election years (2008, 2009 and 
2012) compared to non-election years (see both Figure 16, and Table 31). 
Given that we look at party donations from the perspective of the clientelistic 
phenomenon, these hikes in funding during electoral years can be linked to 
the costs involved in campaigning and Election Day activities (e.g. vote-
buying). As the three major parties have had relatively good chances to end 
up in the government coalition (with the exception of 2012), the received 
amounts are substantial. 
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Table 32. Share of Financing Sources for the Romanian Political Parties 
(2003-2010) 
  Year State Funding Member Fee Donations Total Revenues 
PS
D 
2003 2,266,310 17.51% 7,256,352 56.08% 969,501 7.49% 12,939,590 
2004 2,266,310 5.45% 25,311,878 60.87% 7,503,087 18.04% 41,580,817 
2007 2,924,200 22.83% 5,698,889 44.50% 3,793,656 29.62% 12,807,638 
2008 2,924,200 7.09% 19,098,942 46.33% 18,879,601 45.80% 41,226,272 
2009 2,651,208 12.61% 10,309,590 49.03% 8,065,707 38.36% 21,026,505 
2010 2,284,258 34.99% 3,584,859 54.92% 389,505 5.97% 6,528,003 
PD
L 
2003 812,027 35.65% 212,710 9.34% 1,113,792 48.91% 2,277,459 
2004 812,027 15.62% 1,099,322 21.15% 3,180,240 61.19% 5,197,553 
2007 1,599,130 10.45% 2,304,802 15.06% 11,159,289 72.93% 15,302,363 
2008 1,599,130 2.77% 21,375,888 36.97% 33,374,071 57.72% 57,821,701 
2009 2,636,000 6.05% 13,266,235 30.46% 27,655,223 63.49% 43,557,458 
2010 2,281,636 20% 4,349,937 38.13% 4,465,291 39.14% 11,407,221 
PN
L 
2003 1,125,095 45.37% 491,497 19.82% 667,896 26.93% 2,480,064 
2004 1,125,095 13.38% 1,555,784 18.50% 4,962,015 59.01% 8,408,174 
2007 1,589,366 10.83% 2,877,868 19.61% 9,925,276 67.62% 14,677,061 
2008 1,589,366 3.50% 9,801,581 21.56% 33,198,234 73.03% 45,459,233 
2009 1,534,487 13.72% 3,384,632 30.26% 5,983,277 53.50% 11,183,458 
2010 1,322,125 16.90% 4,330,730 55.36% 1,835,019 23.46% 7,823,312 
UD
M
R 
2003 746,945 26.14% 567,169 19.85% 633,403 22.17% 2,857,472 
2004 746,945 16.16% 728,627 15.76% 3,019,316 65.32% 4,622,351 
2007 722,269 20.45% 638,939 18.09% 2,148,688 60.85% 3,531,119 
2008 512,422 6.33% 1,088,878 13.44% 6,475,613 79.95% 8,099,504 
2009 80,123 2.76% 636,608 21.94% 2,184,684 75.30% 2,901,414 
2010 20,882,660 94.32% 724,111 3.27% 431,896 1.95% 22,140,396 
Source: Popescu and Soare 2015, Preda and Soare 2011, Ionaşcu and Soare 2011, 
Mateescu 2011, based on published data from the Permanent Electoral Authority 
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Party funding from private sources can take two forms: premium and 
normal donations. A premium donation refers to a supersized contribution. 
The average value of a regular fee / month is 2 € and all fees that exceed the 
value of 10 minimum wages should be declared (i.e. premium donations). 
Normal donations are constituted from money coming from private individuals 
and firms. The present analysis lumps them because quite often managers 
make individual donations in addition to their firm’s contribution. This 
procedure masks the real donation made by a private firm.  
The empirical data shows us where the top donors are located. Their 
territorial dispersion brings evidence linking them to clientelistic linkages. 
Each of the three major parties counts on extensive private contributions in 
those counties where they already have strong organizational bases, largely 
due to consecutive terms in office of local party leaders. The Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL) has a large amount of donations in Bucharest (around 
30% of top donations) and Cluj (10%-20% of top donations). The National 
Liberals’ (PNL) benefit from substantial contributions of private companies 
based in Bucharest (around 27% of top donations). The Social Democrats’ 
(PSD) have substantial donations from companies in Teleorman (40%-51% of 
top donations) and Constanta (17%-97% of top donations). 
In most cases, the large coverage of party funding from one or two 
territorial organizations reflects their relative power to the central leadership. 
In the case of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) the Teleorman county has 
been directly, and more recently indirectly, under the control of one of the 
main political actors of this party, Liviu Dragnea. Furthermore, the county of 
Constanta is one of the richest and most strategically important counties in 
Romania. It has been under the control of Radu Mazăre, who was mayor of 
Constanța municipality from 2000 until 2015. In the case of the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL) the donations sourced in Cluj can also be linked to a 
prominent local party leader—Emil Boc, who has been strengthening his 
party’s territorial base here, either as the Mayor, or as Prime Minister.  
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Table 33. Party Financing from Private Contractors 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
PSD (Social Democratic Party) 
Main Regional 
Concentration 
of Top Donors 
Teleorman 
(40%) 
Teleorman 
(51%) 
Constanta 
(62%) 
Constanta 
(97%) 
Timis 
(26%) 
PDL (Democratic Liberal Party)  
Main Regional 
Concentration 
of Top Donors 
Bucharest 
(40%) 
Bucharest 
(28%) 
Bucharest 
(31%) 
Bucharest 
(60%) 
Bucharest 
(28%) 
PNL (National Liberal Party) 
Main Regional 
Concentration 
of Top Donors 
Bucharest 
(27%) 
Bucharest 
(52%) 
Bucharest 
(21%) 
Bucharest 
(31%) 
Bucharest 
(24%) 
Source: Romanian Legislation (Monitorul Oficial) 2009-2013 
Even if we can identify some party funding ‘champions’, whose ability 
to mobilize donation is largely based on their local administrative power, we 
can also see that there is still large dispersion of top donations provenience. 
Furthermore, those donations sourced in the capital city of Bucharest are 
unlikely to be signs of local organizational power, but rather yet another 
example that there is a strong centralization tendency with regards to party 
funding. This inference is reinforced by the trajectory of those few local party 
leaders, mentioned above, whose political career has intertwined local power 
with national-level influence. 
The problematic aspect of party funding delivered by private 
contractors is signaled even in the accountancy books submitted by the 
political parties to the Bucharest Court every year, in March. While we 
observe smaller parties submitting a single list of party donations for each 
year (e.g. Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), or the 
Greater Romania Party (PRM)), the three major parties submit multiple lists, 
from multiple local organizations, in incompatible digital formats, so that the 
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processes of tracking down the actual donors, to the actual amounts becomes 
a sinuous, difficult process.  
This lack of transparency becomes an obviously purposeful measure 
especially in the case of ruling parties. On the party donors lists of the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) premium donations (i.e. exceeding 10 
minimum wages) are split in multiple payments falling just under this level. 
This practice is effective on two accounts. On one hand, the categories of the 
Official Gazette announcements make the distinction between premium 
donations, and normal one. The latter list being considerably longer—in 
electoral years amounting to dozens of pages long, it is much easier for 
recurrent public procurement beneficiaries to hide out. On the other hand, the 
few interested investigative journalists, or watchdog organizations, do not 
have the resources to analyze the party donors lists in depth, and generally 
looking only at the top donors189. 
It is necessary to match the donations of private contractors with their 
benefits from private procurement. In this case, the benefits come from direct 
allocation of public contracts, or from open contest public procurement 
procedures. Table 34 includes 10 examples for each major party whose 
activity is mostly based on the direct allocation of public contracts (i.e. the 
fastest and safest procedure of employing private contractors by public 
institutions). The complete list of matches between public contracts and party 
financing is considerably longer.  
The activity profiles of these companies indicate the extent to which 
their revenues are based on public procurement contracts. All three parties 
have many top donors with business activities in the fields of constructions, 
infrastructure, and energy distribution. Only for National Liberal Party (PNL) it 
was harder to establish the profile of all donors, as it receives donations from 
investment companies. Publicly known companies often prefer to reroute their 
donations so that they are not directly linked to the party190.  
																																																								
189 Emilia Seican, investigative journalist, interview with the author 3.03.2014 
190 private contractors, B.P., interview with the author 
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Table 34. Top Donors with Public Procurement Contracts (amounts in €) 
Party 
 
Company 
Value of 
Donatio
n 
Year of  
Donation 
Nature of Activity 
PDL 
Grup Salubrizare Urbana 
SA 
90,000 2008 Cleaning Services 
PDL Transilvania Construct 65,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL Proserv 60,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL SC Victor Construct 25,000 2008 Constructions 
PDL Industrial Montaj Grup 25,000 2008 Infrastructure 
PDL Transilvania Construct 110,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL Criseni SRL 25,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL SC Victor Construct 25,000 2009 Constructions 
PDL Conrec SA 5,000 2010 Constructions 
PDL Euro Grup DG Transport 6,000 2011 Constructions 
PDL Compact Industrial SA 5,000 2011 Labor Protection 
PDL Pro-Consul Prod SRL 25,000 2012 Constructions 
PNL Carpati Proiect SRL 12,500 2008 Constructions 
PNL SC Universal SA 12,000 2008 Constructions 
PNL M&D Cons Investitii SRL 9, 000 2008 Financial Services 
PNL International SA 40,000 2009 Constructions 
PNL SC Electrosistem SRL 10,500 2009 Electrical Components 
PNL Elita Construct 12,500 2010 Constructions 
PNL M&D Cons Investitii SRL 12,500 2010 Financial Services 
PNL SC Simultan SRL 25,000 2012 Food Delivery 
PSD Modul Proiect SA 125,000 2008 
Engineering and 
Infrastructure 
PSD SC Simca SA 125,000 2008 Constructions 
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PSD General Concrete SRL 40,000 2008 Constructions 
PSD Deep Serv 2000 SRL 9,000 2008 Cleaning Services 
PSD SC Artego SA 12,500 2008 Rubber Products 
PSD SC Proinvest SRL 50,000 2009 Constructions 
PSD Argenta SRL 10,000 2010 Infrastructure 
PSD SC Simultan SRL 25,000 2012 Food Delivery 
PSD SC Victor Construct 16,000 2012 Constructions 
PSD SC Tehnodomus 9,300 2012 Constructions 
Source: Official Gazette (2009-2013) and Public Procurement announcements 
Many donors also have indirect benefits from public policy choices that 
do not necessarily involve direct payments—as in the case of public 
procurement contracts. A special interest in favourable regulation and policies 
is found in the case of companies from sectors such as energy distribution, 
agriculture, or cargo activities. While not as intensely employed as preferential 
public benefits distribution, or government contracts and public procurement, 
regulatory proceedings are another clientelistic provision of Romanian political 
parties (see Chapter 2). Survey data from Democratic Accountability and 
Linkages Project (DALP) suggests that the main political parties in Romania 
deploy a moderate effort to influence or promise to influence rules issued by 
government agencies 
Some private firms contribute to the campaign of more than one party 
(e.g. SC Victor Construct in Table 34). This is congruent with the current 
clientelistic phenomenon, in which the political parties become increasingly 
more focused on resource accumulation, than general popular support. Since 
private contractors bear little interest in vehicles of electoral mobilization, they 
supply more parties with resources to maximize their chances of getting public 
procurement. In addition, this procedure is consistent with the earlier 
discussed cartelization of political parties in Romania. There is a high 
likelihood of inter-party cooperation at county levels – the place where most 
public procurement activity is deployed.  
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Another important aspect to be considered is that the party donations 
represent the tip of the iceberg in terms of the actual return delivered by 
private contractors back to patron political leaders, or party organizations.191 
In general terms, ‘a “fee” for public contracts ranges between 10% and 30%, 
and usually it is delivered in cash to whomever made it happen’.192 As such, 
official donations remain obviously a necessary instrument for official 
expenses – the real value of private contractors’ contribution to political party 
is probably ten-fold higher, according to respondents193.  
A close look at these donors’ economic activity over time reveals two 
relevant aspects for the clientelistic nexus. Many top donors record significant 
hikes in their activity during electoral years. For example, most donors of the 
PDL have a turnover increase by ten-fold in the electoral years of 2008-2009 
(when the PDL was in government next to the PSD or alone). Also, in the 
case of the PNL, turnovers of top donors expand significantly during election 
years and some of the companies cease to exist after these years. The latter 
may suggest an instrumental use of private companies with the purpose to 
channel public funds into party organizations.  
The framework of party financing, like most of the political parties’ 
regulations, set up from the very beginning either the polarization, or 
fragmentation trajectories of evolution for a political system. The way the party 
financing system is constructed in Romania, at the present moment, leaves a 
wide range of private sources of finance to political parties. As mentioned 
throughout this chapter this ultimately leads to the situation in which political 
parties finance their electoral campaigns, and other organizational 
necessities, through donations from private contractors, gaining income 
through public procurement contracts.  
While not excluding the cases of personal gains, or corruption, there 
are notable high-ranking prosecuted cases, in which senior politicians (i.e. 																																																								
191 Social Democratic Party (PSD), party leader, A.D., interview with the author 
192 private contractor, A.V., interview with the author 
193 Bogdan Pintileasa, Campaign manager and local party official (PSD), interview with the 
author 25.01.2013, G.F. Campaign Manager for the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL), interview 
with the author 28.10.2014, D.F. Local Councilmen, interview with the author, 16.01.2013 
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prime ministers, or ministers) are under criminal investigation, or have been 
already sentenced to jail for such clientelistic linkages, as described in this 
chapter. As such, public contracts allocated through their high-ranking 
positions in the central administration have been turned into direct, or indirect 
electoral financing leverages. 
6.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Cartelization: Electoral Outcomes 
and Judicial Sanctions 
Yearly reports of the Romanian Audit Court mention how discretionary 
governmental funds effectively constitute a parallel budget that is not 
subjected to Parliamentary control. The national audit authorities also point to 
that fact that the lack of transparency in the allocation criteria suggest that 
these are in fact politicized financial instruments. Based on the evidence 
presented in this chapter, we can see how political affiliation seems to be the 
most significant allocation criteria, and that the ruling parties generally use 
these funds to uphold preferred constituencies, through budgetary 
supplements.  
The issue that remains to be addressed is the envisaged outcome of 
creating these preferential leverages. To what extent the artificial expansion of 
local budgets brings electoral success to incumbents? The clientelistic logic 
behind the preferential transfer mechanisms leads us to believe that they will 
at least enhance the electoral chances of the local candidates. In order to 
assess the electoral efficiency of these clientelistic financial allocations—be 
they through discretionary funding instruments, or through national 
development projects, we compared the electoral results of two rounds of 
local elections.  
Looking at the elected position of County Council President, we see 
that the majority of them maintained their position, by gaining a consecutive 
term—20 out of 41. Such electoral victories show the strength of “local 
barons”, and their semi-autonomous control over a vast array of funds and 
attributions, at the LG level in Romania. Still, their positive performance might 
also be a result of development projects and investments, spanned over a 
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longer period of time, or capital expenses in the eve of the electoral period 
(e.g. Government Decision No. 255/2012). Furthermore, 5 of the county 
council presidencies remained with the same party, but the winner was a 
different person. Finally, as many as 16 out of 41 counties changed their 
president and the local government’s ruling party (i.e. county council majority).  
While the most numerous category was that of incumbents holding on 
to their positions, once we look at the political party affiliation for each of the 
incumbent county council presidents, we see that the opposition party—Social 
Democrats (PSD), and not the ruling coalition for the previous term gained the 
majority of these victories. We consequently see contrasting situation in terms 
of electoral outcomes, by comparison to the preferential distribution schemes. 
This would suggest that the clientelistic mechanism is flawed, and the 
electoral outcomes are not affected in any way by the central transfers along 
party lines. Still, we have to account for the fact that the counties are relatively 
sizeable constituencies, and the small scale of preferential transfers—either 
allocations, or local investment projects, are not enough to change the 
sentiments of the electorate across an entire county.  
 Therefore, we can safely infer that the mechanisms presented in this 
chapter, linking the central patrons (i.e. government members) with local 
beneficiaries, do not work at the mezzo level of the 41 counties in Romania, 
because of the autonomy of resources that local government leaders already 
posses. This point is further supported by the fact that many of the surviving 
county council presidents (see Annex 1, marked in red) are going through 
criminal investigations on the proprietary use of public procurement contracts, 
which hints towards autonomous clientelistic networks at the county level. As 
described in Chapter 3, the more resources a local leader controls on his own, 
the more likely it is that he will become a semi-autonomous patron, rather 
than an intermediary in the clientelistic system.  
In contrast, it is at the smaller locality level–small town and communes, 
that the lump sum allocations, or development projects (e.g. swimming pools) 
have the highest impact. Our analysis shows that the vast majority of such 
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recipients, from the governing coalition, maintained their mandates—over 
60%. This would thus tentatively suggest that the fundamental aspects of 
efficient clientelistic exchanges—control, monitoring, clients’ captivity, were 
very much present in Romanian relationship between preferential central 
allocations, and electoral outcomes.  
Currently there are 22 out of a total of 41 county council presidents in 
Romania that are investigated, undergoing trial, or have been already 
sentenced for corruption-related offences. Still, not all of these cases are 
connected to the clientelistic machine in full. While the financial standing of 
many of them contributed to the party organization’s finances in those 
territories, this is not enough to be considered part of a clientelistic machine. 
Rather, of interest are those instances where the local and the national levels 
of the party leadership colluded in creating and supporting informal channels 
of distribution.  
The recent investigation into the Prahova County Council President 
Mircea Cosma (PSD) is an illustrative example of how public procurement 
cases in infrastructure development have been a frequent means of financing 
the party organizations. According to official records of the testimony of the 
private contractors, 10% of the value of the contract would go to the leading 
figures in the county council (i.e. budget committee presidents).194 Based on 
official testimonies, Mircea Cosma was explicitly concerned with ‘bringing 
money to the party’195. As such, even the distribution of the kick-back money, 
amongst the county councilmen, was an act of informally fueling the strength 
of the PSD Prahova party organization, and its leaders, who were public 
officials at that time. Furthermore, the fact that he maintained his position for 
three consecutive mandates leads us to assume that the clientelistic practices 
were perfected over time; as these linkages fueled and consolidate the local 
organization and mobilize party supporters, they subsequently become 
efficient in terms of the electoral objectives as well. 																																																								
194 http://dosareachizitii.hotnews.ro/achizitie-17309834-dosarul-cosma-10-din-lictatiile-publice-
pentru-partid.htm, last accessed on 21.06.2015  
195 idem 
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A similar mechanism seems to have been set up by the mayor of 
Sector 1, in Bucharest, Andrei Chiliman (PNL). The charges brought against 
him, and his collaborators, both within his administration, as well as within the 
party organization, reveal kickbacks on various public procurement projects. 
The most significant are the thermic rehabilitation works for apartment 
buildings. According to the official prosecutors’ files, the clientelistic network 
surrounding and involving mayor Andrei Chiliman was financing the entire 
activity of the Bucharest organization of the National Liberal Party (PNL). He 
was apparently soliciting kickbacks, of 7%-15% of the value of the public 
procurement contracts granted by his administration, but only 30% of the 
alleged kickbacks went to the mayor, and administrative staff, and the rest 
going directly to the party organization. 196 As such, one of the co-defendants 
in this trial is Vlad Moisescu, head treasurer of the PNL Bucharest party 
organization.  
After surviving several electoral cycles in power, local party leaders 
become powerful enough to project nominations at the central level. 
Candidate nomination for MPs is one of the easiest victories for local party 
bosses, as it is their party organization that is responsible for electoral 
victories at the national level too. Again we find empirical evidence to support 
the much greater organizational strength at the local level of Social 
Democratic leaders, than in other parties, as some of the local leaders (e.g. 
Mircea Cosma, Prahova County Council President, or Victor Mocanu, Buzău 
County Council President) have successfully supported the nomination and 
electoral win of their sons as Members of Parliament (MPs). In contrast, it is 
much more difficult to exert patronage over key appointments in central 
government. Furthermore, the autonomy and power of local bosses is often 
based on inter-party collusion at the local level (e.g. Nicolae Mischie (PSD) 
																																																								
196 http://sorinamatei.blogspot.ro/2015/06/dosarul-bomba-al-dna-ploiesti_20.html?m=1 , last 
accessed on 21.06.2015 
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and Ionel Manțog (PNL) in Gorj county, or Relu Fenechiu (PNL) and 
Gheorghe Nichita (PSD) in Iași county197).   
One of the most significant electoral campaigns for a nationwide party 
is the presidential election. As such, within the party leadership echelon, 
especially in the case of party leaders that concomitantly occupied cabinet 
positions (i.e. prime-minister, minister) there is a stringent involvement in 
ensuring a presidential victory for their party. As both candidates (e.g. Adrian 
Năstase 2004, Elena Udrea 2014), or as members of the candidate closest 
circle, the measures undertaken through informal means to ensure an 
electoral victory make use of the power within both their public office, as well 
as their clientelistic network. The latter comprises as much party members, as 
non-members (e.g. private contractors, civil servants).  
The main challengers in the presidential competition have been, 
throughout most of the post communist period, the main contenders from the 
right and from the left of the political spectrum. It was only in the presidential 
campaign of 2000 that the Social Democratic candidate, former president 
Iliescu, faced an opponent from a nationalist party (PRM)—Vadim Tudor. As 
can be seen in Table 30, all the presidential electoral campaigns of the last 
decade, in between 2004 and 2014, can be linked to a trial or sentence 
regarding the use of public funds, or governmental decisions, to attract 
funding to the campaign. It is not a self-imposed assessment timeframe, but 
rather a contextual circumstance. 
Since 2004, we find two candidates from the Social Democratic Party—
Adrian Năstase, and Mircea Geoană, and the two candidates from the right—
Traian Băsescu, and Elena Udrea. In some cases the candidates were 
directly involved, and trailed for the clientelistic deployment of public 
resources to the benfit of their campaign (e.g. Elena Udrea, Adrian Năstase), 
and in other cases, members of their close, personal circle were tried and 
sentenced (e.g. Monica Icob-Ridzi, Bunea Stanciu).  																																																								
197 http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/cum-confiscat-baronii-locali-romania-oamenii-incredere-
liderilor-politici-judet-impanzit-institutiile-statului-1_5360c0d20d133766a83a0c1b/index.html, 
last accessed on 26.06.2016 
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Table 35. Presidential Campaigns and Clientelistic Exchanges 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Prosecution File 
Name 
Sentences Electoral 
Outcome 
Traian Băsescu 
(PD-L) 
2009 campaign 
„Microsoft” (Microsoft 
licences) 
- Pending final ruling Won 
„Ziua Tineretului” 
(Youth Day 
Celebration) 
- Former Youth Minister Monica 
Iacob-Ridzi is currently serving a 
5 year jail sentence, since 16th of 
February 2015 
Won 
Elena Udrea 
(PMP—splinter 
party of PD-L) 
2014 campaign 
„Gala Bute” (Boxing 
Gala for Super 
Middleweight 
Champion Lucian Bute) 
- Pending final ruling Lost 
Adrian Năstase 
(PSD)  
2004 campaign 
„Trofeul Calității” 
(Quality Trophy) 
- Former Prime Minister and 
Presidential candidate Adrian 
Năstase served two years in jail, 
starting on the 20th of June 2012 
Lost 
Mircea Geoană 
(PSD)  
2009 campaign 
„Bribes for PSD” 
(Campaign Donation) 
- Agriculture magnate Ioan 
Niculae, serves two and a half 
years in jail, starting 4th April 2015 
- Bunea Stanciu, Braila party 
boss, serves three years in jail, 
starting 4th April 2015 
Lost 
Source: Official records of the National Anticorruption Agency (DNA), and press coverage 
The case of Adrian Năstase was not one of extensive clientelistic 
reach, as mentioned before his party was organizationally strong, and he 
conducted a series of administrative reforms during his term in office, as 
Prime Minister (2000-2004) that further empowered local party bosses. As 
such, he did not need to deploy to a great extent resource accumulation 
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through public contracts, as the party machine was electorally competitive. 
Furthermore, his term in office covered the entire pre-accession to the EU 
negotiations, and as such there were many restrictions on institutional 
processes and allocation.  
He was trailed and sentenced for, along with other public employees, 
but not any party leadership figure for competition called “Trofeul Calității”. 
This was a ceremony organized by the State Inspectorate for Construction, for 
private companies in the construction sector. These companies paid a hefty 
tax for participation, and all the revenues went into electoral materials (e.g. 
flyers, brochures) for the presidential campaign. While apparently it is 
fundraising system, the problem was that the companies were paying the 
participation fee to a public institution, under the control of the then prime 
minister, and the public institution was then channeling the funds to the 
benefit of the candidate.  
The other left wing candidate involved in such clientelistic prosecutions 
was Mircea Geoană, party leader and presidential candidate in 2009. He was 
not directly involved in the case, but one of the main local party leaders of the 
time was. Bunea Stanciu was the long standing County Council President of 
Braila. From this position he had a good relationship with Ioan Nicuale, who is 
the president the biggest private company in the Agricultural sector in 
Romania—Interagro, and one of the richest men in Romania. The 
businessmen donated 1 mil. € to the presidential campaign, in exchange for 
selecting appoitmentees to the leadership of two state companies—SNTGN 
Transgaz and SNGN Romgaz SA, with whom he had business dealings.198 
The two cases of the candidates from the right wing—Traian Băsescu 
and Elena Udrea, are still in very incipient phases of the trial. While Elena 
Udrea has been in jail for 3 months, while awaiting trial for „Gala Bute” and 
„Microsoft”, Traian Băsescu has not yet been involved in any clientelistic 
investigation. Monica Iacob-Ridzi on the other hand, is serving 5 years in jail 
for using the buget of the Ministry of Youth over which she presided in 2009, 																																																								
198 http://www.hotnews.ro/ancheta-14560859-dosarul-mita-psd-gheorghe-bunea-stancu-ioan-
niculae.htm, last accessed on 21.06.2015 
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for the purpose of supporting the electoral campaigns of the Băsescu family. 
In the spring of 2009, former president Băsescu’s younger daughter, Elena 
Băsescu was running for the European Parliament. After an internal scandal 
in the PDL over her candidacy, at 28 years of age, and previous professional 
experience in modelling, she ran as an independent. Being a close friend with 
Minister Iacob-Ridzi, her electoral trail was usually doubled by expensive 
concerts and festivities organised by the Ministry. Elena Băsescu won 5% of 
the national votes at that election, as an independent candidate, and after the 
results were public she was welcomed back in PDL, by Monica Iacob-Ridzi 
and Elena Udrea. Some of the kickbacks recorded in the tenure of the 
Minister of Youth have allegedly went on to finance the presidential campaign 
of Traian Băsescu in the fall of 2009, but the damages of 600,000 € could not 
be found in the official records.  
Finally, Elena Udrea’s involvement on both sides of the clientelistic 
machine is more straightforward. As depicted in the previous chapter, as a 
Minister of Regional Development and Tourism she deployed substantial 
financial allocations to various local strongholds of the PDL, or to those of the 
coalition partners’. In the “Microsoft” case we find an transversal clientelistic 
network, involving her husband, as a representative of her financial interests, 
her protégées from the political party, at both central level—Minister of 
Communication, Gabriel Sandu, and local party leader and mayor of Piatra 
Neamț, Gheroghe Ștefan, as well as private contractors benefiting from public 
procurement contracts. Vasile Blaga, former president of the PDL, after 
defeating Elena Udrea in internal elections is also alleged to be a beneficiary 
of the kickbacks obtained by Gabriel Sandu, and then redistributed to the 
party organization. According to testimonies, Blaga’s failed electoral campaign 
for the Bucharest City Hall, in 2008. He went on to be Internal Affairs Minister 
in the same cabinet as Elena Udrea, and Gabriel Sandu.  
Some of the highest kick-backs from public procurement contracts are 
predictably recorded at the central level, where budgetary capacity is bigger. 
What distinguishes cases of corruption from clientelistic components in our 
case study is the fact that the latter have a specific political usage—generally 
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assessed based on the involved parties’ own statements. According to official 
transcripts of the National Anticorruption Agency, former country manager for 
Fujitsu Siemens Romania made an official statement in court mentioning that 
former and current dignitaries, and high party officials were taking bribes from 
public contracts for personal or political usage. These bribes were requested 
by party officials, in support of former president Basescu’s presidential 
election in 2009, which he won. The denouncements were against the 
husband of the former Minister of Regional Development and Tourism Elena 
Udrea—approximately 9 mil. €, the former Minister of Communications and 
Information Society, Gabriel Sandu—2.7 mil. €, and incumbent mayor of 
Piatra Neamt municipality, Gheorghe Stefan—3,996,360 €. All denounced 
recipients of the bribes were high-ranking members of the PDL. All of the 
political actors in this network are currently imprisoned. 
 Both at the local, and national elections, the risk of judicial 
investigations seem to outweighed the benefits of resource accumulation 
through donations from private contractors. Electoral success is influenced in 
a positive manner by long-standing informal distributional channels. Still, such 
channels consolidate the power of local leaders, rather than the central party 
leadership. The local political organizations are the main beneficiaries of 
political allocations, and local leaders are careful to fuel the party networks, 
especially in the case of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). This is one of the 
main reasons why the electoral success of this party is outstanding from other 
regional counterparts, as well as Romanian competitors. Still, right-wing ruling 
parties (e.g. PDL, PNL) have managed to achieve an important territorial 
penetration through political allocations while in power.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the evidence on how clientelistic channels of 
resource distribution fuel local party organization, thus stabilizing a cartel 
party and anchoring it in society. Whether it is through central budgetary 
transfers, political allocations, or developmental projects, the captured state 
delivers to the local governments the necessary resources to maintain the 
clientelistic system in the territory. Furthermore, I show here how public 
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procurement contracts are subsequently used to finance the party 
organization as the beneficiaries become party donors.  
 There are two elements that distinguish the present thesis from 
previous studies on state capture or proprietary use of public resources. 
Firstly, I show here that it is predominantly the electoral or organizational 
goals that determine political allocations, and not personal gains. I trace most 
of kick-backs and profits from extractive practices back to campaign financing 
and party organizations. This is not to say that corruption is not part of such 
mechanisms of extraction as those described here, but rather that the access 
to public resources, and preferential distribution are set up by cartel parties 
primarily to deploy in a systematic manner clientelistic exchanges.  
Secondly, I show that the electoral efficiency of clientelistic exchanges 
is clear only in: the case of small local communities, or the case of larger LGs 
(i.e. county) with continuity in office. The explanation for the latter is that the 
informal distribution of goods and services needs time to consolidate and 
become referential to the electorate. Nevertheless, through the clientelistic 
resources described here (e.g. budgetary expenditures, public works, 
housing, infrastructure) the patron party develops a presence and recognition 
at the local level that anchors it in society. Even if the electoral outcome is not 
a win, the clientelistic system ensures its continuous presence in the territory 
and in the legislative bodies at the local level. Thus, as this thesis argues, the 
clientelistic exchanges help stabilize a cartel party in the post-communist 
setting.  
Given that the puzzle addressed in this thesis is the electoral stability of 
the main Romanian political parties, the metric normally used to measure 
party strength is mainly that of voter support at the ballot box. It is 
nevertheless difficult to draw a direct and convincing causal arrow from the 
choices of individual voters to party success (or failure). The key indicator of 
political survival is indeed winning elections, but I also argue that cartel 
political parties with roots in society (maintained mainly via clientelistic 
linkages), can also survive electoral cycles in opposition. The evidence in the 
Romanian case study supports this proposition, as we can see that cartel 
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outsiders do not indeed manage to survive successive electoral cycles, 
especially if they are not in power. Whether this is due to the lack of access to 
public resources, or the fact that they do not engage with informal linkages is 
besides the point. The Romanian context shows the wider significance of the 
cartel-plus-clientelism survival strategy: not only winning elections, but also 
(and more importantly) creating resilience on the long term and a semblance 
of partisan support.  
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Conclusion 
Contribution to the Existing Literature 
The topic of this thesis is the symbiosis between cartel parties and 
clientelism in post-communist Europe. There is a striking puzzle in the case of 
these new democracies, as despite their high instability after transition, we 
find their party systems relatively stable decades later. While the gradual 
process of consolidation might be seen as a partial answer, we have to 
account for the fact that political parties here faced numerous challenges at 
the time of their formation (e.g. scarce territorial presence, high electoral 
volatility, legislative and institutional engineering). The research question 
addressed here is therefore: how can a stable party system emerge in a 
post-communist setting given the weakness of mass mobilization? 
 The argument of this thesis is that there are 2 layers of stabilization 
whose contingency we need to account for. The first layer of stabilization is 
similar to most of the contemporary democracies: political cartelization. In the 
face of organizational challenges, parties aim to survive through collusion and 
state penetration (i.e. cartel party thesis). The existing literature signals that 
cartelization however creates a different set of problems, as leaders detach 
from the lower ranks of the party (i.e. stratarchy), and outside challengers may 
arise.  
A second layer of stabilization can thus ensure the survival of cartel 
parties: clientelistic distribution of goods and services. Clientelism can act as 
a facilitating factor both for the establishment of the cartel, and its survival. 
Clientelistic linkages provide a further layer of stabilization in the party system, 
as they compensate the weakening or poorly developed roots in society. Due 
to the simultaneous development of the party system and the public 
administration in CEE, the party-state interpenetration achieved through 
cartelization can often lead to state capture, thus fueling clientelistic channels 
of informal distribution on a larger scale than in western democracies.  
The present thesis makes a contribution to two main fields in the 
academic literature: party politics and public administration. It is the argument 
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of the present study that informal linkage mechanisms like party patronage 
and clientelistic exchanges can not be fully understood if explored under the 
conceptual framework of either field alone. Under a process of party-state 
interpenetration, administrative functions and political interests become part of 
the same linkage mechanisms.  
 There are certain gaps in the existing party politics literature that this 
study has tried to fill. Firstly, this thesis engages with the framework of the 
cartelization process. Its main limitation is that the model was developed on 
the basis of case studies from Northern European democracies. It did not 
address the issue of how sustainable cartel parties are on the long term, and 
it was not widely applied or tested in the context of new democracies. In terms 
of theory confirmation, this thesis shows that the cartel party model does 
indeed apply to Central and Eastern European parties, as it does to their 
Western counterparts. More importantly, it traces the circumstances under 
which the cartelization process can increase their stability. 
The contemporary political parties are subjected to numerous 
contingent challenges from the moment of their formation and throughout their 
subsequent evolution. Not only are there notable differences between the old 
and new democracies, but additional contextual differences shape the 
evolution of political organizations within the set of cases of new democracies, 
and even within party systems. The empirical contributions from the party 
politics literature have had a limited coverage of these contingencies, and how 
certain phenomena like cartelization and clientelism relate differently to one 
another in the setting of post-communist democracies. Therefore, the present 
thesis adds to the literature by generating new empirical evidence on Central 
and Eastern European party politics. Based on a comparative analysis of CEE 
party systems, and an in-depth analysis of the case study of Romania, I test 
the roles fulfilled by informal mechanisms in a post-communist context. 
The literature on political parties in Europe has developed ample 
comparative studies on the formal traits of party organizations (e.g. party 
membership, territorial coverage). What is has not managed to do in a 
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systematic manner is to give us an understanding of the impact or effects of 
informal traits (e.g. clientelistic linkages, patronage appointments) on party 
organizations. Does clientelism harm or help the political parties that deploy 
it? To answer such a question, researchers first need a better conceptual 
framing of the clientelistic phenomena, with both its strengths and 
weaknesses as a survival strategy.  
The main limitation of the existing literature on clientelism is that it is 
generally studied as a stand-alone political phenomenon, and little attention 
has been given to its role in the overall evolution of political party 
organizations. The present thesis makes a theoretical contribution by arguing 
that clientelism is not only an informal means of electoral mobilization, but 
(can be) a system of anchoring political parties in society, and within the state 
(when they no longer have the capacity to do so). We can thus assess how 
clientelism helps, when it does indeed help, political organizations.  
Since Linz and Stepan’s 1996 benchmark study on the transition to 
democracy and consolidation challenges, there has been an ensuing plethora 
of studies on this topic. One of the key issues in the European post-
communist democracies has been that of managing the extensive public 
resources of the former communist state (see an early coverage of the issue 
in Stark and Bruszt 1998). The privatization process in itself offered ample 
opportunities for state capture, but more importantly the party-state 
interpenetration and proprietary use of public resources survived the 
transition. This allowed major political parties to develop both cartelization and 
clientelism in a systematic manner. The informal networks evolved and 
consolidated simultaneously with the new administrative systems.  
The present thesis has showed the mechanisms through which 
informal networks of capture (through cartelization) and redistribution (through 
clientelism) contribute to the political survival of major parties. Still, there are 
unaccounted for effects on the party system as whole and the quality of 
democracy. Neither cartelization, nor clientelism contribute to the core 
premises of democracy such as: political competition, accountability, 
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representativeness. In addition to this, the contemporary context places an 
additional burden on the democratic systems in Central and Eastern Europe 
as the electorate is widely disengaged and disenchanted. Either at the hands 
of cartels, or anti-establishment parties, “the idea that democracy is 
backsliding in East-Central Europe is fast becoming consensus view” 
(Dawson and Hanley 2016: 21). 
There is an intrinsic link between the quality of democracy and the 
quality of governance in any democratic country. As the quality of governance 
decreases or is low to begin with (as in the case of post-communist European 
democracies), the appeal of clientelism is higher. People can thus get a 
chance to timely access goods and services that they otherwise would not, 
given poor administrative capacity. But, the occurrence of informal practices 
does not only have a corrosive effect on state capacity, it also affects 
democratic practices and accountability relationships.  
Based on the case study of Romania that has been covered in-depth in 
this thesis, I argue that the corrosive effects of informal linkages on 
democracy are twofold. Firstly, the principal-agent relationship is inversed. 
Cartelization disengages the party as an agent of either internal (i.e. party 
members) or external (i.e. voters) principals. In turn, through its characteristic 
conditionality, clientelism makes the beneficiaries of patronage (both within 
and outside the party ranks) become agents of the politicians, tasked with 
ensuring effective electoral mobilization and support.  
Secondly, the social contract that should guide the relationship 
between the parties in office and the citizens becomes void of meaning. In a 
context where both state capture and clientelism are deployed at large, the 
core social relationship is not with the state, but with the political elites able to 
fuel informal exchanges. A wide variety of personalistic and preferential 
relationships thus structure social interactions. This affects the electoral 
process that is no longer driven by accountability and representativeness, but 
by the promise of inclusion in a particularistic benefits system. Nevertheless, 
such particularism in accessing public goods or services is not solely linked to 
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informal exchanges, as many public policies can be designed to be similarly 
restrictive or preferential. In a global context of rising inequalities and 
economic disparities, informal exchanges are not the only culprit that 
menaces the quality of democracy.   
The clientelistic practices that appear in the Romanian case study 
could be regarded as a low quality, but functional form of democratic 
representation. Firstly, as mentioned before, the context of poor 
institutionalization and consolidation made for a poor administrative capacity 
throughout the transition period and even afterwards. Clientelistic exchanges 
compensated for these state weaknesses, even if they also prevented them to 
improve. Secondly, informal exchanges that reach out into society 
compensate the detachment that cartel parties usually have, allowing a 
mutual engagement and communication of needs. This is an essential 
contribution to the quality of democracy, as in the absence of stable linkages 
between the state and society (mediated by representative parties), 
democracies become vulnerable to instability and takeover (Innes 2002 in 
Tavits 2005:283). Thirdly, within a cartel-plus-clientelism situation, at least 
some of the captured public resources find their way back to the citizens 
(conditional upon political support). 
Clientelistic linkages play an essential role in connecting cartel parties 
with the electorate. By developing or maintaining roots in society for political 
organizations, clientelistic exchanges ensure their long-term survival. In the 
absence of large-scale, inclusive informal redistribution mechanisms, cartel 
political parties remain state-oriented, and lose over successive cycles their 
grassroots presence. 
The empirical evidence collected in this thesis shows that even when 
clientelistic linkages fail to deliver electoral victories to the local or national 
political patrons, they nevertheless fulfill an important role of consolidating 
local organizations. Given the process of cartelization, political parties have 
the leverage (e.g. political algorithms of appointments) to continue to obtain 
supporters’ loyalty through conditional benefits.   
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By analyzing appointments in the civil service and funding allocations 
from the public budget, this thesis also contributes to the field of public 
administration. The empirical evidence collected in this project helps us see 
that clientelistic distribution of goods and services is based on networks of 
loyal appointees in key positions of the state apparatus (i.e. party patronage). 
It is through institutional analysis (e.g. civil service regulation, administrative 
architecture, budgetary ceilings) that we can link public appointments and 
political interests (i.e. politicization). Thus, the objects of the present 
investigation are public institutions, as much as party organizations.  
Chapters 2 and 3 show how administrative measures influence party 
politics (e.g. prerogatives of local governments, party regulation, electoral 
legislation), while chapters 4 and 5 show how political interests shape 
administrative functions (e.g. appointments in public institutions). Finally, in 
chapter 6 we see the full spectrum of the party-state interpenetration, as 
public money can be traced from central government structures, to local 
governments, to private contractors, and back to political patrons, as party 
donations. To my knowledge, there is no other study to date that has covered 
the full political process involved in deploying clientelistic exchanges.   
Relevance of the Empirical Findings 
The present research furthers our understanding on the utility of informal 
linkages and their contingency. I will briefly go through the relevance of the 
main findings from each section of this thesis.  
While structured as an in-depth case study research on the intertwining 
of two political phenomena (i.e. cartelization and clientelism), the present 
thesis also contains a comparative section. It is designed to establish the 
baseline of the development of cartelization and the deployment of informal 
linkages (e.g. clientelistic exchanges, patronage) in Central and Eastern 
European democracies. Chapter 2 reveals how post-communist European 
countries provided a favorable context to the (further) development of informal 
linkage mechanisms: the political parties faced organizational challenges, and 
the institutional context was permissive.  
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Clientelism becomes an effective tool for developing and maintaining 
roots in society when political parties had little time to develop territorial 
networks and mobilization capacity. The context of post-communist countries 
presents distinctive conditions for clientelistic linkages. Multi-party systems in 
these countries have reappeared/developed suddenly, at the same time as 
the democratic governing system. Consequently, the party-state 
interpenetration has been more profound, building upon previous legacies (i.e. 
Communist party-state), as well as these transitional circumstances.  
Given the cartelization process, political actors were permanently 
tapped into the state resources (e.g. policy favors, public goods and services), 
and these resources were in themselves much more abundant than in 
Western democracies, given the centralist/nationalist economic model of the 
previous regime. A much more substantial property share was in the hands of 
the state, at the time of the transition, in post-communist democracies than in 
any of the Western democracies at the time. Clientelism developed in this 
context much more systematically than in older democracies, mirroring an 
institutional system of redistribution. The wealth of the state allowed for a 
bigger flow of resources to be distributed through informal channels, and thus 
contributed to the survival of a cartel party system. Its reliance on state 
resources makes it inherently unstable when the institutional context is less 
permissive for state capture (e.g. Western democracies). In contrast, in the 
setting of post-communist new democracies, we find high levels of patronage, 
as well as clientelistic linkages.  
Chapter 3 is the first section of the in-depth case study of the 
Romanian party system and its informal linkage mechanisms. It looks at the 
main political parties, their genesis, subsequent evolution and internal party 
power distribution. Most of their current challenges are similar to those of 
established parties in the old democracies (e.g. decreasing party 
membership, narrowing policy space) and favor the process of cartelization. 
But, CEE parties also faced specific challenges of their own: “weak societal 
roots of parties do not allow for party identification or voter alignment, the 
unclear patterns of competition make the policy dimension not very relevant, 
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and the lack of elite continuity reduces leadership continuity” (Gherghina 
2015:3). How have party systems in post-communist Europe nevertheless 
managed to achieve a relatively high level of stability, given their inherent 
weaknesses? Cartelization supported by clientelistic networks (both within the 
party organization and outside it) offer parties this stability in the Romanian 
case.   
Another relevant aspect revealed in this chapter is that there is 
variation across parties in Romania. The main successor party (PSD) had 
from the beginning a much stronger territorial presence than any of the other 
parties. Its competitive advantage was diminished after the spread of 
clientelistic exchanges across parties in office: whoever controlled state 
resources managed to develop a territorial presence. This is significant 
because we find that the complementarity between cartelization and 
clientelism holds both for parties with preexisting organizations that they need 
to maintain, and for parties with no preexisting organizations, which they need 
to develop.  
With weakening mass mobilization, the access to and control of public 
resources is the determining factor in building the local branches. Clientelistic 
linkages are deployed within the party organizations—from central or local 
elites to members and activists, and within society—from central or local elites 
to voters and supporters. Another relevant aspect here is that local leaders 
who control enough resources to fuel their local networks do not seek  
autonomy from central leadership (i.e. stratarchy), but try to impose their will 
on the national leadership (e.g. MP nominations for national elections, seats 
in the Leadership Forum). In this aspect, clientelism might empower 
competition to party leadership from within its ranks. But, as we see in the 
following sections, local leaders remain largely dependent on central transfers 
to fuel their networks, and the internal party hierarchy is usually maintained, 
with a higher inclusiveness than prescribed initially in the cartel party thesis.    
 Chapter 4 brings presents the values for Romania of the Index of Party 
Patronage (IPP) (Volintiru 2015 in Kopecky et al 2016). This was an original 
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data compilation by the author, based on a previously developed methodology 
(i.e. Kopecky et al 2012), which added the new observation/case study of 
Romania to the overall Index. Given the background analysis of contextual 
and organizational factors that favour informal linkages, it is not surprising that 
Romania scores the second biggest overall value in Europe, surpassed only 
by Greece. Relevant to the present analysis is the variation across policy 
sectors, with economic, media and health sectors being perceived as having 
the biggest levels of party appointees. These sectors are indeed good 
anchors for clientelistic mobilization, as in the Romanian case they 
concentrate both material resources and regulatory powers that can serve 
cartel parties. 
 Another relevant empirical finding in this chapter is the comparative 
analysis of the appointment procedures for all Senior Service positions in 
Romania (i.e. General Secretaries, Deputy General Secretaries and 
Governmental Inspectors, Prefects and Underprefects). Firstly, there is a 
sharp increase in the number of appointment and dismissals in these 
functions in electoral years, suggesting that new governments systematically 
appoint their own people in civil service positions. The highest turnover is for 
the category of Prefects and Underprefects who are governmental 
representatives in the territory. Furthermore, this chapter presents an in-depth 
investigation of the mechanisms that allow parties in office to exert political 
patronage over Senior Civil Service positions, such as temporary 
appointments, mobility provisions. These findings allow us to grasp the 
mechanisms through which the political dominates the administrative in terms 
of personnel appointments. Relevant is not only the will of the political patrons 
to have loyal people on the ground (e.g. Prefects and Underprefects), but also 
the opportunities for patronage embedded in the institutional framework (e.g. 
legislative provisions).  
Chapter 5 develops the subject of appointments in the Senior Civil 
Service further through a comparative analysis of the Ministries with the 
highest personnel turnover within the period of analysis (2005-2013). The 
purpose of this comparison is to identify: variation across Ministers and 
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Cabinets, stakes in controlling each of these institutions, and what is the 
connection between patrons and appointees (i.e. career pathway analysis).   
Targeted public resources differ from one ministry to another. This 
analysis is relevant because it allows us to move beyond the fact that every 
institution of the Central Government has a range of public contracts it can 
attribute to private contractors, and the personnel has higher salaries than in 
most of the other public institutions. As the findings show, the real stakes of 
controlling these institutions tend to lie with their regulatory capacity (e.g. 
Ministry of Environment), subordinate agencies and companies (e.g. Ministry 
of Economics) or electoral role (e.g. Ministry of Internal Affairs).   
Chapter 6 shows the full process of party-state interpenetration, 
clientelistic distribution of benefits, and electoral outcomes. The argument of 
this thesis is that clientelism is as much an electoral resource, as an 
organizational one—it contributes to the survival of cartel parties by 
developing territorial organizations and roots in society. The capital transfers 
from the Central Government to the Local Governments exemplify the 
mechanisms through which clientelistic networks consolidate local party 
organizations. Public procurement to private contractors who are also party 
donors shows the mechanisms through which clientelistic networks help 
finance cartel parties.   
The premises of the present thesis have been largely confirmed by 
political events that occurred after the studied period. Firstly, the 2016 
national elections reconfirmed the advantage of the major political parties 
employing a cartel-plus-clientelism model: the Social Democrats (PSD) won a 
sweeping majority in Parliament, followed by the merger of the other two main 
political parties (i.e. National Liberals and Liberal Democrats merged in 2014 
under the name of PNL). Secondly, their reliance on party-state 
interpenetration was confirmed by the ruling coalition’s move to decriminalize 
conflict of interest which is the legal term characteristic for the proprietary use 
of public resources described in Chapter 6 (e.g. proxies of the elected officials 
win public contracts). Thirdly, new parties have not managed to effectively 
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counteract the ruling majority, either in elections or in power, thus confirming 
the strength of the Romanian cartel in fending off outsiders.  
One of the limitations of the conceptual model presented here is that it 
does not account for the degree to which informal practices can be effectively 
contested or counteracted. As defection from the cartel is unlikely (see Blyth 
and Katz 2005 for the same argument), and newcomers do not have very 
good odds of surviving, the general public’s reaction seems to be the only 
avenue of contestation. The largest street protests since the ’89 Revolution 
took place at the beginning of 2017, in opposition to the easing of 
anticorruption measures. Arguably, street protests would de-stabilize the 
cartel parties, while the Romanian party system as a whole might in contrast 
benefit from a stronger opposition and more powerful check and balances. 
They did not. 
The role that the (waves of) mass mobilization to contest governmental 
(discretionary) decisions was not necessarily disruptive or threatening to the 
status quo of the main Romanian parties. While apparently the urban 
electorate of the capital city of Bucharest might not be the core electorate of 
the ruling Social Democrats, the party did in fact win the city hall of Bucharest 
with a wide majority just the previous year, in the spring of 2016. Additionally, 
PNL as the main opposition party did little by means of procedural or 
institutional measures to stand in line with the public’s position. As such, we 
can see that even if there is a critical mass of protesters and public 
contestation, the electoral results or policy output might not change. In 
contrast, the vigorous manifestations acted very much like an informal 
checking or accountability mechanism which led to the repeal of the legislative 
provisions by the very Cabinet that adopted them in the first place, in order to 
deescalate the situation. Still, it is unlikely that every funding or appointment 
decision could pass through a public scrutiny in the near future. Therefore, the 
cartel is likely to continue and thrive, as long as it maintains a wide 
redistributive function.  
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Avenues for Further Investigation 
The present thesis showed the mechanisms of resource 
extraction/accumulation via state capture, and the system of informal 
redistribution set up by Romanian political parties. As we see in Chapter 2, 
both exogenous (i.e. institutional context) and endogenous (i.e. party 
organization) variables suggest that clientelism can play a stabilizing role in 
CEE political cartels. This conceptualization is confirmed by the existing 
comparative datasets on clientelism (Democratic Accountability and Linkages 
Project (DALP), Kitschelt 2015) and on party patronage (Index of Party 
Patronage (IPP), Kopecky et al 2016). However, a systematic comparison of 
the different sequences of the clientelistic system is yet to be realized. I 
believe that this research lays the foundation for such an analysis, by 
conceptualizing the relationship between cartel parties and clientelism in CEE, 
and also by disentangling the relational and environmental mechanisms 
involved in the process.  
Therefore, as an avenue of further investigation, I would propose such 
a structured comparison over a larger set of cases from CEE on certain key 
aspects: (1) Party Organizational Challenges (i.e. party system vulnerabilities, 
internal balance of power, changes over time) (2) Appointments in key 
positions (i.e. institutional appointment procedures in Central Government, 
Senior Civil Service, and other key positions of the state apparatus), (3) Public 
Funding (i.e. regulation and trends of public funds transfers from the Central 
Government to Local Government), and its correlation to Electoral Outcomes, 
and finally (4) Party Financing (i.e. party donations—regulation, sources). The 
layers of such a structured comparison are informed by the original research 
developed in the present thesis for the case study of Romania. Without an in-
depth exploration of the way these linkage mechanisms functions within the 
state apparatus, our avenues of inquiry into cartel parties and clientelism 
would remain limited.  
A second avenue of investigation is the further analysis of linkage 
pattern variation in the present case study. The present research could inform 
a within-case comparison of the clientelistic channels of resource distribution. 
	 287	
This thesis has explored the mechanisms that link (1) cartel parties to (2) 
political appointments (i.e. party patronage and politicization), and finally to (3) 
discretionary resource allocation. The latter aspect however, can be further 
investigated. A systematic comparison of discretionary allocations to private 
contractors from all public institutions would provide us with a better 
understanding of the informal mechanisms of funding cartelized political 
parties. More specifically, the link between political appointments and 
institutional spending can be particularly revealing in the case of State Owned 
Companies and other Non-Departmental Commissions and Agencies that 
manage large budgets and/or regulatory powers.  
In conclusion, the present thesis has addressed two gaps in the 
existing literature. On one hand, it has engaged with the cartel party model, 
developing new insights in its potential variations. As it can be seen from the 
present case study of Romania, the CEE context provides ample opportunities 
for cartelization, yet leaves such parties open to the similar and indeed 
greater challenges as their Western counterparts (i.e. organizational 
weakness, challenges from new party entrants). A second layer of 
stabilization can thus be provided by clientelism, given continuous access to 
public resources (through party-state interpenetration). Therefore, this thesis 
has also addressed the existing gap in the literature regarding the role 
clientelism can play for party organizations. Based on the present research, I 
argue that the clientelistic systems of informal distribution are as much 
electoral instruments of partial mobilization, as they are means of 
organizational consolidation.  	
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Annex	1.	Romanian	Cabinets	2000-2012	
CABINET 
LEADER PERIOD GOVERNING PARTIES 
Adrian Năstase 2000 (28, December) – 2004 (29, December) (elections) 
Social Democrats: PDSR 
(renamed PSD), PSDR (which 
merged into the PSD in 2001), 
30 portfolios; Conservatives: 
PUR (renamed PC) until 2002, 1 
portfolio  
Călin Popescu-
Tăriceanu (I) 2004 (29, December) - 2007 (5, April) 
National Liberals: PNL, 6 
portfolios; Democrats: PD 
(renamed PDL), 6 portfolios; 
Hungarian Union: UDMR, 1 
portfolio; Conservatives: PUR 
(renamed PC), 1 portfolio 
Călin Popescu-
Tăriceanu (II) 
2007 (5, April) – 2008 (28, December) 
(elections) 
National Liberals: PNL, 12 
portfolios; Hungarian Union: 
UDMR, 3 portfolios; 
Emil Boc (I) 2008 (22, December) – 2009 (23, December) 
Liberal Democrats: PDL, 9 
portfolios; Social Democrats: 
PSD, 8 portfolios 
Emil Boc (II) 2009 (23, December) – 2012 (9, February) 
Liberal Democrats: PDL, 8 
portfolios; Hungarian Union: 
UDMR, 3 portfolios; National 
Union for Romania’s 
Progress: UNPR, 1 portfolio 
Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu 2012 (9, February) – 2012 (27, April) 
Liberal Democrats: PDL, 9 
portfolios; National Union for 
Romania’s Progress: UNPR, 2 
portfolios; Hungarian Union: 
UDMR, 4 portfolios; 
Victor Ponta (I) 2012 (27, April) =2012 (9, December) (elections) 
Social Democrats: PSD, 6 
portfolios; National Liberals: 
PNL, 8 portfolios; 
Conservatives: PC, 1 portfolio 
